Essays on Information in Macroeconomics and Finance: by Struby, Ethan
Persistent link: http://hdl.handle.net/2345/bc-ir:107371
This work is posted on eScholarship@BC,
Boston College University Libraries.
Boston College Electronic Thesis or Dissertation, 2017
Copyright is held by the author, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise noted.
Essays on Information in
Macroeconomics and Finance:
Author: Ethan Struby
Boston College
Morrissey College of Arts and Sciences
Graduate School
Department of Economics
ESSAYS ON INFORMATION IN MACROECONOMICS AND FINANCE
a dissertation
by
ETHAN STRUBY
submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
May 2017
c© copyright by ETHAN STRUBY
2017
Essays on Information in Macroeconomics and
Finance
by
ETHAN STRUBY
Dissertation Committee:
RYAN CHAHROUR (Chair)
PETER IRELAND
SUSANTO BASU
Abstract
Expectations formation is central to macroeconomics. Households, firms, and policymakers must
form expectations not only about fundamentals, but about what other agents’ beliefs are, because
others’ beliefs will determine their actions. The three essays in this dissertation examine empirically
and theoretically how agents use both public and private information to form expectations. The first
two essays combine a models of optimizing behavior and forecasting with data on the macroecon-
omy, financial prices, and macroeconomic forecasts to examine the extent to which economic agents
learn about the macroeconomy from financial prices and monetary policy actions. The third essay
examines theoretically how members of a committee use public and private information to form
beliefs when they care both about having accurate forecasts and coordinating actions with others.
All three essays emphasize that frictions in expectations formation are a salient feature of the world,
and understanding the extent and importance of those frictions is important for both positive and
normative questions in macroeconomics and finance.
Beliefs about the future determine the willingness of financial market participants to save and
invest, and theory suggests they should value more highly assets which are expected to pay higher
returns during recessionary periods when consumption is otherwise low. Hence, financial prices
reflect macroeconomic expectations. In the first essay, titled Macroeconomic Disagreement in
Treasury Yields, I explore how agents with idiosyncratic, private information form beliefs about
both the macroeconomy and the beliefs of other agents. Using data on United States Treasury
debt, the macroeconomy, and individual inflation forecasts, I estimate the precision of bond traders’
information about the macroeconomy and how much they disagree with each other. I allow for
traders to learn both from private signals and from asset prices, which aggregate the beliefs of all
the traders in the market. I find that bond prices are moderately informative about macroeconomic
variables, but are the source of most of the information traders have about monetary policy and
the beliefs of others. In contrast to studies which assume full information, risk premia are much
less important than slow-adjusting interest rate expectations for explaining the behavior of long-run
yields. The most important signal for bond traders appears to be the Federal Reserve’s short-run
rate, which encodes information about the macroeconomy and the central bank’s intended future
policy. Nevertheless, the fact that traders held disparate beliefs about the macroeconomy, and
especially about the long-run inflation target of the Federal Reserve, elevated long-term yields on
average.
The first essay demonstrates empirically that financial market participants learn about the macroe-
conomy from monetary policy actions. However, it is silent on how monetary policymakers form
beliefs about the macroeconomy, or how the information in monetary policy rates endogenously af-
fects macroeconomic outcomes. In the second essay Your Guess is as Good as Mine: Central
Bank Information and Monetary Policy, I use data on private sector forecasts and forecasts
from the Federal Reserve Board staff to examine the typical assumption of common information
between firms and monetary policymakers. Using forecasts from a survey of professional forecasters
and from the Federal Reserve Board staff, I show evidence against the typical assumption of common
information between monetary policymakers and the private sector, and also that policymakers are,
at best, only weakly better at forecasting than private forecasters. Based on this evidence, I augment
an otherwise standard monetary policy model by relaxing the common information assumption. In-
stead, I assume there is idiosyncratic, private information among price-setting firms, and between
firms and the central banker. Firms combine private information about aggregate conditions with
the observed monetary policy rate to form expectations about fundamentals and the beliefs of rival
firms. The central banker must form expectations about firms’ beliefs because those beliefs will
determine inflation and overall economic activity. But as a result of their differences in information
sets, firms must form expectations about other firms’ expectations, and what the central banks’
expectations of their expectations are. I examine the ability of this model to fit the data and find
that the model can capture features of both firm and central bank inflation expectations, but in
the absence of imperfect information among households, it is difficult to simultaneously match the
forecast data and data on real activity. This result points to the sensitivity of models with dispersed
information to the underlying assumptions about how central bankers will respond to exogenous
shocks.
The second chapter emphasized how the assumptions economists make regarding monetary pol-
icymakers’ information is critical for understanding their actions. Motivated by this example, my
third chapter Information Investment in a Coordination Game explores theoretically how
members of a committee who are uncertain about others’ beliefs decide on a binary action, and how
their decision to pay close attention to public or private signals is related to their desire to accu-
rately forecast versus coordinating their behavior with others. I show that when it is assumed that
information decisions among committee members are symmetric - everyone pays the same amount
of attention to the same things - there is a unique outcome of the coordination game. However, I
further show that it is difficult to guarantee that committee members will all choose a symmetric
allocation of information. Aside from the direct cost of acquiring better information, allocating
attention to more accurate signals can harm welfare when coordination motives are dominant. In a
set of numerical exercises, however, I show that it is possible for a unique equilibrium to exist, and
that actions that do not have a large impact on the payoffs of committee members (such as changing
the size of the committee) may nevertheless have large impacts on the accuracy of the committee’s
forecasts. This suggests a possible tension between the welfare of the committee, which benefits
from consensus, and the welfare of those affected by the committee’s actions, which likely depends
on whether the committee takes the objectively correct action.
My dissertation has important implications for both academic economists and policymakers. Un-
derstanding the sources of business cycle fluctuations and the determinants of asset prices requires
grappling with the fact that people have differences in beliefs. Empirical evidence suggests that
agents’ beliefs are shaped by both idiosyncratic forces and by public announcements and policy
decisions, and economists’ models need to reflect these features of the world. Policy, too, is affected
by the information available to policymakers, and to understand how policymakers have acted in
the past and should act in the future, it is necessary to take seriously the ways their belief formation
deviates from the full information rational expectations benchmark.
To Joules
and in memory of my mother, Marsha
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Chapter 1
Macroeconomic Disagreement in Treasury
Yields
1
Abstract
I estimate an affine term structure model of Treasury yields featuring idiosyncratic, private infor-
mation about macroeconomic and policy conditions. The estimation uses data on U.S. long-term
bond yields and inflation forecasts to identify the precision of bond traders’ information and their
degree of disagreement. The results imply: (1) Bond prices are moderately informative about the
macroeconomy, but very informative about policy and others’ beliefs (2) Bond traders’ beliefs are
still dispersed despite a large number of endogenous public signals (3) The short term interest rate
is more informative than other interest rates (4) Accounting for agents’ learning dynamics dramati-
cally reduces the magnitude and volatility of risk premia relative to a full information benchmark.
Overall, I find that the failure of common knowledge adds an average of 60 basis points to ten
year yields, with most time variation in this wedge attributable to disagreement about the Federal
Reserve’s inflation target.
I gratefully acknowledge advice and suggestions from Susanto Basu, Ryan Chahrour, and Peter Ireland at every
stage. Thanks also to Rosen Valchev, Dongho Song, Michael Connolly, and Giacomo Candian, seminar participants
at the FDIC, the SEC, and Carleton College, and participants at the Boston College Macro Lunch and dissertation
workshop.
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1.1 Introduction
Professional forecasters generally disagree about the evolution of the macroeconomy. Survey evidence
reveals that even during normal times, there is nontrivial disagreement about what inflation will
be in the current quarter (figure 1.1). How does macroeconomic disagreement affect the price of
long-term assets? And what can the dynamics of asset prices reveal about beliefs? Accounting for
differences in beliefs may affect our assessment of the causes of bond price fluctuations; whether
we care about bond prices for their own sake, to evaluate the effects of policy, or to inform the
implications of equilibrium models, it is important to understand the process of belief formation that
determines bond prices. Furthermore, understanding what asset prices tell us about the information
financial market participants have can help us assess the empirical plausibility of more structural
macroeconomic models with dispersed beliefs.
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Figure 1.1: Distribution of forecasts from the SPF of current-quarter inflation as measured by
change in the log GDP deflator.
To answer these questions, I estimate an affine term structure model (ATSM) of Treasury yields,
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where short term interest rates and macroeconomic variables are described by a structural vector au-
toregression. I relax the usual assumption in the asset pricing literature that agents share a common
information set. Instead, I assume their information is dispersed: bond traders optimally combine
noisy, idiosyncratic signals with the prices they observe to form expectations. Because they care
about other traders’ (unobserved) beliefs, they must form expectations of not only fundamentals, but
also expectations about others’ expectations, and about others’ expectations of others’ expectations,
etc. To account for this “forecasting the forecasts of others” problem, the model solution is cast
in terms of a fixed point problem between the evolution of agents’ beliefs about the macroeconomy
and the prices used to form those beliefs. I estimate the model on U.S. data from Q41971-Q42007,
including data on individual forecasts from professional forecasters to discipline the belief of agents
in the model.
The estimated model allows me to quantify the sources of agents’ information. My estimates
imply roughly half of what bond traders know about macroeconomic factors (deviations of inflation
from the Federal Reserve’s implicit target and the output gap) comes from observing asset prices,
rather than their private information. Asset prices are more informative about policy risks - here,
risks related to the inflation target - and are the source of nearly everything traders know about
the beliefs of others. The price most informative for agents in that of one-period bonds, which is
determined in the model by a Taylor-type rule. The short rate, combined with agents’ idiosyncratic
information contains nearly all the information agents have about fundamentals and others’ beliefs,
with longer yields adding only small fraction of additional information. The importance of the policy
rate in expectations formation adds to growing evidence of a signaling channel of monetary policy
(for example, Melosi (2017), Tang (2013)).
I use the estimated model to understand the determinants of bond prices. Because agents’ ex-
pectations about others’ expectations (“higher order” expectations) differ from average expectations
about fundamentals, prices differ from those that would obtain if traders counterfactually held com-
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mon beliefs. The difference is a wedge directly attributable to dispersed information. I find that
this higher order wedge plays a direct role in yields; on average, it contributed 60 basis points to ten
year yields over the sample period. In my setting, this wedge can be meaningfully decomposed into
components driven by different macroeconomic variables. I find that the majority of time variation
in the wedge for long-term debt is attributable to changes in higher-order beliefs about monetary
policy, particularly, policymakers’ long-run inflation target.
After estimating the model, I decompose yields into average expected short rates over the life
of the bond (the “expectations hypothesis” component), the higher order wedge, and “classical”
compensation for risk. The model attributes the vast majority of movement in long-term yields
to rate expectations which adjust slowly relative to what a full information version of the model
would suggest. This is a consequence of traders’ inference problem; they attribute some changes
in fundamentals to noise in their idiosyncratic signals, and they misattribute transitory shocks to
extremely persistent changes in the Federal Reserve’s inflation target. This suggest much of the
“excess sensitivity” of long term yields to short-term macroeconomic news (noted by Gurkaynak
et al. (2005)) is attributed by the model to violations of the auxiliary assumption of full information
rational expectations. “Classical” risk premia are estimated to be quite small and nearly constant
across all maturities, in sharp contrast to their full information counterparts.
The dispersed information affine term structure model is builds on the work of Barillas and
Nimark (2015). They assume yields are driven by three latent factors in the yield curve and identify
rate expectations using interest rate forecasts. They find a somewhat larger role for the higher
order wedge in explaining yields. In contrast to their latent factor approach, I explicitly model the
relationship between short rates, macroeconomic variables, financial risk, and monetary policy. I
particularly generalize the structural VAR of Ireland (2015) to incorporate dispersed information. In
the model, the central bank is assumed to set an inflation target, and to set short rates in response
to deviations from that target, the output gap, and changes in risk premia. The dynamics of these
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fundamentals are identified using structural assumptions. Changes in market prices of risk (and thus
risk premia) are governed by changes in a single variable, consistent with Cochrane and Piazzesi
(2005) and Bauer (2016). Shocks to this variable are correlated with macroeconomic shocks, and
the level of the variable that governs movement in risk premia is allowed to affect macroeconomic
dynamics; hence, the model allows for more links between the macroeconomy and financial markets
than the estimated Taylor rules of Ang, Dong and Piazzesi (2007).
Because the model explicitly accounts for links between monetary policy and the prices of bonds,
the results shed light on the relationship between policy uncertainty and yields. This paper is
particularly related to the branch of the macro-finance literature that relates long-maturity bond
price movements to changes in the monetary policy framework. For example, Gurkaynak, Sack and
Swanson (2005) suggest incorporating learning about a (possibly time varying) long-run inflation
target can help macro-finance models explain the effect of transitory shocks on long-term bonds.
This paper extends this idea to the entire term structure. Moreover, I allow for pervasive infor-
mation frictions about macroeconomic variables, and the estimated results quantify how important
learning dynamics are for fluctuations in the prices of bonds at different maturities. My results
also complement those of Wright (2011). He estimates term premia across different countries using
both a term structure model and forecast surveys, and links declines in measured term premia to
falling inflation uncertainty due to changes in the conduct of monetary policy. In my paper, the
relationship between monetary policy and uncertainty is self-contained; dispersion of beliefs about
the level of the inflation target could be interpreted as disagreement about policymakers’ tolerance
for inflation in the long run.1 My results imply the decline in long-run yields in the United States is
explained by falling average rate expectations, driven by a decline in the Federal Reserve’s inflation
target. Moreover, higher-order beliefs about the inflation target became a smaller component of
prices of long-run debt over the course of the Great Moderation, implying that disagreement about
1Doh (2012) estimates a model where agents have a noisy signal of trend inflation, which he interprets as the
credibility of the inflation target.
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the target contributed less to yields. To the extent the target could be interpreted as the level of
inflation central bankers were perceived as being credibly able to achieve, the results of my paper
are complementary to Wright’s.
My finding of small risk premia and persistent short rate expectations, stands in contrast to
the literature that assumes bond yields are determined by full information rational expectations.
My results add to growing evidence that accounting for information frictions tends to make time
varying risk premia less important for explaining yields. Critically, the “slow” adjustment of rate
expectations holds even with optimal Bayesian learning where agents have full understanding of the
model structure and access to a large number of signals. This stands in contrast to other papers
(for example, Dewachter and Lyrio (2008)) who assume traders’ forecasts are based on a model-
inconsistent prior. Moreover, my structural results are consist with the more agnostic approach of
Piazzesi, Salomao and Schneider (2013) who construct subjective beliefs without modeling inference.
Unlike their paper, however, I am able to numerically characterize the information content of different
signals.
The findings of this paper should also be of interest to researchers working with more detailed
dynamic general equilibrium or financial models featuring information frictions. The term structure
model makes relatively modest structural and functional form assumptions. Unlike many exogenous
information models, I do not restrict agents from learning from prices they encounter (in line with
the “market consistent information” assumption advocated by Graham and Wright (2010)). The
empirical results allow me to generate estimates of the plausible degree of information dispersion
about the macroeconomy consistent with asset price movements, and of how informative prices are
for agents. Despite having less structure, the ATSM is consistent with the pricing implications of
many general equilibrium models: Barillas and Nimark (2015) show the dispersed-information ATSM
nests an equilibrium model with wealth-maximizing traders (as in Barillas and Nimark (2016)). A
number of authors have also embedded ATSM in DSGE models with the term structure (for example
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Jermann (1998), Wu (2001), Doh (2012)). A result of the estimation is that belief dispersion is
sustained and important, despite agents’ access to a large number of informative common signals.
Furthermore, the estimated results point to prices as an important source of information for agents
making investment decisions. While this feature of prices has a long intellectual history mentioned in
the next section, it has not been explored as much in the recent literature on macroeconomic models
with dispersed information. My results suggest structural macroeconomic models with dispersed
information should not ignore the role of prices, especially asset prices, as a source of information
about the macroeconomy and monetary policy.
In the next section, I discuss in more detail the relationship of this paper to the existing literature
on asset pricing, especially asset pricing with non-full information rational expectations. Section 1.3
presents some reduced-form and graphical evidence of information frictions in financial forecasts. I
outline the asset pricing side of the model, the macroeconomic VAR, and solution and estimation
strategy in sections 1.4 and 1.5. I then discuss the parameter estimates, the information content of
signals, and the model’s interpretation of the sources of yield fluctuations before concluding.
1.2 Related literature
The model in this paper is an affine term structure model that assumes the absence of arbitrage,
combined with a structural macroeconomic VAR. Although it is most closely related to the specific
model of Ireland (2015), a number of authors have estimated models combining structural macroe-
conomic elements with a no-arbitrage finance model, assuming that agents have full information
rational expectations. Ang, Dong and Piazzesi (2007) estimate Taylor rules in such a setting. Rude-
busch and Wu (2008) link yields to a dynamic New Keynesian model. Unlike these papers, I focus
on disagreement about the macroeconomy and do not assume agents have full information.
My emphasis on learning from prices means that this paper is closely related to the noisy rational
expectations literature. An influential classic in this literature is Grossman and Stiglitz (1980). The
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basic model of Grossman and Stiglitz was been extended by Hellwig (1980) and Admati (1985).
More recently, Mondria and Quintana-Domeque (2012) use rational inattention in a two-market
setup similar to Admati (1985), but where prices are endogenously noisy. Hassan and Mertens
(2014) embed the Hellwig noisy rational expectations model in a DSGE model to study the equity
premium. My model is less structural than these models to facilitate estimation while retaining a
complicated inference problem with many assets and fundamentals.
A second classic asset pricing literature, associated with Harrison and Kreps (1978), focuses on
disagreement about fundamentals but abstracts from learning. Harrison and Kreps assume there
are discrete agent types with different priors who “agree to disagree.” Institutional or financial
frictions prevent agents from making side bets which would make each type satisfied with their
positions. Hence, agents may want to pay more for an asset today in order to resell it later. This
form of heterogeneity has been used by Barsky (2009) to explain the Japanese asset bubble; Simsek
(2013) generalizes the model and shows how it can rationalize financial innovations similar to those
that emerged in the subprime mortgage market. Cao (2011) develops a dynamic version of the
Harrison and Kreps model with collateral constraints. He shows incorrect beliefs can be sustained
in equilibrium because agents “profit by speculating.” Unlike the papers in this literature, I assume
any differences in agents’ beliefs are driven by differences in observed signals. In this way, the model
in this paper is consistent with the “Harsanyi doctrine” (Harsanyi (1968)); agents will have full
information about the structure of the model and its parameters, and form expectations optimally.
Only differences in information gives rise to differences in belief.2
This paper falls primarily into the recent literature on deviations from full information rational
expectations in asset pricing. Much of this literature retains the assumption of common information
and thus ignores the “forecasting the forecasts of others” problem or assume agents are not Bayesian
learners. Piazzesi, Salomao and Schneider (2013) use forecasts to construct subjective bond risk
2Aumann (1976) points out that two agents with common priors whose posteriors are common knowledge cannot
“agree to disagree.” Here, posterior beliefs of particular agents about the state will not be common knowledge,
and thus need not be the same despite a common prior. Posterior beliefs about prices will, of course, be common
knowledge because they are commonly observed.
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premia, but they abstract from agents’ inference procedure. Piazzesi and Schneider (2007) examine
how different assumptions about information affect risk premia in a representative investor setting.
Sinha (2016) shows how adaptive learning can account for perceived failures of the expectations
hypothesis. Dewachter and Lyrio (2008) use the restrictions implied by a three-equation Dynamic
New Keynesian model to govern the evolution of macroeconomic variables that are priced in an
affine term structure model where agents have misspecified priors. Collin-Dufresne et al. (2016)
examine how Bayesian learning about parameters related to long-run risks, rare disasters, and model
uncertainty can help a general equilibrium model explain risk premia.
The asset pricing literature that allows for differences in belief tends to abstract from higher
order beliefs, the macroeconomy, or both. Giacoletti et al. (2015) also develop an arbitrage-free
term structure model with belief dispersion about the parameters that govern latent risk factors but
explicitly ignore the “forecasting the forecasts of others” problem. Colacito et al. (2016) develop
an equity pricing model that includes variance and skewness of professional forecasts, which they
treat as exogenous processes. Makarov and Rytchkov (2012) show how the state space of a dynamic
asset pricing model with dispersed information can be infinite-dimensional, and that information
asymmetries affect the time-series properties of returns. Kasa et al. (2014) solve a particular asset
pricing model with higher-order expectations in the frequency domain. Their focus is on how the
model can generate failures of tests of present value models.
Finally, this paper is related to a literature that seeks to explain the beliefs implied by forecast
surveys. Examples include Patton and Timmerman (2010), Andrade et al. (2014) and Crump et al.
(2016). Like these papers, I use the cross-section of forecasts at different horizons to help identify
agents’ belief formation, in a setting where agents are assumed to understand that macroeconomic
and financial variables are related to each other. However, I infer the beliefs of bond traders treating
both forecasts and prices as endogenous.
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Figure 1.2: Distribution of SPF forecasts of current-quarter average rate on 3-month Treasury bill.
1.3 Dispersed information: evidence from forecasts
A number of authors (such as Mankiw et al. (2004) and Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012a, 2015))
have documented evidence of information frictions using forecast data. With the exception of Coibion
and Gorodnichenko (2015), most papers have focused on inflation expectations, generally finding
average forecast errors are predictable and beliefs appear to adjust slowly to shocks. In this section,
I briefly discuss some evidence for the presence of dispersed information about the evolution of
Treasury bond prices in particular.
I take data on forecasts from the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF), a quarterly survey
originally conducted by the American Statistical Association and the NBER before being taken over
by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia in 1990. The survey is generally sent out after the first
month of each quarter (after the initial release of the National Income and Product Accounts) to a
panel of forecasters in the financial services industry, non-financial private sector, and academia.
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Figure 1.3: Full range (top) and interquartile range (bottom) of current-quarter average rate on
3-month Treasury bill.
The SPF began to survey its panel about 3-month Treasury bill rates in 1981. The 5th through
95th percentiles of the current-quarter forecasts are found in figure 1.2, and the range of forecasts
in figure 1.3. Despite the fact that the rate for a Treasury bill in the secondary market is observable
freely in real time to survey participants, there is still a fair amount of disagreement among forecasters
within the current quarter - that is to say, the forecasters surveyed in the SPF disagree about what the
average yield of Treasury bills will be over the course of the next two months. The interquartile range
of forecasts, even including the zero lower bound period where Treasury bill rates were also effectively
zero, is still nearly 20 basis points, with the overall range of forecasts often in the neighborhood of
100-200 basis points. To place these ranges in context, the yield on 3-month Treasuries was about
436 basis points between 1981-2015. From 2008-2015, the average was 24 basis points. The pictures
for one-quarter ahead forecasts, shown in appendix 1.A, are similar. The striking fact that emerges is
that the evolution of the price of an essentially risk-free asset is the subject of nontrivial disagreement
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among professional forecasters.3
To more formally test for information frictions, I adapt the empirical strategy of Coibion and
Gorodnichenko (2015) to the forecasts of bond prices in the SPF.4 For simplicity, assume Treasury
bill rates follow an AR(1) process but agents observe idiosyncratic, noisy signals about the realization
of that process.5 Innovations and signal noise are assumed to be normally distributed and mean
zero:
rt = ρrt−1 + εt with ρ ∈ [0, 1)
rit = rt + eit
Assuming agents are Bayesian learners, their conditional expectations can be written as:
Eitrt = κrit + (1− κ)Eit−1rt
Eitrt+h = ρhEitrt
Their expectation of the short rate is a weighted average of their current signal and their prior,
where κ is the relative weight placed on the signal. Anticipating notation used later, I use r(1)t|t to
indicate the average expectation of rt at time t.
Averaging across agents and rearranging gives the relationship between the forecast error for the
average forecast and the revision of the average forecast at each horizon h:
rt+h − r(1)t+h|t =
1− κ
κ
(
r
(1)
t+h|t − r(1)t+h|t−1
)
+
h∑
j=1
ρh−jεt+h (1.1)
where the error term is the sum of rational expectations errors. If signals were perfectly informative,
κ = 1, and there would be no weight on forecast revisions in this regression. To the extent agents
face information frictions, κ < 1. The simple reduced-form test of information frictions in financial
forecasts amounts to projecting forecast revisions on forecast errors; the null hypothesis of full
3Recall that under rational expectations with common information, even if that information is imperfect, forecast
distributions will be degenerate.
4Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2015) consider Treasury bill forecasts as part of their pooled regressions in a robustness
test, but do not explicitly test for information frictions using financial asset forecasts alone.
5In the model developed in the next section, prices will be endogenous objects determined by fundamentals that
agents have noisy signals about. A disconnect between the model and the results presented here is in the model
that I will assume agents view the prices of current-quarter assets without error.
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Figure 1.4: Coefficients from regression (1.2) for treasury bills. Bands represent 90 percent HAC
confidence bands.
information rational expectations is equivalent to testing whether the regression coefficient is 0.
Finding a significant positive coefficient, on the other hand, suggests information frictions. The
regression takes the form
Average Forecast Errort,h = β(Average Forecast Revision
t,t−1
t,h ) + ε¯t (1.2)
where ε¯t is the sum of rational expectations errors as before.
The results of conducting this for different forecast horizons are shown in figure 1.4 for 3-month
Treasury bills. The results are broadly consistent with Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2015)’s findings
for inflation. The estimated coefficient is positive and at least marginally significant, suggesting av-
erage forecasts for financial variables reflect dispersed information among individuals. The response
for 10 year bonds (not shown) are more mixed and have a high degree of uncertainty, probably re-
flecting the fact that the sample of available forecasts is much smaller. However, the point estimates
are consistently positive and generally significant.
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Graphical and reduced-form evidence suggests professional forecasts of macroeconomic and finan-
cial variables are inconsistent with those forecasters having full information rational expectations.
Moreover, using the mean forecast for short-maturity debt, there is a positive, significant relation-
ship between average forecast errors and average forecast revisions. This is inconsistent with full
information rational expectations, but is consistent with a world where agents face information fric-
tions.In the remainder of the paper, I explore the extent to which these facts are related and how
much this disagreement affects prices.
1.4 The dispersed information model
In this section, I outline the model of asset prices and macroeconomic dynamics used to assess the
effect of macroeconomic disagreement on prices. The asset pricing intuition and derivation in the
next subsection closely follows that of Barillas and Nimark (2015); some additional details are found
in appendix 1.B.
1.4.1 The term structure model with heterogeneous information
Intuition: the fundamental asset pricing relationship. Index bond traders by j ∈ [0, 1].
Denote Ejt xt = E[xt|Ωjt ] as the expectation conditional on j’s information set at time t (Ωjt ). Call
Ωt the “full information” information set (i.e., the history of the realizations of all variables up to
time t).
The basic asset pricing equation for a zero-coupon bond is
Pnt = Et[Mt+1Pn−1t+1 ] (1.3)
Standard results in asset pricing theory give that the nominal stochastic discount factor Mt+1 exists
and is positive if the law of one price holds and in the absence of arbitrage (Cochrane (2005)). If
we relax the common information assumption, instead assuming there are a continuum of agents
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j ∈ (0, 1) with heterogeneous information sets, the pricing relationship for each agent j is:
Pnt = E
j
t
[
M jt+1P
n−1
t+1
]
(1.4)
Two things are specific to each agent j: Information sets (Ωjt ) and stochastic discount factors (M
j
t+1).
Centralized trading means that it is common knowledge that all agents face the same prices today
and will face the same price tomorrow, while the fact that agents are atomistic implies they take
prices as given. However, allowing information sets and forecasts of future prices to differ across
agents, while assuming today’s price is common knowledge, implies (1.4) can hold with equality only
if stochastic discount factors also differ.
To decide their willingness to pay for a bond today, agents must form expectations of tomorrow’s
prices. Tomorrow’s buyers face the same problem, so the decision to purchase a bond today depends
on a conjecture about others’ (future) beliefs - that is, they face the Townsend (1983) “forecasting
the forecasts of others” problem. More specifically dispersion of information implies that asset
prices depend on “higher order expectations” - expectations of expectations.6 Assuming common
knowledge of the pricing equation, joint lognormality of prices and stochastic discount factors, and
deterministic conditional variances one can show (appendix 1.B) the log price of the bond takes the
following form:
pnt =
∫
Ejt [m
j
t+1]dj
+
∫
Ejt
[(∫
Ekt+1[mkt+2]dk +
∫
Ekt+1[pn−2t+2 ]dk
)]
dj
+ 12Var(m
j
t+1 + pn−1t+1 ) +
1
2Var(m
k
t+2 + pn−2t+2 )
(1.5)
The price of a bond in period t is a function of the average expected stochastic discount factor
in t + 1 plus the average expectation of the average SDF and price at t + 2, plus variances. Re-
peatedly recursively substituting allows us to write prices today as a function of average higher
6As alluded to in the literature review, the role of higher order beliefs in asset pricing is discussed by Allen et al.
(2006), Bacchetta and Van Wincoop (2008), and Makarov and Rytchkov (2012). Barillas and Nimark (2015)
consider the particular case of zero-coupon government debt.
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order expectations about future SDFs and variance terms.7 The model outlined below is consistent
with the assumptions made here, but puts additional structure on the stochastic discount factor;
doing so makes it easier to characterize how agents form higher order expectations and how those
expectations affect bond prices.
Short rates and higher order expectations. Let xt be a vector of exogenous factors and
conjecture that the one-period risk free rate rt is
rt = δ0 + δ′xxt (1.6)
Assume there are d elements in xt. I refer to xt as “fundamentals” or “fundamental factors.”
Fundamentals follow a VAR(1):
xt+1 = µP + FPxt + Cεt+1 (1.7)
where εt+1 ∼ N(0, I). These matrices are specified in detail in section 1.4.2.
Each period, agents observe private signals which are a linear combination of xt and an idiosyn-
cratic noise component:
xjt = Sxt +Qη
j
t (1.8)
where ηjt ∼ N(0, I) is assumed to be independent across agents. For tractability, and in keeping
with most of the dispersed information literature, I assume signal precision is the same across all
agents, fixed at all times, and common knowledge.
By the pricing equation (1.4), bond prices will be related to stochastic discount factors, which
themselves are a function of the fundamentals xt. Future stochastic discount factors will be a
function of (future) fundamentals. Combined with the fact that bond prices today are functions
of higher order expectations about stochastic discount factors, the relevant state vector will be the
7Barillas and Nimark (2015) derive more implications of this result, such as the fact that the portion of individuals’
expected excess returns due to differences in belief from the cross-sectional average must be orthogonal to public
information.
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hierarchy of average higher order expectations about fundamentals. pth order average expectations
are defined recursively as
x
(p)
t ≡
∫
E
[
x
(p−1)
t |Ωjt
]
dj
and the hierarchy of average order expectations is collected in the vector Xt:
Xt ≡

xt
x1t
...
x
(p)
t
...
x
(k¯)
t

where k¯ is the maximum level of higher order expectation considered (Nimark (2007)).8
Conjecture and verify the price of a bond takes the form
pnt = An +B′nXt + νnt (1.9)
where νnt is a maturity-specific shock, which is i.i.d. across time and maturities. Further conjecture
that Xt follows a VAR(1)
Xt+1 = µX + FXt + Cut+1 (1.10)
where ut+1 contains all aggregate shocks - the shocks to fundamentals t and the vector of price
shocks νt. Xt is a (d× (k¯ + 1))× 1 vector.
(Log) yields at time t of a zero coupon bond maturing in n periods are defined as − 1npnt where pnt
is the log price of the bond. Assume bonds up to a finite maturity n¯ are traded.9 Collect yields in
a vector yt:
yt ≡
[− 12p2t · · · − 1npnt · · · − 1n¯pn¯t ]
8I set k¯ = 15. The majority of the weight in bond prices is on the first few orders of expectation; raising the order
increases the computational burden substantially without improving the fit of the model.
9Hilscher et al. (2014) document that the vast majority of Treasury debt currently held by the public has maturity
of less than ten years. I set n¯ = 40, i.e., 10 years is the maximum traded by agents or used to form forecasts.
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Assume agents’ information sets Ωjt include the history of their private signals x
j
t , the short rate
rt and a vector of bond yields out to maturity n¯:
Ωjt =
{
xjt , rt, yt,Ω
j
t−1
}
(1.11)
Having conjectured an affine form for bond prices and exogenous information, the signals that agents
observe will be an affine function of the state. The filtering problem of an atomistic agent j has the
following state-space representation:
Xt+1 = µX + FXt + Cut+1xjtrt
yt

︸ ︷︷ ︸
zjt
= µz +DXt +R
[
ut
ηjt
]
(1.12)
I assume agents use the Kalman filter to form estimates of the state Xt. In a linear, Gaussian
setting, the Kalman filter is equivalent to recursive Bayesian updating, so this amounts to assuming
that agents use Bayes’ rule to update their predictions (Harvey (1989)). I further assume agents
have observed an infinitely long history of signals, so they use the steady state Kalman filter to
make their predictions. This standard assumption avoids the need to keep track of individual signal
histories. The matrices F , C determine how higher order expectations evolve, which depends on the
individual filtering problem of traders and the equilibrium expressions for prices. At the same time,
prices depend on the evolution of (higher order) expectations, which depends on the state transition
matrices F , C. Hence, we first take the bond price equations as given to derive the law of motion,
and then show the law of motion is consistent with our conjecture for prices.
The details of the bond trader’s Kalman filtering problem are in appendix 1.B.2. The filtering
problem, aggregating across traders, implies a fixed point expression for F and C (appendix equation
(1.42)).
SDFs and bond prices. To derive an expression for prices, I need to explicitly model the stochas-
tic discount factor of bond traders. As is common in the Gaussian affine term structure literature,
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I assume stochastic discount factors are “essentially affine” as in Duffee (2002). The log stochastic
discount factor is assumed to take the form:
mjt+1 = −rt −
1
2Λ
j′
t ΣaΛ
j
t − Λj′t ajt+1 (1.13)
In the above expression, Λj′t are (time-varying) market prices of risks to holding bonds, and a
j
t+1
is the vector of one-period-ahead bond price forecast errors, which have unconditional covariance
matrix Σa.
ajt+1 ≡
 p
1
t+1 − Ejt [p1t+1]
...
pn¯−1t+1 − Ejt [pn¯−1t+1 ]
 (1.14)
These errors occur because of shocks that were unanticipated by agents. Hence, the vector of forecast
errors span the risks that agents must be compensated for.
Assume prices of risk Λjt are an affine function of X
j
t and the vector of maturity shocks:
Λjt = Λ0 + ΛxX
j
t + ΛνE[νt|Ωjt ] (1.15)
where Xjt is are trader j’s expectations (from 0 to k¯) of the latent factors
Xjt ≡

xjt
Ejt [xt|Ωjt ]
...
Ejt [x
(k¯)
t |Ωjt ]
 (1.16)
As mentioned above, the prices of risk represent additional compensation required for traders to
be willing to hold an additional unit of each type of risk. In the absence of Λx and Λv, that
compensation would not vary over time and risk premia would be constant. If Λjt = 0, agents would
be risk-neutral.
Given the conjectured bond price equation (1.9):
pnt = An +B′nXt + νnt
Appendix 1.B shows how to arrive at the following recursive representation of bond prices.
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An+1 = −δ0 +An +BnµX + 12e
′
nΣaen − e′nΣaΛ0 (1.17)
B′n+1 = −δX +B′nFH − e′nΣaΛ̂x (1.18)
with
A1 = −δ0 (1.19)
B1 = −δ′X (1.20)
The price of a one-period bond, p1t = −δ0 + [δx,0]Xt = −rt. H is a matrix that selects only higher
order expectations terms.10 e′n is a selection vector that has 1 in the nth position and zeros elsewhere.
Λ̂X is a normalization of ΛX .
For comparison, I also estimate a full information model, which is essentially that of Ireland (2015).
There are no maturity shocks in the baseline model. Equations (1.17) and (1.18) are replaced by
An+1 = −δ0 +An +BnµX −Bnλ0C + 12B
′
nCC
′Bn (1.21)
Bn+1 = −δx +BnFP −BnCλx (1.22)
1.4.2 The macroeconomic environment and prices of risk
This section outlines the evolution of the factors xt that are sources of priced risk in the empirical
model. The parameters of the VAR for the factor dynamics are restricted to allow for structural
interpretations of the shocks, ensure the model is identified, and to constrain the estimation to
economically relevant areas of the parameter space. The assumptions I make are similar to that
of Ireland (2015). Ireland’s model has several features that are desirable from an empirical and
computational point of view. It is relatively parsimonious, making it straightforward to extend to
10More specifically, H is a matrix operator that replaces nth order expectations with n+ 1-th order expectations and
annihilates any orders of expectation greater than k¯. This is equivalent to writing prices in terms of a (hypothetical)
agent whose SDF is equal to the average.
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the case of higher order expectations. At the same time, it is rich enough to capture salient features
of both the macroeconomy and yields, and thus is useful for understanding the role of information
frictions in a more structural macroeconomic model.
Macroeconomic dynamics
Assume short term rates are managed by a central bank that sets an exogenous, time varying, long
run inflation target τt and then picks a short rate rt to manage an interest rate gap grt = rt − τt.
Define the deviation of inflation from its long run target gpit = pit − τt. Then the evolution of the
interest rate “gap” takes the form of a Taylor-type reaction function:
grt − gr = φr(grt−1 − gr) + (1− φr) (φpigpit + φy(gyt − gy) + φvvt) + σrεrt (1.23)
In this expression, gyt is the output gap (defined as the log difference between real GDP and its
trend).11 The financial risk factor vt shifts prices of risk Λjt in a manner specified below. I will
assume that all time variation in prices of risk comes through movement in this factor, which is
consistent with the empirical results in Cochrane and Piazzesi (2008), Dewachter et al. (2014), and
Bauer (2016) who all find that a single factor is responsible for nearly all time variation in bond
risk premia.12 As in Ireland (2015), I treat this factor as latent during the estimation. Including
it in the Taylor rule is a simple way to incorporate contemporaneous feedback between financial
conditions and the central banks’ interest rate’s policy stance. I impose prior restrictions on these
parameters. First, I assume that φv is non-negative. While in principle unnecessary to identify the
model’s key parameters, this restriction is consistent with the idea that the central bank has raised
rates in response to an increase in risk premia.13 Second, I assume φr, which governs the degree of
11I detrend log real GDP using the Hodrick-Prescott filter with a smoothing parameter of 16000, which amounts to
assuming an extremely slow-moving trend in output.
12Notably these authors arrive at this conclusion from different methods. Cochrane and Piazzesi (2008) show that
a single “tent shaped” factor extracted from the yield curve explains nearly all time variation in term premia.
Dewachter et al. (2014)’s risk factor is identified by a similar assumption to that of Ireland (2015) and is highly
correlated with the Cochrane-Piazzesi factor. Bauer (2016) use Bayesian methods to estimate a Gaussian term
structure model and finds evidence for strong zero restrictions which imply only changes in the “slope” factor
affect term premia.
13McCallum (2005) suggests a Taylor rule with smoothing and a reaction to the term spread - itself affected by a
possibly time varying term premium - is consistent with a negative slope coefficient in Campbell and Shiller (1991)
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interest rate smoothing, is restricted to fall between zero and 1. Finally, I assume φpi and φy are
both positive.
The long-run inflation target is assumed to follow a stationary AR(1) process:14
τt = (1− ρττ )τ + ρτττt−1 + στετt (1.24)
with ρττ ∈ (0, 1).
For the remaining equations, I follow Ireland (2015) in imposing restrictions similar to the struc-
tural VAR literature. Namely, I impose impact restrictions that shocks to monetary policy (εrt ) do
not affect the inflation or output gaps on impact, and shocks to the output gap do not affect infla-
tion immediately (implicitly assuming that prices are initially sticky in response to “real” shocks).
Moreover, I assume shocks to τt only affect the output and inflation gaps on impact; otherwise the
effect of changes in the inflation target are limited to its changes to the interest rate and inflation
gaps (and their attendant effects on output). Hence, lags of τt do not appear separately in the
other equations, consistent with a notion of long-run monetary neutrality. Finally, I assume that the
latent risk factor vt can affect the inflation and output gaps (that is, allowing for linkages between
the financial system and the macroeconomy), and that shocks to other variables also affect vt on
impact. However, I assume that vt is stationary and only affected by its own lags. To summarize:
gpitgyt
vt
 =
 −ρpirgr − ρpiygygy − ρyrgr − ρyygy
0
+
ρpir ρpipi ρpiy 0 ρpivρyr ρypi ρyy 0 ρyv
0 0 0 0 ρvv


grt
gpit
gyt
τt
vt
+
 0 σpi 0 σpiτστ 00 σypiσpi σy σyτστ 0
σvr σvpi σvy σvτ σv


εrt
εpit
εyt
ετt
εvt

(1.25)
Collecting the factors in xt:
regressions.
14Stationarity is assumed for two, related, technical reasons. The first is that as Ireland (2015) notes, interest rate
processes that contain a unit root will leave long-run yields undefined. The second, related issue, is the stationarity
of asset prices helps ensure that approximation error caused by truncating k¯ can be made arbitrarily small (Nimark
(2007)).
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xt =

grt
gpit
gyt
τt
vt
 (1.26)
they can be written in matrix form:
P0xt = µx + P1xt−1 + Σ0εt (1.27)
Exact expressions for P0, µx, P1,Σ0 are shown in appendix 1.B.4. Left multiplying by P−10 yields
(1.7). After a normalization of one shock covariance matrix parameter, the VAR is exactly identified.
Like Ireland, I set σv = 0.01.
Restrictions on prices of risk. The matrices governing the mapping of factors into prices of
risk shown in (1.13) and (1.15) are high-dimensional. Without additional restrictions, it is unlikely
that these matrices would be identified. Moreover, as Bauer (2016) notes, absent restrictions on the
prices of risk, the estimation does not take into account cross-sectional information in the yield curve.
Moreover, Bauer’s results suggest that the data prefer strong zero restrictions (albeit in a setting
where yields are driven by the “level, slope curvature” factors rather than macroeconomic shocks).
Accordingly, I incorporate two sets of restrictions. First, I follow Ireland (2015) in imposing that,
under full information, changes in prices of risk are driven by entirely by changes in vt, and that vt
is not itself a source of priced risk.15 Second, I follow Barillas and Nimark (2015) in restricting Λjt
to nest a full information version of the model without maturity shocks. This means that the same
number of parameters govern prices of risk in the full and dispersed information models.16 Details
of these restrictions are shown in appendix 1.B.5.
15This is consistent with the notion that movements in a single variable explain time variation in risk premia, and
that variable is related to the state of the macroeconomy.
16I also assume the maturity specific shocks shocks have the the same standard deviation across yields, although the
shocks to each yield are independent.
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1.4.3 Signals
The last step is to specify agents’ agents’ idiosyncratic signal structure. I do not formally model
the information choice of traders as in the rational inattention literature, but impose an exogenous
information structure. I assume prices are observed without error, but individuals’ observations of
the non-price factors driving prices of risk are subject to idiosyncratic noise that is uncorrelated
across variables. Recalling (1.8), I assume bond traders observe the short rate and separate signals
about inflation and the long-run inflation target. To summarize:
xjt =

1 0 0 1 0
0 1 0 1 0
0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 1
xt +

0 0 0 0
σ˜pi 0 0 0
0 σ˜y 0 0
0 0 σ˜τ 0
0 0 0 σ˜v


e˜t
pi
e˜t
y
e˜t
τ
e˜t
v
 (1.28)
Exogenous information keeps the model tractable enough to allow for likelihood based estimation.
The downside is vulnerability to a Lucas-critique-like argument that the allocation of attention is
not invariant to policy changes, and the model does not let the precision of signals vary over the
business cycle, as it might in a model where agents optimally (re)allocate attention. The advantage
is this allows estimation of the precision of traders’ information that is consistent with asset price
movements over the sample.
1.4.4 Bond price decompositions
Given the expression for prices and a model for inference, we can characterize what portion of bond
yields are driven by higher-order beliefs - that is, the portion of yields driven directly by dispersed
information. To do this, note that common knowledge of rationality and the VAR describing Xt
implies two facts: (1) bond prices are pinned down by the current state and thus agents’ forecasts
of future states determine their forecasts of future bond prices, and (2) all information about future
Xt is summarized in today’s state (Barillas and Nimark (2015)). This implies two agents who agree
about Xt today also have the same belief about Xt+1, Xt+2, etc, and hence prices at future dates.
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Intuitively, the difference between actual prices and the price that would obtain if all agents coun-
terfactually held the same beliefs is the direct contribution of dispersed information to the bond
price.17 Like Barillas and Nimark (2015), I use the wedge between the counterfactual price with
common beliefs and actual prices to quantify the extent to which dispersed information about partic-
ular factors affects bond yields. Moreover, because the risks priced in bonds have a macroeconomic
interpretation, the wedge can be decomposed in order to understand what set of higher-order beliefs
are particularly important for determining yields at different maturities.
Following Barillas and Nimark (2015), we can define a matrix operator H¯ that replaces all higher
order expectations with first order expectations, that is:

xt
x
(1)
t
...
x
(1)
t
 = H¯

xt
x
(1)
t
...
x
(k¯)
t
 (1.29)
The price that would obtain if all higher order expectations coincided with the first order expectation
- the “counterfactual consensus price” - is
p¯nt = An +B′nH¯Xt + νnt (1.30)
We can use this to decompose prices into the component that depends on first order “average” expec-
tations and the component that depends on dispersion of information and the resulting divergence
of expectations about expectations. The wedge can be written as:
pnt − p¯nt = B′nXt −B′nH¯Xt = B′n(I − H¯)Xt (1.31)
The counterfactual consensus price, which contains only the effect of average expectations in yields,
can be decomposed into short rate expectations and “classical” risk premia - that is, the part of
yields that depends on first-order average beliefs net of average rate expectations.
17Allen et al. (2006) show in a similar setting how prices of long-lived assets will not generally reflect average expec-
tations when there is private information. Barillas and Nimark (2015) refer to the difference between actual prices
and the counterfactual consensus price as the “speculative component”; Bacchetta and Van Wincoop (2006) refer
to it as the “higher order wedge.” The preferred interpretation of Bacchetta and Van Wincoop is that it is the
present value of deviations of higher-order beliefs from first-order beliefs.
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pnt =Apremn +Bprem′n Xt +Araten +Brate′n Xt + B′n(I − H¯)Xt︸ ︷︷ ︸
higher order wedge
+νnt (1.32)
Where Apremn = An − Araten , Bprem′n = B′nH¯ − Brate′n . To make this decomposition operative, we
need the model-implied future expected short rates. For the hypothetical average agent,
Et|trt+1 = −δ0 − δXHXt+1|t = −δ0 − δX(µX + FHXt)
and so on for further ahead future short rates:
Araten =− n(δ0 + δXµX)− δX
n−1∑
s=0
FsµX
Brate′n =− δX
n−1∑
s=0
FsH
(1.33)
The decomposition of the wedge is a straightforward selection of different elements. For example, the
portion of the higher-order wedge attributable to higher-order beliefs about the long-run inflation
target τt is
B′n(I − H¯)Xτt ≡
B′n(I − H¯) · diag
[
0 0 0 1 0 · · · 0 0 0 1 0]Xt (1.34)
Note that this depends on both the level of the (higher order) expectations (i.e., τ (2)t , τ
(3)
t ) and so
on), and the appropriate elements of B′n.
1.5 Solution and estimation
1.5.1 Solution
The solution to the model is a fixed point of the bond pricing terms An, Bn and agents’ beliefs,
summarized in the law of motion and covariance of the vector of higher-order expectations. In
particular, we need to find a fixed point between the price recursions, (1.17) and (1.18), the mean-
square error matrix for state forecast error ((1.40) in the appendix), and the law of motion for
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the hierarchy of average higher-order expectations ((1.42) in the appendix). The precise numerical
procedure for finding a fixed point is detailed in appendix 1.C.
1.5.2 Econometric model and data
The model period is a quarter and the estimation runs from Q4:1971-Q4:2007. The end date is
chosen prior to the zero lower bound period because the linear model does not respect the ZLB
constraint. I take data on (non-annualized) zero coupon yields from the yield curve estimates in
Gurkaynak et al. (2007), averaged over the quarter. In the econometric model, I use the the short
rate (assumed to be the Federal Funds Rate, as in Piazzesi et al. (2013)), and rates on 1,2,3,4, 5
year and 10 year bonds.18
To identify agents’ beliefs and the macroeconomic dynamics, I use data on the output gap (calcu-
lated as the log difference between real GDP and its HP filtered trend using a smoothing parameter
of 16,000)), inflation and inflation forecasts (as measured by log changes in the GDP deflator), and
treat τt and vt as latent process.19 I treat individual forecasts as (noisy) observations of the aver-
age expectation of financial market participants, and use the cross-sectional variance of forecasts to
estimate the cross-sectional dispersion of signals.
Individual survey responses are treated as a noisy indicator of the average expectation, where the
extent of the noise is pinned down by the model-implied cross-section of expectation around the
first-order average expectation. This matrix can be calculated using the Kalman filtering problem
of individual agents (see appendix 1.B.2). Because the number of respondents to the SPF has varied
over time, the number of observables at different times is time varying. This is not difficult to
incorporate into the Kalman filter used to calculate the log-likelihood of the data. Assuming there
are m1t respondents to the 1-period ahead question and m4t to the four-period ahead question in the
18Note that I assume agents in the model observe the whole yield curve, not just this subset.
19I use the cross-section of one and four quarter ahead forecasts from the Survey of Professional Forecasters in the
estimation. The advantage of inflation forecasts is that they are available for the entire sample period with a
relatively high response rate. Moreover, inflation forecasts in the SPF are quite accurate on average, which means
my choice of data does not automatically favor sizable information frictions.
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SPF at time t, the state space system for estimation is
Xt = µX + FXt−1 + [C,0d(k¯+1)×m1t+m4t ]u¯t
u¯t ∼ N(0, 1) with dimension (d+ (n¯− 1) +m1t +m4t )× 1
z¯t = µz¯,t + D¯tXt + R¯tu¯t
(1.35)
where in particular µz¯,t, D¯t and R¯t vary in size to account for missing observations. The matrices
are reported in appendix 1.D.
For the full information version of the model, I treat forecasts as if they are observations of the
rational expectations forecast with i.i.d. error. I allow each forecast horizon to have a different
error variance. I also treat each individual bond yield as if it were observed with maturity-specific
econometric error. Conceptually, these errors are distinct from the errors in the dispersed information
version. In the dispersed information model, the “noise” in forecasts is pinned down by the model-
consistent state mean square error matrix. As discussed earlier, the maturity specific shocks are a
risk faced by traders in the model, rather than being econometric noise in the empirical model.
I estimate the model via Bayesian methods. The advantage of Bayesian methods in this context are
the use of prior information to constrain parameters in line with economic theory (in a transparent
way), and the characterization of posterior credible sets to illustrate the distributions of parameters.
In particular, I use a Metropolis-Hastings Markov Chain Monte Carlo procedure to estimate the
model parameters.
Because the model has a large number of parameters and is computationally burdensome to solve,
I use somewhat informative priors on macroeconomic variables to focus on reasonable areas of the
parameter space. In particular, as noted earlier, I restrict φv ≥ 0. I also place some informative
prior restrictions on VAR parameters. I impose that ρyv is non-positive, which implies that all
else equal, greater risk premia are contractionary. This is consistent with most general equilibrium
models with financial frictions. For similar reasons, I impose a slightly informative prior that for ρyr
that is centered around -1, while still allowing the estimation to explore regions of the parameter
space where this restriction does not hold. These restrictions, while technically unnecessary for
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identification, help discipline the estimation. Finally, I follow Ireland in imposing that ρττ = 0.999.
The prior distributions are reported in appendix 1.F.
I follow Ireland (2015) in imposing that λxpi < 0 to identify the way changes in vt affect risk premia,
and that that long-run bond prices are well defined by assuming that the parameters governing the
physical and risk-neutral dynamics of bonds are stationary under full information. This implies only
accepting parameter draws such that the maximum eigenvalues of FP and FP − Cλx are less than
one in modulus.
I run separate MCMC chains in parallel for each model. For the full information model, each
chain is of length 400,000; I discard the first 10% of each chain and subsequently analyze every
1000th draw. The DI model is much more computationally intensive; the results reported here are
based on 5 chains of length 23, 000 each. I drop the first 50% of each chain (because it takes longer
to stabilize) and use every 100th draw.
1.6 Parameter estimates and impulse responses
Here I report the results of the estimation for the dispersed information model. Analogous figures
for the full information model are shown in appendix 1.H.
Parameter estimates
Parameter estimates across chains, and posterior credible sets are reported in table 1.1.
In terms of the macroeconomic dynamics, the full and dispersed information models have relatively
similar estimates. This is, perhaps, unsurprising, as the model does not allow for direct feedback
from the inference problem of agents to the macroeconomy and the VAR is exactly identified without
reference to bond yields. Most of the macro-VAR parameter estimates are basically in line with the
results in Ireland (2015). My estimates of the prices of risk in both models differ from those in Ireland
(2015). While some of this is likely attributable to differences in samples, the full information
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estimates of those parameters have a high degree of dispersion, as do the parameters governing
the covariance of the non-financial factors with the risk factor v. Taking the full and dispersed
information parameters together, it appears that it is difficult to separately identify the prices of
risk terms, and the covariances that govern changes of risk.
The key parameters of interest are the parameters that govern the informational quality of agents
(the bottom five rows). The relatively small value for σν indicates that prices are not especially
noisy. This implies, all else equal, that prices move mostly due to (higher order beliefs about)
fundamentals rather than large direct shocks to prices. Agents’ noisy signals about fundamentals
are the last four rows of the table.
Although there is some imprecision in the estimates, agents’ idiosyncratic noise has a fairly large
standard deviation. However, this does not necessarily imply that agents’ beliefs are inaccurate or
dispersed, because agents understand the structure of the economy. For example, traders know an
unanticipated increase in inflation is correlated with unanticipated increases in output (σypi > 0), and
that higher inflation today usually depresses growth in the future (ρypi < 0). Moreover, agents are
allowed to learn from prices, which aggregate the idiosyncratic beliefs of different agents. Hence, we
can infer that the quality of agents’ idiosyncratic signals is somewhat poor, but we cannot conclude
simply from the parameter estimates that agents have incorrect beliefs. All else equal, noisier private
signals will simply receive less weight.
Impulse responses
To demonstrate some of the (informational) mechanisms at play in the model, I plot impulse re-
sponses for fundamentals, the first three orders of expectation about fundamentals, inflation fore-
casts, and prices for a subset of the model shocks. The impulse responses discussed in this section are
shown for the posterior mode for clarity. The complete set of impulse responses, including posterior
credible sets, shown in appendix 1.G.1. Analogous full information impulse responses are shown in
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Mode Mean Median 5% 95% Std.
φr 0.5357 0.5339 0.5355 0.5324 0.5370 0.0224
φpi 0.1835 0.1851 0.1869 0.1768 0.1908 0.0090
φy 0.1016 0.1010 0.1010 0.0928 0.1101 0.0066
φv 0.0349 0.0343 0.0348 0.0305 0.0365 0.0024
σr 0.0029 0.0033 0.0032 0.0029 0.0038 0.0003
ρyr -0.9329 -0.9954 -0.9994 -1.0440 -0.9312 0.0539
ρypi -0.3871 -0.4088 -0.4134 -0.4361 -0.3730 0.0254
ρyy 0.9164 0.8988 0.9031 0.8794 0.9136 0.0389
ρyv -0.0007 -0.0008 -0.0006 -0.0022 -0.0000 0.0007
σypi 0.3329 0.2873 0.2711 0.2443 0.3355 0.0362
σyτ 2.6888 2.6788 2.6878 2.6491 2.7163 0.1140
σy 0.0062 0.0068 0.0068 0.0063 0.0071 0.0004
στ 0.0008 0.0009 0.0009 0.0008 0.0010 0.0001
ρpir 0.9229 0.8949 0.8882 0.8650 0.9323 0.0453
ρpipi 0.4331 0.4368 0.4372 0.4223 0.4564 0.0208
ρpiy -0.1998 -0.1870 -0.1872 -0.2027 -0.1724 0.0117
ρpiv -0.1139 -0.1105 -0.1114 -0.1143 -0.1062 0.0055
σpiτ -0.1380 -0.1483 -0.1452 -0.1993 -0.1123 0.0309
σpi 0.0031 0.0034 0.0033 0.0031 0.0037 0.0002
ρvv 0.8633 0.8600 0.8613 0.8589 0.8640 0.0360
σvr 9.7831 9.8318 9.8834 9.7764 9.8987 0.4138
σvpi 2.1485 2.1574 2.1672 2.1123 2.1919 0.0932
σvy -2.1067 -2.1144 -2.1111 -2.1939 -2.0638 0.0972
σvτ 0.8502 0.8581 0.8577 0.8215 0.9125 0.0466
λr 1.3216 1.0637 1.1132 0.7289 1.3235 0.1872
λpi -4.6156 -4.6789 -4.6655 -4.9244 -4.4789 0.2289
λy 0.0223 -0.5522 -0.5930 -1.0610 -0.0260 0.3227
λτ -0.1725 -0.2202 -0.1318 -0.7908 0.1247 0.2885
λxr 18.0439 18.3595 18.5122 17.9321 18.8519 0.8392
λxpi -76.2162 -76.1999 -76.2163 -76.6236 -76.1171 3.1893
λxy -17.4621 -17.4327 -17.4515 -17.9745 -17.0402 0.7816
λxτ 0.0126 0.1011 0.0987 -0.0640 0.3192 0.1232
σν 0.0025 0.0032 0.0031 0.0025 0.0041 0.0005
σ˜pi 0.3418 0.4817 0.5082 0.3303 0.6348 0.1106
σ˜y 0.7511 0.6247 0.6539 0.4601 0.7715 0.1073
σ˜τ 0.5445 0.5860 0.5825 0.4727 0.7032 0.0849
σ˜v 0.4116 0.4153 0.4175 0.3039 0.5054 0.0609
Table 1.1: Parameter estimates for dispersed information model
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appendix 1.H.
The non-asset price impulse responses to one-standard deviation shock to the monetary policy
rule are shown in figure 1.5. The top row displays the responses of the fundamental factors, while
the subsequent rows show increasing higher-order beliefs about those variables (and inflation ex-
pectations in the far right column). For inflation and interest rates, the responses are in terms of
annualized percentage points; the output gap is in percentage points, and “risk” is scaled up by 100.
As expected, a shock to the short rate shock causes inflation and output to fall over the course of sev-
eral years; output eventually recovers, while inflation remains depressed for some time. The impulse
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Figure 1.5: Response of non-financial variables to monetary policy rule shock, dispersed informa-
tion
responses illustrate the identification problem faced by agents in the model. Agents observe that
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the short rate has risen. However, they do not know precisely why it increased; it might have been a
shock to the rate directly, but also could be attributed to a change in inflation, the output gap, risk,
or the inflation target. Because they are unable to discern the origin of the change, they place some
posterior weight on the possibility that both inflation and the inflation target, are above average.20
Hence, although inflation and the output gap have fallen, agents persistently mis-attribute the cause
of the increase in short rates to changes in the inflation target. They further believe that others be-
lieve the inflation target has risen by about the same amount (second order expectations are similar
to first order), but third order beliefs increase by less. This implies that traders’ beliefs, in addition
to being imperfect, are dispersed - on average, that others do not believe the same thing as them.
Over time, as they observe the evolution of prices and their noisy signals about macroeconomic
dynamics, their beliefs approach the “true” impulse responses (top row). Still, even two years after
the shock has occurred, they believe that the inflation target is above its long-run level. It is worth
emphasizing that agents are Bayesian learners and are doing the best they can; optimal inference in
the model is characterized by mistaken beliefs about the origins of shocks and divergence of average
beliefs with higher order beliefs.
Interestingly, despite not knowing the fundamental reason rates have risen, dispersion of beliefs
after an interest rate shock does not have a large direct effect on yields. The response of yields
are shown in figure 1.6. The overall response of yields to the shock are shown in the first row.
Subsequent rows show the decomposition into rate expectations, “classical” risk premia, and the
higher order wedge. Rate expectations (row 2) ,on average, are elevated as a result of the shock and
those changes in (first-order) rate expectation explain nearly all of the increase in yields, even at the
long end of the yield curve. In other words, while agents may not know why rates have increased, it
is common belief that the path of short rates will be persistently elevated and the model attributes
the increase in yields after a monetary policy shock to rate expectations. This is driven by beliefs
20The fact that inflation expectations rise after an identified monetary policy is consistent with the VAR results
presented in Melosi (2017) for the response of average inflation expectations to a monetary policy shock identified
with sign restrictions.
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about the inflation target, which raises the expected path of short rates. Classical risk premia (row
3) and the higher order wedge (row 4) barely move as a result of the shock. The lack of direct
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Figure 1.6: Response of financial variables to monetary policy rule shock, dispersed information
influence of higher order beliefs (at least in response to this shock) is reminiscent of Venkateswaran
and Hellwig (2009) and Atolia and Chahrour (2013). In both these papers, firms have inaccurate
beliefs (in that they incorrectly attribute the sources of the fluctuations they observe). However,
in the general equilibrium settings in those papers, it turns out to not matter, in the sense that
actions actions based on incorrect beliefs are virtually indistinguishable from ones when they had
correct beliefs. In the context of this asset pricing model, however, the latter does not hold. The
critical difference here is that rate expectations here are not the same as full information rational
expectations. Because the path of expected short rates does not decline as slowly as it would under
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full information, long term yields rise more after a rate shock and stay elevated for a longer period
of time. In other words, the inference problem of agents in and of itself matters for our assessment
of financial fluctuations, even without appealing to the higher-order wedge, at least in the case of
monetary shocks. As will be shown in section 1.8, this is true in general; once we account for the
slow adjustment of expectations, yields are mostly attributed to the path of average short rate beliefs
rather than “classical” risk premia or higher-order beliefs.
A similar set of impulse responses for a one standard deviation increase in the inflation target τ
are shown in figures 1.7 and 1.8. Movements in the inflation target cause level shifts in the yield
curve by persistently raising short rates.21 Agents are slow to adjust the shock, so the level shift is
gradual, rather than immediate, but the shock to the inflation target raises yields across the board
by approximately the same amount over the course of several years. This is similar to the role it
plays in the full information model, as shown in the appendix, and also to its role in Ireland (2015)
and Gurkaynak et al. (2005).
What is interesting is the difference between fundamentals (the top line in figure 1.7) and higher
order beliefs about those fundamentals, particularly the output gap. As in the full information
model, a higher inflation target - essentially a more dovish policy stance, tolerating a higher rate
of inflation in the long run - is associated with a temporary expansion in output. However, agents
observing higher rates, accompanied by upward movements in inflation and risk, actually believe
that output rises initially, falls over the medium term, and rises again. Higher order believes follow
this pattern, although third-order expectations move more dramatically than first or second order
beliefs.
“Risk shocks” (shocks to v) are shown in figures 1.9 and 1.10. The effect of risk shocks on
macroeconomic variables and asset prices stand in contrast to the risk shocks in Ireland (2015).
In his paper, the co-movements brought on by risk shocks are qualitatively similar to those of a
21Recall that the inflation target is the most persistent shock, with its autoregressive component calibrated to ρττ =
0.999.
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Figure 1.7: Response of non-financial variables to inflation target shock, dispersed information
monetary policy shock, albeit without a “price puzzle.” By contrast, impulses to vt in both the
full- and dispersed-information versions of the model estimated here have nearly no direct effect on
output, but depress inflation, and the reduction in inflation leads output to grow over time. Since
this holds for both the full- and dispersed-information models, it is not a result of the information
assumption.
Two possibilities for differences in the dynamic behavior for vt between these results and those of
Ireland (2015) present themselves. One is that this is driven by differences in sample, particularly, the
difference in sample period.22 The second possibility, alluded to earlier, is that the risk parameters
22One other sample difference between my full information results and Ireland’s is that I include inflation forecasts.
Removing those forecasts from the dataset does not qualitatively change the impulse responses at the posterior
mode of the full information model.
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Figure 1.8: Response of financial variables to inflation target shock, dispersed information
and the prices of risk are not particularly well identified. Both of these explanations suggest that
stronger prior information might “smooth out” the posterior and make the impulse responses to
risk shocks more strongly resemble those of Ireland. In the absence of strong priors, these dynamics
appear to be what the data prefers.
In terms of asset prices, the dynamics of Ireland’s estimates and the full information estimates are
more similar; risk shocks increase risk premia more than monetary policy shocks. But it is worth
noting that the size of the change in risk premia is smaller between Ireland’s estimates and the
full information model. Once again, this is likely due to differences in sample composition and the
imprecision of the estimates of parameters governing risk premia. More importantly, “risk premia”
move much less in the dispersed information model, even following risk shocks. This is because
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Figure 1.9: Response of non-financial variables to risk shock, dispersed information
risk premia in Ireland’s model are the difference between yields and average rational expectations
of short rates. From the point of view of the dispersed information model, the rational expectations
risk premia conflates the difference between rational expectations and agents’ actual average expec-
tations, the effect of higher-order expectations, and “classical” risk premia, which are the part of the
counterfactual consensus price unexplained by average rate expectations. Since the models differ
quite a bit on what the right specification for average expected short rates is, the full information
risk premia appears to be largely driven by the auxiliary assumption of full information rational
expectations.
Other impulse responses are shown in appendix 1.G.1. The macroeconomic implications of impulse
responses in both the full and dispersed information models are reasonable similar. Shocks to the
39
00.02
0.04
0.06
1 year: yield
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
2 year: yield
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
3 year: yield
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
4 year: yield
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
5 year: yield
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
10 year: yield
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
Rate exp.
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
Rate exp.
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
Rate exp.
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
Rate exp.
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
Rate exp.
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
Rate exp.
-4
-2
0
#10-4 RP
-2
0
2
#10-4 RP
0
0.5
1
#10-3 RP
0
1
2
3
#10-3 RP
0
1
2
3
#10-3 RP
-1
0
1
2
#10-3 RP
-1
0
1
2
#10-3HOW
-2
0
2
4
#10-3HOW
-2
0
2
4
#10-3HOW
-2
0
2
4
#10-3HOW
-2
0
2
4
#10-3HOW
Risk shock: Yield Responses
0 10 20
period
-2
0
2
4
#10-3HOW
Figure 1.10: Response of financial variables to risk shock, dispersed information
output gap induce positive comovement in inflation, output, and interest rates - in a sense they are
similar to demand shocks in DSGE models. Inflation shocks raise output on impact but lower it
over the medium term. Apart from the initial (positive) change in output, they somewhat resemble
cost-push shocks to the Phillips curve in New Keynesian models.
1.7 What do traders learn from?
Despite the abundance of commonly observed signals, the estimated results imply agents’ information
is imperfect and dispersed. In this section, I characterize the informativeness of agents’ signals. As a
preview, agents’ private signals are sufficiently noisy that they are not especially informative about
40
fundamentals. They learn about half of what they know about the output and inflation gaps from
their private signals, and learn much less about policy or the financial risk factor. The rest of their
information about fundamentals comes from prices. Moreover, the majority of traders’ information
about the beliefs of others also comes from observing prices. The most important price signal appears
to be the policy rate of the central bank, which is also the yield on a bond that matures in one period.
The short rate is informative about fundamentals, and because everyone knows that everyone learns
about fundamentals from this particular signal, it is also informative about higher-order beliefs.
In most models of dispersed information, agents are assumed to learn only from idiosyncratic
signals about fundamentals. While this simplification is justified by a desire for tractability, it is
worth asking whether belief continues to be dispersed when agents have access to a wide range of
price signals. Since agents’ noisy signals are, on average, the true realization, it is possible that
asset prices clean out idiosyncratic noise and agents are able to determine the true realization of
fundamentals. Moreover, it is possible that yields are informative about higher order beliefs, which
agents do not observe any direct signals about. On the other hand, it may be the case that prices are
sufficiently noisy (due to maturity specific shocks or because they also reflect agents’ idiosyncratic
noise) that they are not particularly informative for agents. And, because prices reflect the beliefs
of agents, it may be possible that yields do not contain any information that agents do not already
know.
The approach I use to understand the informativeness of prices is drawn from information theory.23
In particular, the posterior uncertainty of agents about particular variables (calculated during the
agents’ Kalman filtering problem) can be characterized in terms of “entropy,” which can be thought
of as the average number of binary signals needed to fully describe the outcome of a random variable.
We can characterize how much agents learn from signals about a particular variable in terms of the
reduction in entropy after observing those signals (see appendix 1.E for details).
23The entropy-based measure of signal informativeness I use is also used in the rational inattention literature initiated
by Sims (2003) to describe the constraint on agents’ information processing capacity.
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Table 1.2: Reduction in uncertainty about fundamentals (columns) coming from observing a single
signal (rows).
Signal(↓), fundamental → pi gy τ v
rt 0.42 0.45 0.97 0.64
pij 0.03 0.03 0.12 0.00
gy
j 0.03 0.07 0.04 0.00
τ j 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.00
vj 0.37 0.33 0.03 0.24
Adapting a measure used in Melosi (2017), I examine how informed agents are after viewing a
limited subset of signals relative to how informed they would be if I let them use the total set of
signals outlined in section 1.4.3. In other words, I calculate how informed they are after observing all
of their private signals and the yield curve. I then can calculate how informed they would have been
under a “counterfactual” subset of signals. Since on average additional information must (weakly)
reduce uncertainty, we can think of the reduction in entropy coming from the counterfactual subset
of signals as the fraction of total information that could have come from that set; if the reduction in
entropy were zero, that would imply that there was no information in that particular signal, while
if that number were one, all of the information traders have about that variable is contained in that
signal. The advantage of this measure is that it respects both that agents’ inference is optimal (by
assuming that they do the best they can with whatever signals they are endowed with) and also
respects the fact that information may be redundant between signals.
Table 1.2 shows the relative reduction in uncertainty about particular macroeconomic variables
(columns) from observing the short rate (first row) or a single private signal (remaining rows).
This represents an extreme constraint on the information available to agents. The second row, for
instance, suggests, that very little (around 3 %) of the information traders have about inflation
comes from their inflation signal in particular (second row, first column). Effectively none of their
information about the risk variable could come from their signal about inflation (second row, last
column).24 Three features of the table stand out. First, individual private signals are not terribly
24Note that the columns will not generally sum to 1 because some information is redundant between signals and
because yields are also informative.
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Table 1.3: Reduction in posterior uncertainty about about fundamentals and higher order beliefs
from observing only private signals
gr gpi gy τ v
xt 0.02 0.41 0.41 0.16 0.24
x
(1)
t 0.01 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.02
x
(2)
t 0.02 0.12 0.11 0.08 0.03
x
(3)
t 0.04 0.12 0.12 0.08 0.04
informative in general. This is unsurprising given the sizable noise estimates. Second, as to be
expected from the fact that agents understand the structure of the model, signals are informative
not just about their own realization but about the realizations of other variables; for example,
knowing something about risk tells you something about the output gap. This feature of the world
is ignored in most exogenous information models because they typically assume agents learn about
independent exogenous processes instead of learning about endogenous variables. Third, the short
rate is very informative about fundamentals. Indeed, observing only the short rate would give you
more information about fundamentals than observing any individual noisy signal. This is likely for
two related reasons. First, the short rate depends directly on the contemporaneous realization of all
of the fundamentals. Hence, it encodes the current state of the world. Second, it is observed totally
without error. Despite the fact that agents are unable to perfectly identify which fundamental moved
the short rate, they do know that noise does not factor into their observation. 25
A more typical information assumption is that agents have access to several noisy idiosyncratic
signals. Table 1.3 shows (relative to the benchmark with price signals) how much agents’ posterior
uncertainty is reduced by conditioning only on their four private signals. Here, I switch to consid-
ering the risks agents face (i.e., leaving rates and inflation in terms of their gaps) rather than the
realizations.
As the first row of the table reveals, agents’ private signals are most informative about the inflation
25One way of breaking this result would perhaps be to consider the informational set up of Melosi (2017), where the
“interest rate shock” is actually three shocks; deviations from the Taylor rule and the central bank’s forecast errors
of inflation and the output gap. Since the interest rate signal is contaminated by the aggregate noise, it is harder
to tell whether the interest rate has changed for fundamental reasons and the interest rate would be less reliable
as a signal.
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and output gaps. Agents get just under half of their information about the macroeconomy from
their private signals. They can learn very little about risk and the implicit inflation target from
observing their idiosyncratic signals and almost nothing about the rate gap grt = rt− τt (recall they
are assumed to not observe the short rate in this counterfactual). The remaining lines show how
much of their information about (higher-order) expectations come from private signals. The answer
appears to be “not much.” Since private signals are about the true realization of variables, rather
than higher-order beliefs about those variables, they are more indirect signals about higher order
beliefs and thus less informative.
Another way of thinking about the results in table 1.3 is “what are price signals informative
about?” It turns out that the majority of information agents have about the financial risk factor
(v) and monetary policy (summarized by gr and τ) comes from observing price signals, including
the short rate. Nearly all of their information about the first three orders of expectations is encoded
in price signals (rows 2-4). Yield curve variables may not be fully informative about fundamentals
or the beliefs of others, but the vast majority of information traders have about the latter seems to
come from prices.
This result has two immediate implications. First, it validates thinking of the yield curve as a
summary measure of what bond traders believe, which is a common interpretation in the financial
press. Indeed, the model implies that the best bond traders can do to understand what others
believe is by combining their understanding of how expectations are determined with the prices
they observe. Since prices depend mostly on higher-order beliefs, prices are useful to bond traders
even though they aren’t fully informative about fundamentals. Second, the results caution against
ignoring the informativeness of prices - agents may have very inaccurate signals on average, but the
ability to learn from prices makes that less consequential. This matters directly for models featuring
dispersed information. If one were to calibrate the informativeness of private signals by looking at
the relative accuracy of a set of forecasts of endogenous variables, for instance, while ignoring the
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Table 1.4: Reduction in posterior uncertainty about fundamentals and higher order beliefs from
observing private signals and rt
gr gpi gy τ v
xt 0.98 0.85 0.88 0.99 0.93
x
(1)
t 0.86 0.72 0.72 0.92 0.90
x
(2)
t 0.85 0.81 0.78 0.90 0.92
x
(3)
t 0.86 0.85 0.84 0.90 0.94
role of learning from prices, one would incorrectly conclude that private information must be quite
accurate. On the other hand, calibrating the distribution of signals directly (for example, using the
empirical distribution of productivity to calibrate signals about productivity), one might erroneously
conclude agent’s information was very bad by ignoring what one can learn from prices.
The estimates imply, however, that most of what traders learn about fundamentals and the first
three orders of expectation can be gleaned from a combination of their private signals and the short
rate. The results of this counterfactual are shown in table 1.4. Effectively all of what they know
about monetary policy and risk comes from their private signals plus the policy rate, and 75% or
more of what they know about the first three orders of expectation can be extracted without using
bonds with a maturity of greater than one quarter.
There are two, related, implications of this result. The first is that this adds to recent evidence,
such as that of Tang (2013) and Melosi (2017) that the Federal Reserve’s policy instrument is an
important signal. It tells observers a great deal about macroeconomic fundamentals and policy
risks. And because it is a public signal that evidently contains a lot of what agents know about
fundamentals, it plays an outsized role in market participants’ higher order beliefs (along the lines
of Morris and Shin (2002)). The second implication is that, assuming agents learn only from private
signals and the policy rate - the information assumption of Melosi (2017) and Kohlhas (2015) - is a
fair approximation of what bond traders appear to learn from (at least for low orders of expectations).
To emphasize the fact that the policy rate is somewhat special, table 1.5 shows a counterfactual
where agents learn from their private signals and ten year yields rather than the federal funds rate.
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Table 1.5: Reduction in posterior uncertainty about fundamentals and higher order beliefs from
observing private signals and ten year yield
gr gpi gy τ v
xt 0.23 0.82 0.76 0.94 0.60
x
(1)
t 0.10 0.68 0.55 0.70 0.36
x
(2)
t 0.12 0.77 0.65 0.66 0.32
x
(3)
t 0.17 0.82 0.72 0.63 0.30
Ten year yields are informative about both fundamentals and higher-order beliefs above and beyond
private signals, but they are less informative than the policy rate. This is especially true about the
current policy gap (the first column) and the risk factor v (the last column).
Why are ten years yields less informative? The price of a ten year bond is determined not just by
fundamentals (the short rate), but also higher order beliefs about the evolution of fundamentals over
the next ten years, plus the maturity-specific shock. The fact that the bond is of longer maturity
means that (increasingly) higher order beliefs play a greater role in its price. The fact that shocks
to fundamentals are transitory, and higher-order beliefs play a bigger role in prices, imply that it
will be less informative about current fundamentals.
More broadly, a lesson of this exercise is that different prices may be informative about differ-
ent things, and some prices are more informative than others. Imperfect-information models with
exogenous information involve making choices about what signals it is reasonable for agents to
condition their forecasts on. A concern about most dispersed information models is that adding
additional sources of information could dramatically affect the predictions of the model. Here, it
appears adding additional information in the form of yields of longer-term bonds does not change
how much agents learn about fundamentals (or low orders of expectation). This result comes with
two caveats. First, in keeping with the majority of the literature, the model is constructed specifi-
cally to price a single type of asset. Other types of assets may be informative about a different set
of macroeconomic or idiosyncratic risks. Although they are not considered explicitly, information
from other asset types would be captured by the precision of private signals. If, for example, stock
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prices were very informative about the output gap, that implies that agents’ signals about the output
gap should be more precise. Second, the results of this section are “partial equilibrium” in a sense;
the model does not allow for direct feedback from expectations to macroeconomic aggregates, as a
more structural business cycle model might. However, from the point of view of an atomistic agent,
macroeconomic aggregates are exogenous processes and the precise role of information in generating
aggregate fluctuations should not matter.
1.8 Decomposing (higher order expectations in) the yield
curve
Despite the abundance of public signals, non-trivial dispersion of higher order beliefs persists in the
model. A natural question is what direct effect this dispersion of belief has had on prices, and more
generally what the model attributes variation in bond yields to. In this section, I use estimates26
of the underlying higher-order beliefs to decompose prices as outlined in section 1.4.4. I use this to
answer two questions: (1) What does the model attribute changes in bond yields to - changes in rate
expectations, “classical” risk premia, or higher-order beliefs? (2) Which higher-order beliefs matter
for prices? Briefly, the answer to the first question is that (slowly adjusting) rate expectations play
the largest role in determining yields at all horizons. Classical risk premia are nearly constant for
bonds at all maturities, but the importance of the higher order wedge increases in the maturity of
the bond. As for the second, a decomposition suggests that higher order beliefs about monetary
policy - the rate gap gr and the inflation target τ - drive most of the time variation in the wedge.
To think about the decomposition exercise informally, we can think about yields as be being
driven by a part that is rate expectations and a residual. The information assumption implies the
26The results here are based on Kalman filtered estimates of the state, which can be thought of as inefficient estimates
of the underlying hierarchy of higher-order expectations Xt. Kalman smoothing (i.e., the procedure described in
Hamilton (1994a)), which takes account of the whole sample to derive estimates, presents numerical problems
because the one-step ahead state forecast error matrix is ill-conditioned and inverting it presents numerical diffi-
culties. This manifests in pathologies, such as states that are observed without error being inaccurate. The filtered
estimates are most closest to what the Kalman smoother would imply at the end of the sample.
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path of rate expectations, and thus determine the “expectations hypothesis” part of bond yields.
Combined with our assumption of no-arbitrage and the way risk is priced, assuming agents have full
information rational expectations implies the (non-econometric error portion of) the residual term
is the risk premium; however, as the decomposition outlined in section 1.4.4 shows, under dispersed
information the residual can be interpreted as the present discounted value of deviations from higher-
order beliefs from average beliefs, and the gap between average expected short rates and the price
that would obtain if agents counterfactually held common beliefs. Of course, the residual in the full
information and dispersed-information models will be different because they assume different things
about how people perceive short rates evolving over time.
Although one could focus on bonds of any maturity, here I focus on ten year yields.27 The
three-way decomposition is shown in figure 1.11.
Comparing the top two panels, it is clear that the model attributes the majority of movement
in bond yields to rate expectations. In other words, accounting for agents’ learning problem and
their subjective rate expectations makes the premium for investing in long term bonds less volatile.
That premium is divided between the “classical” premium and the higher order wedge; they are of
roughly equal magnitudes, but the former is close to constant while the wedge varies over time. The
reduced importance of compensation for risk in determining bond yields is qualitatively consistent
with Piazzesi, Salomao and Schneider (2013), who use a very different methodology to arrive at this
conclusion. For a more direct comparison, the full information model results reported in Appendix
1.H a sizable premium for holding ten year bonds, albeit with a great deal of uncertainty attached
to the estimate.
This result implies that at least part of the dramatic failure of the expectations hypothesis is at-
tributable to assuming agents’ expectations are full information rational expectations. Accounting
for the fact that agents’ subjective forecasts may be different from the underlying full-information
forecast means that volatile time varying risk premia are not needed to explain movements in long
27The results for other maturities are found in the appendix 1.G.3.
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Figure 1.11: Decomposition of 10 year yields, dispersed information
term yields. The remaining premium for holding long term debt is partially about time varying com-
pensation for risk (the “classical” risk premium) but the larger, time varying potion is attributable
to the failure of consensus - that is, the fact that agents believe others have different beliefs. Both
classical risk premia and the higher order wedge rose during the Volcker disinflation and slowly
falling.
Why did risk premia and the higher order wedge decline over this period? Mechanically, a decline
in the “classical” risk premium must be attributable to a decline in vt over time. The inflation target
variable τt is also falling over this period and since σvτ > 0 the decline in the inflation target appears
to have driven the decline in risk. Indeed, in appendix figures 1.20a and 1.20b, the estimated paths
of these variables, and the first three orders of expectation about these variables, both steadily
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declined from the early 1980s to the early 2000s. We can also examine the role of higher order
beliefs about these variables in determining yields. In figure 1.12, I show the higher-order wedge
decomposed into the contribution from higher-order beliefs about fundamentals. The decomposition
reveals that the model attributes growth in the higher order wedge to an increasing role for higher
order beliefs about the inflation target. A smaller contribution comes from higher order beliefs about
the rate gap gr = rt − τt. Since rt is commonly observed, this means that overall policy uncertainty
contributes the most time variation to the wedge, at least for ten year yields. This is (partially)
counterbalanced by higher order beliefs about the risk variable, which grew in the late 1970s and
80s but fell afterwards.
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Figure 1.12: Decomposition of higher order wedge, ten year yields. Details of the decomposition
are found in section 1.4.4.
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How can we interpret this change in the higher order wedge? A plausible explanation for this
change is uncertainty about the credibility of the Federal Reserve prior to the Volcker disinflation
and a gradual increase in the public’s trust in policymakers’ commitment to fighting inflation.
Uncertainty about the inflation target implies that people may have not only been unsure what the
target was, but what others believe the target to be, and what they believe others believe the target
was, and so on. Changes in the long-run inflation target are also intuitively more important for long-
run bonds because the (nominal) payoff is lower when high unanticipated inflation is sustained. A
greater commitment to fighting inflation and greater transparency (for example, announcing Federal
funds rate changes and the “bias” of future policy moves) also lead to a gradual consensus about what
the Fed’s current stance of policy and its implicit inflation target likely was. Greater understanding
of what the new monetary policy regime was, in other words, might have lead to the decline in the
higher order wedge over time.
The importance of the credibility of the central bank’s inflation target is consistent with other
studies, such as that of Wright (2011). He argues that changes in the conduct of monetary policy
lowered inflation uncertainty (measured using forecast dispersion and the time series of the standard
deviation of the“permanent” component of inflation from a time series model with stochastic volatil-
ity), and that inflation uncertainty significantly explains the five-to-ten year forward premium across
his sample of countries from 1990-2009. Both the results here and in Wright’s paper are consistent
with the idea that lower inflation uncertainty over time has caused the premium on long-term US
government debt to decline. In my model, this is a result of both the relationship between changes
in the inflation target and the risk variable - that is, the direct role of the inflation target and risk
- as well as the (higher order) uncertainty about monetary policy arising endogenously from the
traders’ inference problem.
Examining the decomposition also reveals a degree of “canceling out” of the role of higher order
beliefs. One way of thinking about this is the fact that different risks are not perfectly correlated with
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Table 1.6: Contribution of higher-order wedge to yields at the posterior mode
1 year 2 year 3 year 4 year 5 year 10 year
Average 0.03 0.15 0.18 0.20 0.44 0.66
Maximum 0.10 0.31 0.40 0.55 0.72 0.89
Average contributions by source:
gr -0.05 -0.28 -0.41 -0.11 0.11 0.31
gpi 0.03 0.23 0.36 0.19 0.04 -0.09
gy 0.12 0.59 0.93 0.71 0.48 0.28
τ -0.14 -0.78 -1.18 -0.50 0.04 0.54
v 0.01 0.09 0.14 -0.08 -0.23 -0.37
each other, and agents’ higher-order beliefs are constrained by the macroeconomic environment. The
average and maximum contribution of higher-order expectations to yields is shown in table 1.6. The
contribution of higher order expectations to the wedge is increasing over the maturity of the bond.
This is consistent with the model intuition at the beginning of section 1.4. Longer-maturity bonds
are a function of future expectations of future stochastic discount factors. The longer the maturity
of the bond, the larger the role of higher-order beliefs in determining the price. Table 1.6 also
reveals how higher-order beliefs about different risks play different roles in the wedge across different
maturities. This is a result of the expected time path of higher order beliefs and how different risks
are priced at different horizons. In particular, as figure 1.7 reveals, higher-order beliefs about the
output gap tend to fall over the medium term when the inflation target rises, which (along with
the estimated prices of risk) explains why during the period when τ contributes the most to the
higher-order wedge for 10 year yields is also when gy plays such a large role for 3 and 4 year bonds.
For bonds of low maturity, the contributions of higher order beliefs are very small in absolute terms
and essentially cancel out on average.
The contribution of higher order beliefs, and their time series properties, are somewhat different
here than in Barillas and Nimark (2015). They find that higher order beliefs play a larger role in
general (with the peak contribution as a fraction of yields in the early 1990s) and also find a large
negative role for the higher order wedge during the early 2000s. Part of the difference is likely due
to the macroeconomic structure as opposed to the three-variable latent factor model they estimate.
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Agents’ beliefs about pricing factors and the role of those factors in prices are constrained by the
covariances between asset prices and macroeconomic yields in the data. The latent factor model is
more flexible. A second important difference is the choice of data. Barillas and Nimark directly use
data on interest rate expectations to discipline belief formation, whereas I use inflation forecasts.
Inflation forecasts in the SPF are generally regarded as being high quality - in fact, survey-based
forecast measures generally perform better than most forecasting models (Faust and Wright (2013)).
This feature of the data will imply agents have better average forecasts of inflation, which may
mean the choice of data generates a more conservative role for higher order beliefs. Moreover, since
zero coupon yields are constructed based on estimates from prices of different kinds of outstanding
Treasury debt, there may be a concern that the “model” concept of Treasury yields is different
from the concept that the SPF forecasters had in mind, which might exaggerate deviations of yields
from rate expectations. This could influence estimates of the higher order wedge. Furthermore, the
quarterly time series for interest rate forecasts in the SPF is much shorter than the inflation forecast
data and has fewer responses in general. Inflation forecasts are available for the whole sample period.
By contrast, the higher order wedge appears to play a greater influence in the Barillas and Nimark
(2015) results once rate forecasts become available.
1.9 Conclusion
Survey evidence suggests professional forecasters have dispersed beliefs about future prices of Trea-
sury bonds and macroeconomic variables. Motivated by this fact, I construct and estimate a macro-
asset pricing model with dispersed information about macroeconomic fundamentals. The model
allows for bond prices to be affected directly by policy, macroeconomic, and financial conditions;
agents in the model are slow to identify fundamentals, and must learn them using both private in-
formation and commonly observed asset prices. Moreover, dispersed information, and the attendant
gap between average beliefs and average beliefs about average beliefs, introduces a direct wedge into
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prices.
I use this model to understand the informativeness of prices for agents who lack knowledge about
fundamentals and the beliefs of others, and to assess what role dispersion of macroeconomic belief
may have played in determining Treasury yields prior to the Great Recession. The estimates imply
that the direct role of belief dispersion is somewhat modest, but that most of the time variation
in the higher order wedge is caused by policy-related factors. In particular, the wedge grew during
the 1970s and early 1980s, along with the central bank’s implicit inflation target, and fell over the
course of the Great Moderation. This is consistent with gradual learning by agents about a new
monetary policy regime and the emergence of a consensus about the conduct of monetary policy,
perhaps arising from greater transparency and credibility.
I also provide new estimates of the quality of agents’ private information and how much they learn
from prices. I find individual private signals are quite noisy. By contrast, a great deal of agents’
information about fundamentals comes from public prices, and prices are especially informative
about the beliefs of others. Absent any of the public signals in the model, agents are about half
as informed about macroeconomic fundamentals and know only about a fifth as much about the
long-run inflation target of the central bank and financial risk. The most important signal appears
to be the policy rate set by the central bank. By assumption, it is driven solely by fundamentals,
rather than higher order beliefs, and thus agents attach a great deal of weight to it when forecasting
those fundamentals. But since everyone does this, it is also informative about the beliefs of others.
This role of public information was noted by Morris and Shin (2002); Tang (2013) and Melosi (2017)
both emphasize the importance of the signaling channel of monetary policy. However, my paper is
the first to measure the importance of the policy rate as a signal of fundamentals in an asset pricing
setting where agents are not artificially constrained from learning from other prices.
The results here add to the body of evidence that deviations from full information are an im-
portant feature of the world. Accounting for agents’ inference dramatically affects the size and
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interpretation of term premia. Moreover, dispersion of information does not disappear despite a
large number of public signals, and it plays a direct role in prices. These results are instructive for
what sorts of signals agents appear to learn from - in particular, asset prices are an important source
of information. This suggests macroeconomic models with dispersed information should account for
learning from prices when examining the importance of these frictions for macroeconomic outcomes
or when assessing normative questions about optimality of policies that have implications for asset
markets. It also suggests, at least for asset prices, market consistent information is not enough for
aggregate irrelevance of information frictions. This is true in two senses: Dispersed information
directly affects prices and the behavior of endogenous variables is quite different than under full
information. This stands in contrast to some results in the macro-dispersed information literature
(such as Venkateswaran and Hellwig (2009)). The model setting is different, but at a minimum my
results emphasize the tension in this literature. Understanding the source of this tension can be
important for future research.
There are a number of interesting and important extensions to this paper that would be worth
pursuing. In this paper, I have focused on the informational content of a single class of assets - U.S.
government debt. However, other assets may have different information implications worth exploring
- for example, stocks may be informative about aggregate and sectoral shocks, and exchange rates
may be informative about foreign and domestic shocks. Fully exploring the information that traders
learn from different classes of assets would be a worthwhile extension. Second, extending the analysis
to debt of different countries - along the lines of Wright (2011) - may also be informative about how
changes in the monetary policy framework are associated with changes in the importance of higher-
order beliefs. Third, throughout the paper I have taken advantage of the fact that yields are affine.
This makes characterizing the higher order wedge and informativeness of signals straightforward.
However, in the aftermath of the financial crisis, there were nonlinearities in yields introduced by
the zero lower bound which may have affected prices’ information content. Although technically
55
challenging, extending the analysis to nonlinear filters (such as in the “shadow rate” literature i.e.
Wu and Xia (2014)) could be worthwhile.
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Figure 1.13: Distribution of SPF forecasts of next-quarter average rate on 3-month Treasury bill.
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Figure 1.14: Full range (top) and interquartile range (bottom) of next-quarter average rate on
3-month Treasury bill.
1.B Model derivations
1.B.1 Intuition
Beginning with
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Joint lognormality implies:
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Iterating ahead for another agent (an arbitrary k that agent j will sell the bond to)
pn−1t+1 = Ekt+1[mt+2] + Ekt+1[pn−2t+2 ] +
1
2Var(m
k
t+2 + pn−2t+2 )
Then substituting this into the price expectation term:
pnt = E
j
t [m
j
t+1]
+ Ejt [Ekt+1(mkt+2)] + E
j
t [Ekt+1pn−2t+1 ] + E
j
t [Ekt+1pn−2t+1 ]
+ 12Var(m
j
t+1 + pn−1t+1 ) +
1
2Var(m
k
t+2 + pn−2t+2 )
The fact that information sets are not nested means the law of iterated expectations does not apply.
However, because no agent has particular information about other agents, agent j’s expectations
about k’s expectations can be replaced by her expectation of the average expectation. Doing so,
and integrating both sides over all agents implies the equation in the text.
1.B.2 The filtering problem
The individual agent’s filtering problem, and its aggregation into the vector of average higher order
expectations, follows Nimark (2007) and Barillas and Nimark (2015).
CallXt the underlying state we want to estimate (the vector of higher order expectations, including
0th order expectations). Call Σt|t−1 ≡ E[(Xt −Xt|t−1)(Xt −Xt|t−1)′].
Forecast step. Given information dated time t− 1, j’s forecast of the signal is
zjt|t−1 = µZ +DXt|t−1 (1.36)
The associated covariance matrix of signal forecasting error is
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Ωt|t−1 ≡ E[(zjt − zjt|t−1)(zjt − zjt|t−1)′]
= DΣt|t−1D′ +RR′
(1.37)
Updating step. Projection of Xt − Xt|t−1 onto zjt − zjt|t−1 and rearrangement gives that j’s
conditional expectation of the state given her time t information is
Xjt|t = Xt|t−1 + Σt|t−1D
′Ω−1t|t−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
Kt
(zjt − zjt|t−1)
= Xjt|t−1 +K(DXt +R
[
ut
ηjt
]
−DXjt|t−1)
= µX + FXjt−1|t−1 +K[D(µX + FXt−1 + Cut) +R
[
ut
ηjt
]
−D(µX + FXjt−1|t−1)]
(1.38)
Deriving the aggregate law of motion. Partition R into a part associated with aggregate
shocks and one associated with idiosyncratic shocks, i.e. R ≡
[
Ru Rη
]′
. Integrating Xjt|t to obtain
the vector of average higher order expectations “zeros out” the idiosyncratic shocks, and we’re left
with
Xt|t =µX + (F −KDF)Xt−1|t−1 +K[D(µX + FXt−1 + Cut) +Ruut −DµX + FXt−1|t−1)]
=µX + (F −KDF)Xt−1|t−1 +KDFXt−1 +K(DC +Ru)ut
(1.39)
Note that these expressions have been written in terms of the steady state Kalman gainK. To find
the steady state Kalman gain, we can derive the following discrete-time algebraic Riccati equation
(which follows from some algebra during the updating step)
Σt+1|t =E[(Xt+1 −Xt+1|t)(Xt+1 −Xt+1|t)′]
=F(Σt|t−1 − Σt|t−1D′Ω−1t|t−1DΣt|t−1)F ′ +RR′
(1.40)
and iterate until convergence. The resulting steady state Σt+1|t, combined with (1.37), immedi-
ately implies K.
Recall that we conjectured a VAR(1) process for Xt, namely
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Xt ≡
[
xt
Xt|t
]
= µX + FXt−1 + Cut (1.41)
so matching coefficients we can find C,F (recall there are d factors and we truncate at order k¯)
F =
[
FP 0d×dk¯
0dk¯×d 0d×dk¯
]
+
[
0d×d 0d×dk¯
0dk¯×d [F −KDF ]_
]
+
[
0d×d(k¯+1)
[KDF ]_
]
C =
[
C 0
0 0
]
+
[
0
[K(DC +Ru)]_
] (1.42)
where _ indicates truncation to ensure conformability and considering with only considering expec-
tations up to k¯.
1.B.3 Generating bond price equations
The steps here are identical to Barillas and Nimark (2015).
pnt = An +B′nXt + νnt
To arrive at this form, substitute the SDF (1.13) into the (log) arbitrage condition:
pnt = lnE
[
exp
{
−rt − 12Λ
j′
t ΣaΛ
j
t − Λj′t ajt+1 + pn−1t+1
}
|Ωjt
]
(1.43)
Here we use the definition of ajt+1 (1.14) to substitute pn−1t+1 out for its expectation plus the forecast
error for that particular maturity
Pn−1t+1 = E
[
pn−1t+1 |Ωjt
]
+ e′n−1a
j
t+1 (1.44)
where e′n is a horizontal selection vector with 1 in the nth element and zeros elsewhere.
Since we assumed agents knew the model equations we can write, we can write
E[pn−1t+1 |Ωjt ] = An−1 +B′n−1
(
µX + FE[Xt|Ωjt ]
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
E[Xt+1|Ωjt ]
(1.45)
Define an operator H that selects just the average higher order expectations from Xjt (1.16), that is
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E[Xt|Ωjt ] =HXjt
where H =
[
0dk¯×d Idk¯
0d×d 0d×dk¯
] (1.46)
Combining these three expressions gives
E[pnt+1|Ωjt ] = An−1 +B′n−1µX +B′n−1FHXjt (1.47)
substituting this in to the no-arbitrage condition
pnt = lnE
[
exp
{
−rt − 12Λ
j′
t ΣaΛ
j
t − Λj′t ajt+1 +An−1 +B′n−1µX +B′n−1FHXjt + e′n−1ajt+1
}
|Ωjt
]
(1.48)
The inner expression consists of constants and lognormal random variables. It can be written in
terms of things known to agent j at time t (so the expectation is superfluous):
pnt = ln exp
{
− rt − 12Λ
j′
t ΣaΛ
j
t −An−1 +B′n−1µX +B′n−1FHXjt
+ 12(e
′
n−1Σaen−1 + Λ
j′
t ΣaΛ
j
t − 2e′n−1ΣaΛjt )
} (1.49)
where the last term is 1/2 times the variance of (e′n−1 − Λjt )ajt+1. Simplifying:
pnt = −rt +An−1 +Bn−1µX +B′n−1FHXjt +
1
2e
′
n−1Σaen−1 − e′n−1ΣaΛjt (1.50)
The price of the n period bond at time t is a function of constants, the current risk-free rate, and
j specific terms. By no arbitrage, this expression holds for all j at all times, but, like Barillas and
Nimark (2015), I focus on a hypothetical agent whose state coincides with the cross-sectional average
state. Then we can substitute Xt for Xjt in the previous expression, since Xt ≡
∫
Xjt dj.
Finally substitute (1.6) and (1.15) into the previous expression:
pnt =− (δ0 + δ′xxt) +An−1 +Bn−1µX +B′n−1FHXt
+ 12e
′
n−1Σaen−1 − e′n−1Σa
(
Λ0 + Λjx + Λν
∫
E[νt|Ωjt ]dj
) (1.51)
Define δ′X ≡
[
δ′x 0
]
and rearrange this
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pnt =− δ0 +An−1 +Bn−1µX +
1
2e
′
n−1Σaen−1 − e′n−1ΣaΛ0
− δ′XXt +B′n−1FHXt − e′n−1ΣaΛxXt
− e′n−1ΣaΛν
∫
E[νt|Ωjt ]dj
(1.52)
We had guessed
pnt = An +B′nXt + νnt (1.9)
To arrive at the conjectured form, impose two additional restrictions. First, restrict:
Λν = −Σ−1a (1.53)
which also reduces the number of free parameters in the model. Secondly, we can substitute to
replace the remaining e′n−1
∫
E[νt|Ωjt ]dj term via a convenient normalization. Note model consistent
expectations and the conjectured bond price equation imply
pnt = E[An +BnXt + νnt |Ωjt ] = An +BnHXjt + e′n−1E[νt|Ωjt ] (1.54)
Setting this equal to the conjectured bond equation implies
An +BnHXt + e′n−1
∫
E[vt|Ωjt ]dj = An +BnXt + νnt
⇒ e′n−1
∫
E[vt|Ωjt ]dj = Bn(I −H)Xt + νnt
(1.55)
Substituting these restrictions:
pnt =− δ0 +An−1 +B′n−1µX +
1
2e
′
n−1Σaen−1 − e′n−1ΣaΛ0
− δ′XXt +B′n−1FHXt − e′n−1ΣaΛxXt
+Bn(I −H)Xt + νnt
(1.56)
Finally, write B =
[
B′2 · · · B′n¯
]
and note that Bn = en−1B. Normalizing prices of risk:
Λx = Λ̂x +B(I −H) (1.57)
and then
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pnt =− δ0 +An−1 +B′n−1µX +
1
2e
′
n−1Σaen−1 − e′n−1ΣaΛ0
− δ′XXt +B′n−1FHXt − e′n−1ΣaΛ̂xXt
+ νnt
(1.58)
This implies the recursive forms for the bond price equations:
An+1 = −δ0 +An +BnµX + 12e
′
nΣaen − e′nΣaΛ0 (1.59)
B′n+1 = −δX +B′nFH − e′n−1ΣaΛ̂x (1.60)
with
A1 = −δ0 (1.61)
B1 = −δ′X (1.62)
which implies p1t = −δ0 + [δx,0]Xt = −rt.
1.B.4 Macroeconomic structure
P0 =

1 −(1− φr)φpi −(1− φr)φy 0 −(1− φr)φv
0 1 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 1
 (1.63)
µx =

(1− φr)gr − (1− φr)gy
−ρpirgr − ρpiygy
gy − ρyrgr − ρyygy
(1− ρττ )τ
0
 (1.64)
P1 =

φr 0 0 0 0
ρpir ρpipi ρpiy 0 ρpiv
ρyr ρypi ρyy 0 ρyv
0 0 0 ρττ 0
0 0 0 0 ρvv
 (1.65)
Σ0 =

σr 0 0 0 0
0 σpi 0 σpiτστ 0
0 σypiσpi σypiσpi σyτστ 0
0 0 0 στ 0
σvr σvpi σvy σvτ σv
 (1.66)
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rt = δ0 + δ′xxt (1.6)
with
δ0 = 05×1 (1.67)
δ′x =
[
1 0 0 1 0
]
(1.68)
and the matrices governing the evolution of fundamentals (1.7) as
µP = P−10 µ0
FP = P−10 P1
C = P−10 Σ0
(1.69)
1.B.5 Restrictions on Prices of Risk
Recall expressions for the stochastic discount factor and prices of risk:
mjt+1 = −rt −
1
2Λ
j′
t ΣaΛ
j
t − Λj′t ajt+1 (1.13)
Λjt = Λ0 + ΛxX
j
t + ΛνE[νt|Ωjt ] (1.15)
To impose the Ireland (2015) restriction, I set:
λ0 =
[
λr λpi λy λτ 0
]′ (1.70)
λx =

0 0 0 0 λrx
0 0 0 0 λpix
0 0 0 0 λyx
0 0 0 0 λτx
0 0 0 0 0
 (1.71)
To additionally impose the Barillas and Nimark (2015) restriction, recall that the vector of bond price
innovations ajt+1 is a linear combination of forecasting error in the factors Xt+1 and maturity-specific
price shocks νt+1.
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ajt+1 = Ψ
[
Xt+1 − E
[
Xt+1|Ωjt
]
νt+1
]
(1.72)
To see this, write j’s one-period ahead bond pricing error for a particular maturity as
an,jt+1 = pn−1t+1 − pjt+1|t
= B′n−1(Xt+1 − EjtXt) + νn−1t+1
(1.73)
So stacking these errors in a vector ajt+1 gives
ajt+1 =
 B
′
1
... In¯−1
B′n¯−1

︸ ︷︷ ︸
Ψ
[
Xt+1 − E
[
Xt+1|Ωjt
]
νt+1
]
(1.74)
Left multiplying by Λj′t+1:
Λj′t+1a
j
t+1 = Λ
j′
t+1Ψ
[
Xt+1 − E
[
Xt+1|Ωjt
]
νt+1
]
(1.75)
We want to restrict this so that
Λj′t+1a
j
t+1 =
([
λ0
0
]
+
[
λx 0
0 0
])′ [
Xt+1 − E
[
Xt+1|Ωjt
]
νt+1
]
(1.76)
If we removed dispersed information or maturity-specific shocks, this restriction would imply only
fundamentals matter for bond prices, given the restrictions in (1.70) and (1.71). When maturity
specific shocks are equal to zero, these additional restrictions must hold:
[
λ0
0
]′ [
Xt+1 − E
[
Xt+1|Ωjt
]
νt+1
]
= Λ′0a
j
t+1([
λx 0
0 0
]
Xjt
)′ [
Xt+1 − E
[
Xt+1|Ωjt
]
νt+1
]
= Λ̂′xa
j
t+1
(1.77)
where Λ̂x is a normalization (see appendix 1.B.3). This can be achieved by setting
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Φ = Ψ(Ψ′Ψ)−1
Λ0 = Φ
[
λ0
0
]
Λ̂x = Φ
[
λx 0
0 0
]
Ψ =
 B
′
1
... In¯−1
B′n¯−1

(1.78)
These restrictions are the same as those imposed in Barillas and Nimark (2015).
1.C Fixed point procedure
0. Given a set of parameters, we construct H using (1.46), δ0 δx, µP , FP , C, λ0 and λx using
(1.67)-(1.71). We need an initial guess of B (typically starting with the full information B).
This implies an initial An using (1.17), and thus D for the agents’ filtering problem. We must
also guess C,F , typically at the full information solution.
1. The Kalman filtering problem implies steady state Σt+1|t using (1.40).28 This implies steady
state Ωt+1|t and K. Construct F , C from (1.42).
2. We have
Σa = Ψ
[
Σt+1|t 0
0 Σν
]
Ψ′ (1.79)
where Σν is the covariance matrix of maturity shocks, a diagonal matrix where the nonzero
elements are of the form
√
Var(ent ) = nσν (1.80)
28In practice, the bulk of time spent on the solution is in this step. Since no closed form exists for the Kalman gain
in a general multivariate setting, I must numerically find the Kalman gain by solving the discrete-time algebraic
Riccati equation. In this particular setting, the fastest way to solve the equation seems to be through iteration
until convergence, with an additional step to ensure that the matrix is symmetric. The latter step is necessary to
avoid numerical problems due to round-off which is common in large-dimension Kalman filtering problems.
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(this implies the variance of maturity shocks is constant across yields, which reduces the
number of free parameters). Recall we had assumed Λν = −Σ−1a .
3. Update our guess of B using (1.18) and check for convergence. If B, C,F have converged, stop.
Else, go to step 1.
1.D Econometric matrices
The model-consistent notion of dispersion of signals around the average comes from agents’ Kalman
filtering equations. Any dispersion in belief must come from idiosyncratic signals. The idiosyncratic
error covariance matrix is the solution to the following Riccati equation:
Σj = E[(Xjt −X(1)t )(Xjt −X(1)t )′]
= (F −KDF)Σj(F −KDF)′ +KRηR′ηK ′
(1.81)
Hence the cross-sectional variance in average forecasts is just the appropriate element of Σj :
V ar(pijt|t) = [0, 1, 0, 1, 0,01×d∗(k¯)]]︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡epi
Σjepi′ (1.82)
The non-constant parts of the econometric matrices in (1.35) are:
D¯t =

I4 04×2 04×k¯
− 14B′4− 18B′8− 112B′12− 116B′16− 120B′20− 140B′40
epiF × Im1t
epi · F4 × Im4ts

(1.83)
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R¯t =

03×d+n¯−1+m1t
σν

e3
e7
e11
e15
06×d e19
e39

√
epiFΣjF ′epi′ × Im1t√
epiF4Σj(F4)′epi′ × Im4t

(1.84)
For the full information model, the equations are the same. However, instead of the σν terms, the
observed bond yields are assumed to be observed with yield-specific error.29, and the cross-sectional
estimation error terms for the forecasts are replaced with horizon-specific error terms σ˜pih, h = 1, 4.
1.E Information-theoretic concepts
In the discussion of the share of information coming from private signals in section 1.7, I refer to
a number of concepts from information theory, which I detail here without proof; more details are
found in Veldkamp (2011) and Cover and Thomas (2006). As described in section 1.7, I characterize
the extent to which variables are informative using the notion of entropy - the amount of information
required to describe a random variable (Cover and Thomas (2006)). Entropy is typically expressed
in terms of “bits,” i.e., in terms of log base 2 units, which is convenient because the entropy of a fair
coin toss is 1 bit. Intuitively, the entropy of a random variable in bits is the number of 0− 1 binary
signals required on average to describe its realization.
The entropy of a normally distributed variable. If x is a normally distributed variable with
variance σ2, its entropy is 12 log2(2pieσ2) (Cover and Thomas, 2006, Chapter 8).
Conditional entropy. Conditional entropy H(x|y) is a measure of how much information it takes
to describe x given that y is known (Veldkamp, 2011, Chapter 3.2). It is defined as the joint entropy
29A common practice to avoid a stochastic singularity problem, used by Ireland (2015) among others, is to assume
that only certain yields are observed with error. However, as Piazzesi (2009) points out, which set of yields to
treat as viewed with error is essentially arbitrary, and assuming all of them are viewed with error does not pose
any computational difficulty in this setting.
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of x, y minus the entropy of y, that is H(x|y) = H(x, y)−H(y). The calculation of the conditional
entropy of a normal variable is analogous to the unconditional case, replacing the variance with the
conditional variance (Veldkamp (2011)).
Mutual information. The mutual information of two variables x and y, I(x; y) is the measure of
the amount of information one contains about the other. It can be calculated in terms of entropies
((Cover and Thomas, 2006, Theorem 2.4.1))):
I(x, y) = H(x)−H(x|y) = H(y)−H(y|x)
Measure of signal use. Similar to Melosi (2017, 2014), I use the “share” of mutual information
as my characterization of how much information about a variable comes from (a particular subset)
of signals ωred. In particular, the “share” of information about a variable x used by an agent is:
Sharex = I(x;ωred)/I(x;ωfull)
where ωred is the reduced set of signals (for example, only private signals without the use of bond
prices) and ωfull is the complete set of signals detailed in section 1.4.3.
In practice, conditional variances needed to calculate mutual information are taken as particular
entries from agents’ state nowcasting error matrix (Σt|t) (see appendix 1.B.2). The conditional
variance of the subset of signals is calculated by solving the filtering problem of the agent assuming
they have a “counterfactual” subset of signals (just as described in appendix 1.B.2, using A,B,F , C
from the actual model solution.
Note that this share is bounded between 0 and 1 because, on average, conditioning must reduce
entropy (Cover and Thomas, 2006, Theorem 2.6.5).
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1.F Priors
Table 1.7: Prior distribution of model parameters
Parameter Prior distribution Prior mean Prior s.d. Model
φr Beta 0.5000 0.0500
φpi Gamma 0.5000 0.3000
φy Gamma 0.5000 0.3000
φv Trunc. Normal 0.0000 0.5000
σr Inverse Gamma 0.0050 0.2000
ρyr Normal -1.0000 0.5000
ρypi Normal 0.0000 0.5000
ρyy Inverse Gamma 0.9000 0.2000
ρyv Trunc. Normal 0.0000 2.0000
σypi Normal 0.0000 1.0000
σyτ Normal 0.0000 1.0000
σy Inverse Gamma 0.1000 3.0000
στ Inverse Gamma 0.0050 0.3000
ρpir Normal 0.0000 2.0000
ρpipi Inverse Gamma 0.9000 0.2000
ρpiy Normal 0.0000 0.5000
ρpiv Normal 0.0000 2.0000
σpiτ Normal 0.0000 3.0000
σpi Inverse Gamma 0.0050 0.3000
ρvv Beta 0.8000 0.1000
σvr Normal 0.0000 3.0000
σvpi Normal 0.0000 3.0000
σvy Normal 0.0000 3.0000
σvτ Normal 0.0000 3.0000
λr Uniform(-100,100)
λpi Uniform(-100,100)
λy Uniform(-100,100)
λτ Uniform(-100,100)
λxr Uniform(-100,100)
λxpi Uniform(-100,-0.001)
λxy Uniform(-100,100)
λxτ Uniform(-100,100)
σν Uniform(0.001,0.02) DI
σ˜pi Uniform(0.001,100) DI
σ˜y Uniform(0.001,100) DI
σ˜τ Uniform(0.001,100) DI
σ˜v Uniform(0.001,100) DI
σ˜4 Inverse Gamma 1.0000 3.0000 FI
σ˜8 Inverse Gamma 1.0000 3.0000 FI
σ˜12 Inverse Gamma 1.0000 3.0000 FI
σ˜16 Inverse Gamma 1.0000 3.0000 FI
σ˜20 Inverse Gamma 1.0000 3.0000 FI
σ˜40 Inverse Gamma 1.0000 3.0000 FI
σ˜1pi Inverse Gamma 1.0000 3.0000 FI
σ˜4pi Inverse Gamma 1.0000 3.0000 FI
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1.G Additional Results, dispersed information model
1.G.1 Impulse Responses
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1.G.2 State Estimates and Yield Decompositions
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(a) Filtered estimate of inflation target and first three orders of expectation an annualized percent, dispersed
information model.
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
-50
0
50
100
Average beliefs about risk variable, order 0
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
-50
0
50
100
Average beliefs about risk variable, order 1
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
-50
0
50
100
Average beliefs about risk variable, order 2
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
-50
0
50
100
Average beliefs about risk variable, order 3
(b) Filtered estimate of risk variable and first three orders of expectation, dispersed information model.
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1.G.3 Yield Decompositions at Posterior Mode
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Figure 1.21: Decomposition of 1 year yields, posterior mode of dispersed information model
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Figure 1.22: Decomposition of 2 year yields, posterior mode of dispersed information model
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Figure 1.23: Decomposition of 3 year yields, posterior mode of dispersed information model
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
0
5
10
15
For 4 year bonds: Yield
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
0
5
10
15
For 4 year bonds: Rate Expectations
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
0.5
1
1.5
For 4 year bonds: Classical Risk Premium
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
-0.5
0
0.5
1
For 4 year bonds: Higher Order Wedge
Figure 1.24: Decomposition of 4 year yields,posterior mode of dispersed information model
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Figure 1.25: Decomposition of 5 year yields, posterior mode of dispersed information model
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1.G.4 Wedge Decompositions at Posterior Mode
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1.H Results, full information model
Table 1.8: Posterior estimates, full information Model
Mode Mean Median 5th percentile 95th percentile Std. Dev
φr 0.5349 0.5373 0.5350 0.5154 0.5727 0.0170
φpi 0.1771 0.1760 0.1702 0.1098 0.2522 0.0435
φy 0.1178 0.1114 0.1106 0.0908 0.1353 0.0133
φv 0.0283 0.0221 0.0221 0.0128 0.0314 0.0058
σr 0.0020 0.0021 0.0021 0.0019 0.0023 0.0001
ρyr -0.9946 -0.9278 -0.9334 -1.1513 -0.6789 0.1454
ρypi -0.3899 -0.4031 -0.4077 -0.5526 -0.2503 0.0943
ρyy 0.9525 0.9277 0.9266 0.8835 0.9730 0.0272
ρyv -0.0013 -0.0149 -0.0131 -0.0368 -0.0011 0.0109
σypi 0.2903 0.3863 0.3868 0.1419 0.6309 0.1509
σyτ 2.6851 2.6387 2.6360 2.2813 2.9877 0.2174
σy 0.0066 0.0068 0.0068 0.0061 0.0075 0.0004
στ 0.0012 0.0012 0.0012 0.0010 0.0013 0.0001
ρpir 0.8326 0.8344 0.8280 0.7050 1.0022 0.0831
ρpipi 0.4024 0.4059 0.4057 0.3579 0.4558 0.0299
ρpiy -0.1750 -0.1787 -0.1774 -0.2191 -0.1440 0.0235
ρpiv -0.0842 -0.0832 -0.0822 -0.1005 -0.0706 0.0088
σpiτ -0.1585 -0.1803 -0.1836 -0.3356 -0.0191 0.0956
σpi 0.0040 0.0040 0.0040 0.0036 0.0044 0.0003
ρvv 0.8610 0.8550 0.8533 0.8321 0.8931 0.0177
σvr 9.8381 9.7069 9.7540 9.2463 9.9673 0.2172
σvpi 2.1456 1.9804 2.0660 1.2514 2.5665 0.4220
σvy -2.1201 -2.1669 -2.1473 -2.6129 -1.7968 0.2609
σvτ 0.8711 0.8384 0.7641 0.1380 1.6089 0.4336
λr 1.2591 1.1900 1.2892 -0.3004 2.2988 0.7652
λpi -4.3221 -4.4279 -4.7589 -7.6234 0.1405 2.3402
λy -0.6214 -0.2257 -0.4712 -2.4933 2.3231 1.5115
λτ -0.1198 -0.1123 -0.1139 -0.2503 0.0229 0.0960
λxr 18.3449 18.5892 18.6880 13.1336 23.8793 3.3348
λxpi -76.2955 -77.1364 -76.8624 -80.6353 -73.8037 2.0341
λxy -17.4764 -22.7287 -21.9104 -33.4025 -17.1115 4.4454
λxτ 0.1536 0.0564 0.0529 -1.7520 1.8245 1.0744
σ˜4 0.0012 0.0012 0.0012 0.0011 0.0014 0.0001
σ˜8 0.0011 0.0011 0.0011 0.0010 0.0012 0.0001
σ˜12 0.0009 0.0010 0.0010 0.0008 0.0011 0.0001
σ˜16 0.0010 0.0009 0.0009 0.0008 0.0011 0.0001
σ˜20 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.0008 0.0011 0.0001
σ˜40 0.0014 0.0014 0.0014 0.0012 0.0016 0.0001
σ˜1pi 0.0032 0.0032 0.0032 0.0031 0.0032 0.0000
σ˜4pi 0.0039 0.0039 0.0039 0.0038 0.0039 0.0000
1.H.1 State estimates and Yield decompositions
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Figure 1.27: Decomposition of 1 year yields, full information
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Figure 1.28: Decomposition of 2 year yields, full information
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Figure 1.29: Decomposition of 3 year yields, full information
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Figure 1.30: Decomposition of 4 year yields, full information
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Figure 1.31: Decomposition of 5 year yields, full information
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Figure 1.32: Decomposition of 10 year yields, full information
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1.H.2 Impulse Responses
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(b) Response of financial variables to monetary policy rule shock, full information
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(a) Response of non-financial variables to inflation target shock, full information
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(b) Response of financial variables to inflation target shock, full information
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Chapter 2
Your Guess is as Good as Mine: Central
Bank Information and Monetary Policy
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Abstract
I document that Federal Reserve staff and professional forecasters have non-overlapping information
in their forecasts and that the Federal Reserve staff are not systematically more accurate than the
median professional. In light of this evidence, I develop a dynamic New Keynesian model where
firms and the central bank have incomplete, non-overlapping information sets and examine its ability
to match data on business cycle variables and inflation forecasts simultaneously. In the model, price
setting firms learn about persistent aggregate shocks via both idiosyncratic signals and the central
bank’s policy rate; firms and the central bank must form higher-order expectations about each
others’ beliefs. The calibrated model is able to capture the auto- and cross-correlation structure of
inflation forecasts of central bankers. The degree and type of noise in the central bank’s forecasting
process matters for the monetary transmission mechanism and the model’s ability to qualitatively
match business cycle comovements.
I gratefully acknowledge comments from Ryan Chahrour, and suggestions from participants at the Boston College
Macroeconomics Lunch and Dissertation Workshops, and helpful conversation with Alexandre Kohlhas.
97
2.1 Introduction
Many economic environments are characterized by both dispersed information and strategic inter-
dependence. The manager of a firm does not know what actions her competitors will take, nor does
she observe their beliefs. But her rivals’ beliefs affect the prices they set and thus her optimal price.
She can infer their beliefs using her own information; but, knowing her competitors are doing the
same thing, she must try to understand what they expect about what she expects, and so on.
In this type of environment, public signals can play an important role: they inform agents about
the underlying state of the world and make coordination easier by introducing a common compo-
nent of beliefs. One important public signal is monetary policy, and a number of recent papers have
discussed what firms learn from interest rate changes. In a full-information context, Nakamura and
Steinsson (2013) find evidence of a “Fed information effect” - monetary policy changes appear to
influence beliefs about both the stance of policy and future economic fundamentals. Tang (2015)
shows that, when agents have (common) imperfect information, inflation expectations can respond
positively to a contractionary monetary policy shock. This effect depends crucially on the form of
the central bank’s policy response function. These papers emphasize the information role of pub-
lic signals, rather than the coordination role; firms in these models all share a common imperfect
information set. By contrast, Melosi (2017) estimates a model where price-setting firms observe
idiosyncratic signals and also learn from the monetary policy rate. The latter communicates infor-
mation about the aggregate technology and demand shocks, as well as exogenous deviations from
the Taylor rule. Hence, agents observing rate hikes put posterior weight on both that the central
bank sees inflation today, but also knows other firms have extracted a positive inflation signal from
the policy rate movement. Knowing that others believe prices will rise, the optimal action is to raise
prices. He finds that the signaling channel is empirically important for understanding why interest
rate increases did not head off inflation in the 1970s.
An potentially important feature of the signaling channel of monetary policy is that, like firms,
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central bankers must form expectations of current and future economic conditions when setting
policy. Hence, the signal drawn from monetary policy actions must depend on the quality of infor-
mation accessed by the central banker. If central bank information is poor, then firms will choose
to ignore it and it will cease to serve either an informational or communication role. In this paper,
I document that central bank forecasts contain different information than firms’ forecasts, but are
not systematically more accurate (at least, when considering forecasts of current-quarter inflation).
Based on this finding, I examine the ability of a model with endogenous central bank forecasts and
dispersed firm information to explain the data. In Melosi (2017), the central bank’s policy rule is
set according to the true realizations of the output gap and inflation, plus three exogenous shocks
which capture persistent measurement error by the central bank and persistent deviations from the
Taylor rule; expectational error is another shock. By contrast, in this paper, I extend Melosi’s
model by explicitly modeling the inference problem of the central bank. In particular, I endogenize
persistent central bank error by explicitly modeling how the central bank forms expectations. In
order to forecast inflation, the central banker must form an expectation not only about exogenous
shocks, but also what firms belief about fundamentals, the central banker’s actions, and the beliefs
of other firms. The theoretical extension follows Kohlhas (2015). His focus is on understanding the
theoretical properties of central bank information disclosure for aggregate uncertainty and analyzing
disclosure of information, and he makes a number of simplifying assumptions to make the analysis
more tractable. As a result, his model has difficulty matching facts on the dispersion of private
sector forecasts of inflation, their accuracy relative to Federal Reserve forecasts, and he does not
examine the ability of the model to match realize data. By contrast, I examine the ability of a
model with signal extraction by the central bank to match data on forecasts and the macroecon-
omy simultaneously. This is important for both understanding the positive relevance of the central
bank’s expectations formation process and how central bankers’ information quality affects their
efforts to stabilize the economy. Endogenizing the belief formation process of central banks also
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has implications for optimal implementable policies (Svensson and Woodford (2004a), Boehm and
House (2014)).
I show that while calibrated versions of the model can quite successfully match unconditional
second moments of forecasts and (to an extent) inflation, it has a more difficult time matching
business cycle co-movements between measured total factor productivity (TFP), output, and interest
rates. Based on the estimated results of Melosi (2014, 2017), the calibration features a low degree
of price stickiness and relies on information frictions to generate endogenous persistence in inflation,
but the model predicts that inflation is overly-correlated with changes in technology relative to
the data. Assumptions about household information turn out to be critical for the ability of the
model to match data on output; here, households have perfect information and demand shocks
essentially result in noninflationary expansions in output. The calibrated results demonstrate that
the exact transmission of shocks depends crucially on how the central banker responds, which in
turn depends on how noisy her observations are. When the central banks’ observations of technology
are as noisy or noisier than firms, the model implies a negative correlation between output and
TFP rather than the weak, positive correlation observed in the data and has difficulty generating
inflation in response to positive demand shocks. In general, the qualitative (and quantitative)
reaction of inflation to exogenous shocks depends critically on the central banker’s inference problem.
Endogenously matching the persistence of central bank beliefs requires noisiness in their observations
of macroeconomic fundamentals, but too much or the “wrong kind” of noise hurts the ability of the
simple New Keynesian model to match the data. The results suggest that to match the cross-
and auto-correlations of output, inflation, interest rates, TFP, and firm and central bank inflation
forecasts, central bankers must have no worse information about technology shocks than firms and
similar (or perhaps slightly noisier) information about shocks to household demand.1
1A second, methodological lesson is that models with an “informationally large” agent and dispersed information
across firms may find themselves caught between accuracy and the curse of dimensionality. I comment on at the
end of the results section.
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Relationship to the literature. As discussed above, this paper is most closely related to Melosi
(2017) and Kohlhas (2015). The model in this paper also owes a genealogical debt to the literature
on public information in games with dispersed information. Morris and Shin (2002) examine the
effects of a public signal in a stylized “beauty contest” model. Woodford (2001) considers a similar
model with dynamic inference. The approach in this paper is most closely related to the more
recent literature on information in business cycle models. Of these, my paper is most close to that of
Nimark (2008) and Melosi (2014) who estimate models with dispersed information among firms and
show that New Keynesian models with dispersed information can successfully replicate a number of
stylized facts about inflation and prices. These papers, however, do not feature a signaling channel.
A closely related paper which takes a less parametric approach is Chahrour and Ulbricht (2017).
Their interest is estimating information wedges, that is, deviations from full-information actions of
firms, households, and the central bank, and then deriving an information structure that implements
those wedges. Their method is highly flexible, which allows it to match aggregate data well, but
they do not quantitatively examine whether model-implied beliefs are consistent with forecasts. I
impose a stronger information structure which allows me to examine the implications for difference
in information quality across fundamentals for both forecast data and realized macroeconomic data,
and also to examine more closely the information contained in monetary policy rates.
A number of other papers also consider the importance of central bank information with less struc-
ture on beliefs or in a reduced-form context. For example, Orphanides and Williams (2009) consider
the implications of imperfect central bank knowledge for monetary policy in a learning context where
the central bank has imperfect knowledge of the model parameters rather than the state. Romer
and Romer (2000) examine forecasts of the Federal Reserve Board staff and commercial forecasters.
I re-examine their findings in the next section. More recently, Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012b)
document that forecast errors in Romer and Romer’s data, as well as in surveys of household and
professional forecasters, is inconsistent with full-information rational expectations. This paper com-
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plements these by exploring the ability of a textbook model with optimal inference to rationalize
both business cycle data and implied beliefs. Svensson and Woodford (2004b) examine optimal
policy in an asymmetric information environment, but one where firms have full information and
the central bank does not.
The plan for the paper is as follows. In section 2.2, I document some facts about central bank and
professional forecasters - in particular, that there appears to be evidence of a lack of information
overlap and time-variation in relative forecasting performance. In section 2.3 and 2.4, I derive the
model with dispersed firm and central bank information and discuss the solution technique. In
section 2.5 I present and discusses quantitative results.
2.2 Central bank and firm information: Evidence from
nowcasts
Most rational expectations models assume agents have complete information about the state of the
world and the structure of the model up to the current period when forming beliefs. In such models,
agents’ “nowcasts” - i.e., their forecasts about within-period conditions - are perfect. Moreover, even
imperfect information models often assume common information abd thus a degenerate forecast dis-
tribution. By contrast, a recent literature on information frictions emphasizes differences in beliefs,
either because of infrequent and staggered updating (“sticky information” as in Mankiw and Reis
(2006)) or because agents observe private idiosyncratic signals. The typical focus in this literature is
on dispersion at the level of firms. In this section I document evidence that the information of Fed-
eral Reserve policymakers is imperfect, and is different from, but not systematically more accurate
than, the median forecasters’ information. Using forecasts to examine the information available to
policymakers and firms is the approach of a number of papers following Romer and Romer (2000),
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and I use a similar methodology to theirs with an updated data set.2 I focus on inflation fore-
casts from the published estimates of the Federal Reserve’s Summary of Economic and Financial
Conditions - the “Greenbook” - as well as data from the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF).
Figure 2.1a plots the time-series behavior of the median SPF and Greenbook nowcasts.3 The
median SPF and Greenbook forecasts generally are highly correlated, but often quite different from
one another and from the data. Some of this may reflect the fact that taking the median forecast
smooths out some of the variation. In figure 2.1b I replace the median forecast with the percentiles of
the individual forecasts from the SPF. The Greenbook forecast usually falls within the center of the
distribution from the SPF, but sometimes ventures quite far out of it, especially in the late 1970s.
Figure 2.2 re-frames the first figure in terms of real-time forecasting error by the Federal Reserve
Board staff (top) and the median SPF forecaster (bottom). Visual inspection suggests neither
appears to have a particular advantage, particularly in the early part of the sample. Moreover,
residuals appear to be serially correlated, inconsistent with a world where agents have full information
rational expectations.
The time series plots do not tell much about whether the two sets of forecasts are informationally
redundant. Continuing to focus on inflation, I follow Romer and Romer (2000) in undertaking two
simple tests for systematic differences of information. First, I regress real time inflation on the
nowcasts in the Greenbook and the median SPF forecaster. Essentially, this asks whether each
are separately useful in forecasting current period inflation. While Romer and Romer (2000) find
that private nowcasts are generally redundant of the Fed’s nowcasts, I find that both are significant
and positive, suggesting they both contain information about inflation that does not appear to
overlap.4 Moreover, while the R2 of this regression is high, it is less than 1; some information about
2 Sims (2002) finds some supportive evidence for the idea that the Federal Reserve has a forecasting advantage
that comes from private knowledge about its own actions or superior data collection. Hubert (2014) argues that
the Federal Reserve has an informational advantage in forecasting inflation, but not output, owing to “superior
information.”
3Inflation is measured as the annualized percent change in the GNP/GDP deflator. As Romer and Romer (2000)
note, the second revision ensures conceptual consistency between the “real time” data used in forecasting evaluation
while avoiding the errors associated with first estimates; arguably, the more accurate first revision is the series
actually targeted by forecasters.
4One reason for the differences between these results and that of Romer and Romer (2000) could be the duration of
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Table 2.1: Regression results for pi2ndt = α+ β1piGBt|t + β2piSPFt|t + εt
α -0.140
(0.177)
β1 0.705
(0.115)
β2 0.327
(0.127)
Adjusted R2 0.831
Standard errors in parentheses.
Table 2.2: Regression results for SEGBt − SESPFt = γ + εt
γ -0.268
(0.151)
Standard error in parentheses
current inflation is not present in the forecasts of either the Federal Reserve staff or the median SPF
forecaster.
Moreover, it is not the case that the Federal Reserve staff appear to be systematically better at
nowcasting inflation than their SPF counterparts. Again, following Romer and Romer (2000), I
regress the difference in squared errors in each quarter against a constant. A significant constant
suggests a difference in the mean accuracy of the forecasts. As the results in table 2.2 show, this
does not appear to be the case; although the point estimate is negative (implying greater accuracy
of the Greenbook forecast), the result is not significant.
To generate some intuition behind this result, I re-run the regressions from table 2.2 using 10-year
rolling windows. Perhaps surprisingly, I find that the only detectable forecasting advantage is in the
first few quarters of the sample (i.e., in the late 1960s) and beginning in the early 1980s following the
Volker disinflation. While the point estimate is generally negative, it is rarely statistically different
from zero. This suggests that at best the Federal Reserve staff have an only somewhat better
nowcasting track record than the median professional.
The results presented above suggest (1) the Federal Reserve staff’s forecasts are not systematically
better than those of the (median) respondents to the SPF and (2) The information that the SPF
the sample - their sample ends in 1991, while mine extends through the beginning of the Great Recession.
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Figure 2.3: Estimated difference in MSE of Greenbook and Median SPF forecast, rolling (ten year
window) regressions. The red line indicates the estimated γ while the dotted line
indicates two-standard-deviation confidence bands.
respondents have is not redundant of the central bank. However, there are a number of prima
facie reasons central bank information may matter in ways that are different from firm information
and may be important for understanding business cycles. First, if monetary policy has real effects,
than the informational process that leads to monetary policymaking matters. If a firm makes a
pricing “mistake” due to a bad forecast, it has no aggregate implications. But if the central bank
forecasts badly and sets an interest rate “too high” or “too low”, its effect on household savings
and consumption decisions may have business cycle implications, as emphasized by Orphanides and
van Norden (2002). Second, if monetary policy has a signaling role, as in Melosi (2017), then to
the extent that agents internalize that the central bank’s forecasts are of higher or lower quality
may impact how much weight is placed on the interest rate as a signal. Third, as Kohlhas (2015)
emphasizes, monetary policy changes may have implications for the informativeness of other signals,
to the extent that monetary policy stabilization could “obscure” underlying changes in the economy,
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but may also be useful to firms who are trying to assess the central banks’ private information.
2.3 A model with cross-higher order expectations
In this section, I take a simple dynamic New Keynesian model and augment it to include dispersed
information across firms and the central bank. The model is similar to that of Melosi (2017). Firms
produce goods using only labor and set prices subject to a Calvo friction. Firms and central bankers
have different information sets and receive noisy signals about persistent exogenous aggregate de-
mand and technology shocks. Monetary policy is set according to a Taylor rule, but also subject to
persistent shocks, which firms do not observe directly. The model rationalizes differences in forecasts
through differences in signal quality; consistent with the evidence cited in the previous two sections,
the Federal Reserve has a strict informational advantage because it knows its own actions, but firms
may learn from what the Federal Reserve is doing.
2.3.1 Timing
Time in the model is discrete. At the beginning of the period, exogenous shocks are realized, and
the central bank observes signals about the state. Given those signals, the central banker infers the
state of the world and sets the interest rate on government debt according to a Taylor (1993) rule.
In the second stage, firms observe their idiosyncratic technology, a private signal about demand, and
the interest rate set by the central banker. They use this information to update their estimate of the
state and set prices if able. In the final stage, households perfectly observe all shocks, and decide
their consumption, saving, and labor supply decisions. Firms hire labor to produce and deliver the
demanded quantity of their good at the price set at the previous stage. The fiscal authority issues
bonds and collects taxes (makes transfers) so that its budget constraint is satisfied; and markets
clear.
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2.3.2 Households
Households have identical (full) information sets and preferences and I use a representative household
to stand in for all households.5 The representative household maximizes utility from a composite
consumption good (aggregated using a Dixit-Stiglitz technology) and leisure, subject to a period
budget constraint and no-Ponzi condition. Their optimization problem is:
max
Ct+s,Bt+s,Nt+s
Et
∞∑
s=0
βt+sgt+s [lnCt+s − χnNt+s]
subject to
Pt+sCt+s +Bt+s = Wt+sNt+s +Rt+s−1Bt+s−1 + Πt+s − Tt+s
for all s
In the household’s problem β is the deterministic discount factor, gt is a stochastic preference shifter,
ν is the elasticity of substitution between varieties, χn is the parameter governing the marginal
disutility of labor, and Ct is the amount of the composite consumption good:
Ct =
(∫ 1
0
C
(ν−1)/ν
j,t
)ν/(ν−1)
where Cj,t is the differentiated variety produced by firm j. Bt are 1-period government bonds that
pay a (known in advance) gross nominal rate Rt next period. Workers are hired in spot markets at
(common) wage rate Wt. Πt are lump-sum profits from the disaggregated goods firms and Tt are
lump sum taxes or transfers from the government. Pt is the aggregate price index.
Given the Dixit-Stiglitz structure of the composite good, demand for individual differentiated
goods and the price level of the composite good take the familiar form:
5The decision to model households as having full information may see somewhat counterintuitive, given that other
agents have partial information. This decision is made for several reasons. First, it avoids complications about the
distribution of wealth. Second, it keeps the structure of the model close to that of Melosi (2017), which facilitates
comparison of my results to his. However, it has some complications for the results, which I discuss at the end of
section 2.5.
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Cj,t =
(
Pj,t
Pt
)−ν
Ct
Pt =
(∫ 1
0
P 1−νj,t
) 11−ν
The household’s optimization problem yields the following intratemporal optimality condition
Wt
χn
= PtCt
and the intertemporal optimality condition (the household Euler equation)
Etβ
[
gt+1
gt
Ct
Ct+1
Rt
pit+1
]
= 1
where gross inflation is pit = Pt+1/Pt.
Finally, I denote the nondeterministic part of the household stochastic discount factor as Ξt+s|t
and the SDF as
Ξt|t+s =
1/Ct+s
1/Ct
SDFt|t+s ≡ βsΞt+s|t
respectively.
2.3.3 Firms
Firms produce output Yj,t with a linear production technology:
Yj,t = Aj,tNj,t
where Nj,t is the labor employed by a particular firm j and where Aj,t is the firm’s idiosyncratic
productivity. I assume that labor markets are perfectly competitive, so firms take the wage rate as
given.
Firms’ price setting is subject to a Calvo friction. A fraction θ are unable to reoptimize in a given
period, and instead index their prices to the steady state inflation rate pi∗. Moreover, firms can not
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observe the true state of the world, and instead must infer it given their information set. I assume
they observe an infinite history of their idiosyncratic productivity, their idiosyncratic signal about
demand conditions gj,t, and the central bank’s interest rate. Their information set at time t is:
Ij,t ≡ {lnAj,τ , ln gj,τ ,Rτ : τ ≤ t} (2.1)
Denote nominal marginal cost
MCj,t = Wt/Aj,t
Assume firms who are allowed to change prices in period t maximize their lifetime discounted
perceived profits given their technology and a commitment to meet demand at the price they set.
Because households own firms, profits are discounted using the household stochastic discount factor.
All output is consumed, so Yj,t = Cj,t.
Let P ∗j,t be the optimal price selected by firm j that gets to reoptimize at t. The firm’s optimality
condition is:
Ej,t
{ ∞∑
s=0
(βθ)sΞt|t+s
[
(1− v)pis∗ + v
MCj,t+s
P ∗j,t
]
Yj,t+s
}
= 0 (2.2)
2.3.4 Fiscal policy and the central bank
The fiscal authority is passive and does not consume. It uses lumps-sum taxes and transfers to
balance its budget:
Rt−1Bt−1 = Bt + Tt
The central bank sets interest rates according to its policy rule:
Rt = R∗pi∗Et
( pit
pi∗
)φpi ( Yt
Y ft
)φy ∣∣∣∣ICBt
 ηr,t (2.3)
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where R∗ is the steady state real interest rate, pit is the gross inflation rate, and Y ft is the output
that would obtain if there were no information frictions and prices were fully flexible. Policy is
conditional on the information set of the central bank at time t, ICBt . ηr,t, which I refer to as “the
policy shock” captures reasons other than information imperfections the central bank might deviate
from the Taylor rule prescribed rate.
2.3.5 Exogenous processes
Aggregate technology shocks follow a stationary AR(1) process in logs:
ln at = ρa ln at−1 + σaεa,t
with εa,t ∼ i.i.d.N(0, 1)
(2.4)
The monetary policy rule is subject to shocks ηr,t which also follow an AR(1) process in logs:
ln ηr,t = ρr ln ηr,t−1 + σrεr,t
with εr,t ∼ i.i.d.N(0, 1)
(2.5)
Finally, demand shocks (the preference shifter in household utility) takes a similar form
ln gt = ρg ln gt−1 + σgεg,t
with εg,t ∼ i.i.d.N(0, 1)
(2.6)
Firm and central bank signals about technology and demand conditions take the form of the truth
plus normally distributed i.i.d noise, where firms share a common noise variance, which may differ
that of the central bank.
2.4 Solving the model and information assumptions
To make the analysis more tractable, I make a number of assumptions about the information available
to firms and the central bank. In particular, the model is analyzed linearly approximating the first
order conditions. I assume that agents know the linear approximation to the model (its structure
and parameters) and use it to conduct inference. The linearity of their inference problem, combined
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with assuming that all of the shocks are Gaussian, means that firms will optimally use the Kalman
filter for analysis.
I also solve the model under the assumption of “common knowledge of rationality”(Nimark (2007)).
Informally, it is common knowledge that agents form model-consistent expectations. This will result
in the formation of higher order expectations, but given stationarity of the fundamental disturbances
and discounting of the future, additional higher orders of expectation eventually converge and we can
find the approximate solution to the infinite-order model by truncating at a finite order k¯ (Kohlhas,
2014, Appendix B).
2.4.1 The linearized model
After linearizing around the nonstochastic steady state, the model resembles the canonical three-
equation dynamic New Keynesian model:
pit = (1− θ)E¯tpit + (1− θ)(1− βθ)E¯tyt − (1− θ)(1− β)at + βE¯tpit+1 (2.7)
yt = gt − Etgt+1 + Etyt+1 + Etpit+1 −Rt (2.8)
Rt = φpiECBt pit + φyECBt (yt − at) + ηt (2.9)
where E¯t indicates the average firm expectation conditional on time t information and ECBt
indicates the expectation of the central bank conditional on their information up to time t. at
appears in (2.7) because real marginal costs are approximately equal to yt − ajt and
∫
j
ajt = at.
at appears in (2.9) because up to a first order approximation, deviations from steady state in the
natural rate of output - the level of output that would obtain in the absence of information or nominal
frictions - are equal to deviations in technology.6 Higher order expectations - i.e., expectations of
expectations - arise naturally in this setting. Recursively substituting (2.7) reveals current inflation
depends on firms’ higher order average beliefs about future inflation, output, and technology. Higher
order expectations across the firm and central bank also arise. To see why this is the case, assume
6The derivation of these conditions is found in Appendix 2.A and is essentially the same as Nimark (2008) and
Melosi (2017).
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(for now) that φy = 0. The central bank, in order to set its interest rate, must form expectations
about current period inflation. Since we assumed that expectations were model-consistent, we have
that
Rt = φpiECBt ((1− θ)E¯tpit + (1− θ)(1− βθ)E¯tyt − (1− θ)(1− β)at + βE¯tpit+1) + ηt
i.e., current period interest rates depend on the central bank’s expectation of firms’ average expec-
tation of inflation, for example. But then note that by (2.8), current realized output depends on Rt
and by (2.7), inflation depends on average expectations of output. So we have that
pit = f(E¯tyt) = f(E¯t(ECBt E¯tpit))
i.e., inflation is a function of average beliefs about output, which is a function of the central bank’s
expectation of average beliefs about inflation, so firms’ beliefs about inflation depend on their beliefs
about the central bank’s beliefs about their beliefs, and so on.
Even if the central bank had full information, the model would imply an infinite regress of higher-
order expectations about other firms’ beliefs. Now there are two infinite regress problems - one
among firms and one between firms and the central bank.7
I solve the model numerically by matching coefficients. I suppose (and later confirm) that the
the solution can be written in terms of a (truncated) state vector X(0:k¯)t which contains all of the
higher-order expectations in the model. I assume the model solution takes the form
[
pit
yt
]
= AX(0:k¯)t +BRt
Rt = TX(0:k¯)t
(2.10)
And the state follows the law of motion:
7Although the notion of forming cross-higher order expectations may seem a little unusual, it is an immediate
implication of model-consistent expectations in this context. Moreoever, it appears to have real-world relevance:
Barrons.com’s Income Investing blog in September 2015 quoted a market analyst as saying: “We believe the U.S.
economy is on solid footing. we believe the Fed believes the U.S. economiy is on solid footing [...] it’s more difficult
to have confidence in that forecast. The Fed’s decision on whether to raise rates in September is likely to hing on
how confident the FOMC feels about their forecasts.” (Stone (2015)).
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X
(0:k¯)
t+1 = MX
(0:k¯)
t +N

εat
εrt
εgt
eCB,at
eCB,gt
 (2.11)
To arrive at this representation of the economy, we first need to more concretely characterize how
agents perform inference.
2.4.2 Higher order expectations
As the discussion in the previous subsection makes clear, agents in the model must form higher-order
expectations in order to infer their optimal action. In this section, I characterize those beliefs; the
discussion here follows Kohlhas (2015, 2014) closely.
Write the actual realization of a particular variable z as z(0). Collecting the three exogenous states
in a vector xt, we have
xt ≡ x(0)t ≡
atηt
gt

Denote the higher order expectations of firms recursively:
x
(n)
t ≡
∫ 1
0
Et[x(n−1)t |Ωjt ]dj
i.e., the average expectation of the realization of the exogenous variables is x(t1), the average firm
expectation of its average expectation is x(2)t and so on.
Denote the expectations of the central bank with a (CB) superscript. That is, the average
expectation of the central bank about the realization of variables is x(CB)t , its expectation of the
average expectation is x(CB)(1)t and so on. Note that because information sets are not nested, the
law of iterated expectations does not apply. Thus, we need to keep track of, for example, the average
firm expectation of the central bank expectation of the firm’s average expectation:
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x
(1)(CB)(1)
t =
∫
j
Ejt x
(CB)(1)
t dj
x
(CB)(1)(CB)(1)
t = ECBt x
(1)(CB)(1)
t
I refer to an “order” of expectation as a collection the expectations of both firms and the central
bank where the expectations operator has been applied the same total numbre of times; i.e., the
second order of expectations contains the firms’ average expectations of average expectations, its
average expectation of the central bank’s expectation, and the central bank’s expectation of the firm
average expectations, as shown in equation (2.12).
X
(0:∞)
t =

at
ηt
gt
x
(1)
t
x
(CB)
t
x
(2)
t
x
(1)(CB)
t
x
(CB)(1)
t
x
(3)
t
x
(2)(CB)
t
x
(1)(CB)(1)
t
x
(CB)(2)
t
x
(CB)(1)(CB)
t
x
(4)
t
x
(3)(CB)
t
x
(2)(CB)(1)
t
x
(1)(CB)(2)
t
x
(1)(CB)(1)(CB)
t
x
(CB)(3)
t
x
(CB)(2)(CB)
t
x
(CB)(1)(CB)(1)
t
...
...

(2.12)
To isolate terms that are type-specific, write:
X
(0:∞)
t = H
 xtE¯tX(0:∞)t
ECBt AnX
(0:∞)
t
 (2.13)
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where An is a matrix that deletes the redundant orders of expectations. H is a reordering matrix
that reorganizes the vector
[
xt, E¯tX
(0:∞)
t , E
CB
t AnX
(0:∞)
t
]T
into the form of (2.12). Some details
about how higher orders of expectation are organized in practice are found in appendix 2.B.1. Details
of the inference problems are found in appendix 2.B. The end result is a recursive expression for the
matrices governing hte law of motion in equation (2.11).
2.4.3 Structural equations, equilibrium, and solution method
In this section, I outline the structural equations of the model conditional on the proposed law of
motion for the state.
Define H¯ and HCB as two matrices that select EtX(0:k¯)t and ECBt AnX
(0:k¯)
t from X
(0:k¯)
t (See
appendix 2.B.4 for details). We can rewrite the linearized model in terms of the proposed solution,
known coefficient matrices, and X(0:k¯)t . To begin, write the system of structural equations:
[
pit
yt
]
=
[
(1− θ) (1− θ)(1− βθ)
0 0
]
E¯t
[
pit
yt
]
+
[
βθ 0
0 0
]
E¯t
[
pit+1
yt+1
]
+
[
0 0
1 1
]
Et
[
pit+1
yt+1
]
+
[
0
−1
]
Rt +
[−e′1(1− θ)(1− βθ)
(1− ρg)e′3
]
X0:k¯t
Rt =
[
φpi φy
]
ECBt
[
pit
yt
]
+
[−e1φy]ECBt X0:k¯t + e2X0:k¯t
(2.14)
In appendix 2.C, I show how to rewrite the expectations terms solely in terms of structural matrices
and the state. The end result, after matching coefficients and conditional on the law of motion for
the state, is a system of three matrix equations in three unknown matrices A,B and T :
A = GCAH¯ +GF (A+BT )MH¯ +RXF (A+BT )M +GX
B = GCB +GR
T = FC(AHCB +BT ) + FXHCB + e2
(2.15)
B can be solved for explicitly, and in the appendix I derive an explicit expression for T in terms of
A. With all the elements in place, I define equilibrium:
Definition 1 (Equilibrium). An equilibrium is a collection of matrices A,M and N such that the
system of matrix equations (2.15) and appendix equations (2.45), (2.46) are satisfied.
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The definition of equilibrium is that agents’ beliefs about the evolution of the state and the
mapping between the state and endogenous variables is consistent with the actual mapping between
the state and the exogenous variables, and also consistent with individual optimality conditions. All
of these restrictions are summarized the cross-equation restrictions that define A,M and N .
Unfortunately, even with truncation, we can not solve the model explicitly in terms of the pa-
rameters; in general there is not a closed-form expression for the Kalman gain matrices embedded
in M and N . However, by the arguments in Nimark (2007) and Kohlhas (2014), the mapping from
{A,M,N} → {A,M,N}′ is a contraction mapping so an equilibrium exists.
In practice, I find a solution to the model by initializing at the full-information solution, using that
to back out an implied M and N , then iterating between updating A and M,N until convergence.
2.5 Quantitative Results
In this section, I illustrate through calibrated examples the ability of the model to generate macroe-
conomic and forecast dynamics that can rationalize some of the facts established in section 2.2. As
a preview, the model requires some degree of central bank noise to match comovement of inflation
and firm and central bank inflation forecasts. But it is essentially unable to capture the correlation
of measured total factor productivity with other variables, or capturing correlations of output with
inflation and inflation forecasts. and has a hard time matching the relationship of output to other
variables as well. The experiments reveal that the type of and degree of central bank noise matters
for the model’s ability to match forecast moments.
The model calibration is shown in table 2.3. The degree of price stickiness, the variance of the
shocks, and the persistence of demand and monetary shocks are close to the mean estimates in Melosi
(2017). Technology shocks are calibrated to match the empirical persistence of utilization-adjusted
TFP for non-investment goods (from Fernald (2012)), which is much lower than the estimated value
in Melosi (2017). The weight on the output gap in the Taylor rule is set to a lower value in line
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Parameter Value
β .99
θ 0.35
φpi 1.5
φy 0.05
ρa 0.8796
100σa 1.5
ρg 0.9038
100σg 3.75
ρr 0.9468
100σr 0.85
100σ˜a 2.6
100σ˜g 8
100σ˜aCB Varies (see table 2.4)
100σ˜gCB Varies (see table 2.4)
k¯ 10
Table 2.3: Calibrated parameters of the cross-higher-order-expectations model.
with most of the literature. σ˜g is set to a much lower value than in Melosi (2017) because highly
uniformative firm signals about demand shocks lead to nonexistence of equilibria when the central
bank is also uninformed about technology shocks.8
Given this calibration, I examine the role of central bank information by varying over different
calibrations for the central bank’s two noise parameters. Details of the calibration are in table
2.4. The first calibration essentially corresponds to perfect central bank information; the second,
to a situation where the central bank has strictly more accurate exogenous signal than firms; the
third explores what happens when the central bank and firms have equally noisy exogenous signals,
while calibrations 4 and 5 explore asymmetric quality of information across technology and demand
shocks. I evaluate the ability of the model to match the data by examining the response of the
economy conditional on exogenous shocks and the ability of the model to match unconditional
second moments. For the latter, I use the correlogram (out to 6 lags) of detrended data on GDP
deflator inflation, real GDP (from the BEA’s NIPA tables) the Federal Funds Rate (the quarterly
average of the effective daily rate reported by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis), utilization-
adjusted TFP for non-investment goods, and 1-4 quarter ahead forecasts of inflation from the SPF
8I comment on some of the technical issues at the end of this section.
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Calibration 100σ˜aCB 100σ˜gCB
1 2× 10−14 2× 10−14
2 2 2
3 2.6 8
4 1.3 12
5 3.9 4
Table 2.4: Calibrated central bank noise parameters.
(using the median forecast) and the Greenbook. The data run from 1960Q1-2010Q4, with moments
calculated pairwise to account for jagged start dates in the forecast data. Data are detrended using
the Hamilton (2017) filter.
Plots of impulse responses (to a 100× standard deviation shock) and correllograms are shown in
appendix 2.D.9.
Full central bank information. Calibration 1 essentially implies central bankers have full in-
formation while firm information is dispersed. Impulse responses and correlations are displayed in
2.D.1. The high quality of central bank information is apparent from the impulse responses, where
central bank expectations are arbitrarily close to the realization of variables. As the evidence in sec-
tion 2.2 shows, this is counterfactual. Under this calibration, firms underestimate technology shocks
slightly, and also misattribute part of the effect of a technology shock to negative demand or interest
rate shocks. There is a slight price puzzle in response to interest rate shocks, although inflation
expectations rise in response to this shock, which is consistent with evidence from a sign-restricted
VAR estimated by Melosi (2017). Such shocks are contractionary, and firms attribute part of what
they observe to negative technology shocks and a small, positive demand shock. Demand shocks,
however, do not have their “typical” effect in New Keynesian models. Inflation essentially does not
change, while output expands. This is likely because firms’ information about demand is quite poor
and prices are relatively flexible. This means that losses of mispricing (due to not raising prices
9I also solve a version of the model using Melosi (2017)’s mean posterior results for all the parameters. At his
calibration, more than an arbitrarily small amount of noise in the observation of the level of technology results in
the absence of a solution, although there can be somewhat more noise in demand. Results for that calibration and
some additional details are in appendix 2.E.
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when household demands are higher) are relatively low (since they will likely be adjusted in the
near future), and firms underestimate those losses further because they underestimate the positive
demand shock. Hence, firms do not believe that others will raise prices much (inflation expectations
do not increase), nor do they believe they themselves should raise prices for fundamental reasons.
In general, the model has difficulty generating expansions in inflation as a result of demand shocks,
regardless of the calibration; it is most stark here, when there are not complicated confounding
effects from central bank information.
The “supply shock” behavior of inflation, interest rates, and output is the emphasis of Melosi
(2017)’s estimated results because it allows the model to match the data in the 1970s. However, in
his estimated results, the impact response of demand shocks is of a similar magnitude and inflation
expectations fall essentially immediately. However, as the impulse responses in appendix 2.E shows,
this results is fragile to the extent that introducing noise in the central bank’s observation of demand
shocks restores their typical behavior when other parameters are left at the posterior mean of hist
estimation.
Turning to unconditional second moments, the model with near-perfect central bank information
captures qualitatively the autocorrelation of inflation and (to an extent) its co-movement with in-
terest rates. It generates essentially no feedback from activity in the current or previous quarters
to inflation, whereas in the data there is a weak positive relationship between lagged output and
inflation. As mentioned at the start of the section, the model (regardless of calibration) misses a
great deal regarding the relationship between detrended technology and other variables. Finally,
the model has difficulty capturing the relationship between firm expectations and interest rates, and
features of far-ahead central bank inflation expectations. In short, the model captures some features
of (firm) beliefs but makes counterfactual predictions about central bank beliefs; to capture the fact
that central bankers make forecast errors, we have to introduce noise into their beliefs.
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Noisy but superior central bank information. Calibration two assumes central bank observa-
tions are noisy, but strictly better than those of firms. The slight addition of noise, however, changes
the conditional and unconditional predictions of the model as shown in 2.D.2. Firms’ forecasts are
immediately worse conditional on each kind of shock, in the sense that their absolute forecast errors
are larger.10 This represents the loss of reliable information coming from the interest rate signal.
The central bank also makes mistakes; in fact their mistakes are somewhat larger than those of firms
after technology shocks, because they under-estimate the size of the shock to a greater extent.11
Technology shocks cause a greater fall in inflation than in the no-noise case, despite current infla-
tion expectations reacting about the same amount; inspecting the New Keynesian Phillips Curve
(2.7), this implies that agents believe that future inflation (or higher-order average firm beliefs about
inflation) will be lower for longer than in the full-central-bank-information case. Essentially, firms
correctly assume that the central bank will underreact to the shock and, indeed, the gain in output
is smaller than in the full-information case because nominal do not fall as much. In response to a
monetary policy shock, the overall path of inflation, output, and rates is reasonably similar to the
previous case. Owing to its (relative more) superior information, the central banks’ beliefs are more
accurate than firms’ in response to a demand shock. The last two sets of impulse responses show
that, owing to the slow learning process by central banks and firms, i.i.d noise in central bank beliefs
has persistent effects on inflation and especially output; Technology noise shocks are qualitatively
similar to an expansionary monetary policy shock in a full-information New Keyesnian model. By
contrast, demand noise shocks are quite small and have barely any effect. The difference is that a
one-standard deviation demand noise shock produces relatively little movement in interest rates and
is quickly reversed, so firms’ beliefs do not change in a particularly persistent way; households, of
course, do not react to the aggregate noise shock except to the extent interest rates or prices change.
10The “jagged” movements in impulse responses are related to the accuracy of the solution, as I discuss at the end of
the section.
11Essentially, firms are able to construct a more accurate signal of technology by combining their idiosyncratic
information with the interest rate signal, at the expense of mis-attributing some of the interest rate movement
endogenously to other shocks. The central bank must rely on a single signal, but only under-estimates fundamental
changes because it attributes some of what it observes to its own noise.
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In terms of unconditional moments, the addition of noise qualitatively improves the cross-correlation
structure between central bank and firm beliefs, and (to an extent) the relationship between interest
rates and lags of central bank forecasts. The relationship between inflation and contemporaneous
and lagged output is somewhat improved as well, although the model continues to predict too great
of a correlation between contemporaneous inflation and lagged inflation expectations relative to the
data.
Overall, introducing noise into the signals of the central bank qualitatively matches a few features
of section 2.2. The central bank makes forecasting errors, just as firms do; the extent of those
errors is conditional on the type of shock (hence, the advantage might show up more in time periods
where fluctuations are demand- or policy-driven). Consistent with the empirical evidence cited in
the introduction, monetary policy actions are still informative to firms.
Symmetry in noise Calibration 3 illustrates an economy where the central bank and firms have
equally noisy signals about technology and demand. Recall that this does not mean they will have
equal forecast errors; the Fed has a strict advantage over firms in that it observes ηt perfectly, but
firms have the advantage of combining their signals with the interest rate when forming beliefs. It
turns out that calibrations 3 and 4 produce reasonably similar impulse responses (except following
technology shocks) and unconditional correlations, so appendix 2.D.3 contains the results for only
calibration 3 with only one additional impulse response for calibration 4. When the central bank
has relatively better information about technology, technology shocks become contractionary. As
an accounting matter, aggregate hours must be strongly falling in response to the technology shock
in order for technology improvements to generate a decrease in output. This can come from price
rigidity induced by both the Calvo friction and the underestimate of the shock - firms need fewer
workers to produce input matching the demand they face from households at the prevailing price.
Indeed inflation is (conditionally) slower to react here than in the first calibration. At the same
time, real rates are rising (since inflation is falling more than nominal rates) so that consumers are
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satisfied with a reduction in consumption.
Monetary shocks are qualitatively similar to calibration 2, although firms do not attribute as much
of the change in interest rates to demand shocks. Demand shocks do not generate much inflation
because firms systematically underestimate the size of the shock and do not get much help from the
central bank’s policy signal. Output increases by more, however, because households are able to
borrow cheaply to finance the additional consumption they desire, and prices are not adjusting to
counteract this effect. Unconditionally, the model somewhat more closely captures the relationship
of federal reserve inflation forecasts to lags of other observables, although it does worse at matching
the unconditional relationship between TFP and output.
Adjusting the central bank’s information so that they have an advantage in technology shocks but
a relative disadvantage in forecasting demand shocks is qualitatively quite similar to the symmetric
noise case. The largest difference is in impulse responses to technology shocks. Inflation falls less
and interest rates fall slightly more; this is enough that real rates do not rise as much and technology
shocks are again expansionary. The reaction of endogenous variables and beliefs to monetary shocks
is more or less similar, as is the qualitative/quantitative effect of demand shocks. Accordingly, the
main difference between the 3rd and 4th calibrations in terms of unconditional second moments
is that the higher-noise-on-technology-shocks quantitatively matches the low, positive, TFP and
output correlation structure while calibration 3 basically implies they are uncorrelated. Firms’
expectations are still estimated to have a too-high correlation with interest rates (driven by too high
of a correlation with near-term central bank inflation expectations), but both calibrations 3 and 4
are able to capture correlations of inflation forecasts reasonably well.
Asymmetric noise. Finally, appendix 2.D.4 illustrates an economy where the central bank has
relatively noisier technology signals but relatively superior demand signals. Unsurprisingly, under
this calibration firms’ forecasts for output (and the output gap) are more accurate than the central
banks’ following technology shocks (their inflation forecasts appear to be roughly equally accurate),
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but the central bank has more accurate forecasts following demand shocks. Shocks also have effects
at odds with the typical results in New Keynesian models; technology shocks produce business cycle
comovements similar to negative demand shocks (excepting the change in TFP itself) owing to the
rise in real rates, and demand shocks produce mild disinflation.12 models are important for business
cycle accounting; Unconditionally, the model generates negative correlation between output and
TFP, but does similarly in terms of matching the correlogram of inflation expectations.
Summary of the quantitative exercise. Regardless of the calibration, the model has some
difficulty matching features of the data; particularly, the relatively mild relationship between TFP,
inflation, and output, and comovements between output and other variables. However, adding noise
to the central bank’s observations of exogenous demand and technology processes allows the data
to qualitatively match the fact that interest rate movements are informative for firms, and neither
firms nor the central bank have an absolute advantage in forecasting.
Since the dynamics of the model depend nonlinearly on all the parameters of the model, any lessons
about what features models with dispersed information among firms and the central bank should
have are necessarily tentative. Adjustments to the processes of exogenous processes and signal noise
appear to have complicated effects on both conditional and unconditional predictions of the data.
Nevertheless, a few lessons emerge. First, when the central bank has overly-noisy observations of
technology, its failure to accommodate technology shocks by lowering the nominal rate can lead to
contractionary expansions in technology and a negative correlation between technology and output.
Since the correlation in the data used here is weakly positive, this suggests that (at least for the
United States), the central bank’s observation error for technology is not too large (at least here,
not larger than firms’). Too noisy technology observations by the central bank can also lead to the
nonexistence of fixed points, which may be a purely numerical issue (discussed below), but also may
12The unusual impulse responses illustrate that both the form of the monetary policy rule and assumptions about
what information agents have are important for accounting for business cycle fluctuations.
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be related to satisfying the Taylor principle.13 However, it may be that firms have weakly better
signals about aggregate demand shocks, even if those signals are quite noisy; this is consistent with
both firms and the central bank having different expertise in forecasting that leads to differences
in relative accuracy at different times. Second, when the central bank faces a signal extraction
problem, its measurement error shocks can resemble monetary policy shocks; this depends both
on the size of its noise (which determines how quickly the central bank learns about its error) but
also how firms and the private sector endogenously incorporate that error into their own beliefs.
Third, relative to a model which features exogenous measures of forecast error (such as Melosi
(2017)), the model has a more difficult time matching business cycle movements. This partially
seems related to the assumption that households have perfect information, unlike firms and the
central bank. Essentially, the model lacks a mechanism to limit household reactions to shocks;
firms do not raise prices very quickly and the central bank does not adjust rates as much as it
would otherwise. This is a distinction between the results here and those of Melosi (2017). In
Melosi’s model, mismeasurement of inflation is just another shock, and one could always engineer
observationally equivalent sequences of interest rate and inflation forecast error shocks. But when
central bank expectations are endogenous, the central bank systematically under-reacts to exogenous
shocks. Hence, the assumption of a representative household with full information, made in Melosi
(2017) and made here, is not innocuous.
Computational issues. Several of the impulse responses, especially those related to monetary
policy shocks, feature unusual saw-tooth dynamics. This appears to be related to the accuracy of
the truncated solution; it shows up more frequently when low orders of truncation are used, when
shocks are more persistent, and when signal noise is larger. This is partially why I have emphasized
qualitative features of the impulse responses rather than the magnitudes. Kohlhas (2015) finds that
he is able to find accurate solutions for k¯ = 8 but I find even for a higher level of truncation, accuracy
13A similar issue is discussed in Boehm and House (2014).
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becomes an issue. However, the model with explicit cross-higher-order-beliefs encounters the curse
of dimensionality rather quickly as the order of truncation is increased.14
2.6 Conclusion
Inspired by evidence that monetary policy has an information and coordination role, and that
central bankers’ forecasts are not systematically better than the forecasts of firms, I examine the
ability of a monetary policy featuring both dispersed firm information and endogenous central bank
forecasts to match both macroeconomic data and agents’ beliefs. The model can successfully match
features of both firm and inflation forecasts, and under certain calibrations captures the feedback
between central bank beliefs, interest rates, and firm beliefs. However, the model has difficulty
matching output dynamics despite these successes. This is likely due to a simplifying assumption
that households have full information, which is less innocuous here than in the estimated model of
Melosi (2017). The feedback effects between central bank information and household consumption
are difficult to study given the complicated nature of the model, but they appear to be critical in
getting the model to match data on beliefs and outcomes simultaneously.
Empirical evidence - including Romer and Romer (2000), Tang (2015), and Nakamura and Steins-
son (2013) - suggests that in the United States, the private sector learns about the macroeconomy
in part by observing what the Federal Reserve does. The reduced-form evidence in 2.2 suggests that
the forecasts which inform monetary policy rates are imperfect; the results in the previous section
suggest treating central bank forecast error as exogenous delivers quite different positive implications
than when it is endogenous. My results suggest that understanding this in a unified way is impor-
tant for our understanding of an informational monetary transmission mechanism, but also for how
14Calculating Kalman gains for both firms and the central bank becomes computationally burdensome and raises
problems with double-precision arithmetic when the state covariance matrix becomes large; see Simon (2006),
for a discussion of some of these issues from the engineering literature. In contrast to Kohlhas (2015), the three
persistent shocks in the model apparently require a higher truncation to achieve an accurate solution; k¯ = 10
implies that Xt has 1,125 elements, which is sufficiently computationally costly to preclude even generalized
method of moments estimation, much less full-information methods like those used in Melosi (2017).
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monetary policymakers can adjust their policy strategies (either their policy rules or communica-
tion strategies) to optimally stabilize the economy. Unfortunately, besides Kohlhas (2015), many of
the modeling techniques developed for dealing with dispersed information are not well-equipped for
handling “informationally large” agents like a central banker, or dispersed information that differs
in quality across types of agents. Frequency-domain techniques, such as Huo and Takayama (2014),
Tan and Walker (2015), and Miao et al. (2017) show promise in delivering closed-form solutions of
dispersed information models, but are less well-equipped for dealing with endogenous information
(or differences in information across agent types) except in simple cases. An alternative for exploring
these issues is non-parametric approaches which sidestep the forecasting-the-forecasts of others prob-
lem and the accompanying curse of dimensionality, such as Chahrour and Ulbricht (2017). While
this type of approach can generate information-based business cycles and match aggregate data well,
it is less obvious how they can be brought to bear on understanding how agents learn from particular
information sources. An important step for future work is developing techniques that can accurately
and quickly solve models with endogenous information and which can accommodate “noise shocks”
which do not disappear with aggregation. More accurate solutions will clarify the complicated in-
formational feedback mechanisms; more computationally tractable techniques will also enable full
estimation rather than limited comparisons across calibrations.
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2.A Derivation of the linearized Phillips curve
The derivation of the NKPC is as in Melosi (2017) and Nimark (2008), but is reproduced below.
The starting point is the first order condition for the firm’s price setting problem:
Ej,t
{ ∞∑
s=0
(βθ)sΞt|t+s
[
(1− v)pis∗ + v
MCj,t+s
P ∗j,t
]
Yj,t+s
}
= 0 (2.16)
We want to transform this so it is in terms of stationary variables. This involves (mostly) multi-
plying and dividing by γt and aggregate price levels:
Ej,t
{
Ξt|t
[
(1− v) + vMCj,t
P ∗j,t
Pt
Pt
]
γt
Yj,t
γt
+
∞∑
s=1
(βθ)s
[
(1− v)pis∗ + v
MCj,t+s
P ∗j,t
Pt+s
Pt
Pt
Pt+s
]
Yj,t+sγ
t+sΞt|t+s
1
γt+s
}
= 0
We can write Pt+s/Pt as Πsτ=1pit+τ . Using the definitions of the stationary variables:
Ej,t
{[
(1− v) + vmcj,t
p∗j,t
]
yj,tζt|t +
∞∑
s=1
(βθ)sζt|t+s
[
(1− v)pis∗ + v
mcj,t+s
p∗j,t
Πsτ=1pit+τ
]
yj,t+s
}
= 0
At the nonstochastic steady state, given CES preferences, optimal prices are a constant markup
over marginal cost, with the markup term being v/(v − 1). This immediately implies that in the
above expression the bracketed terms will be zero at the nonstochastic steady state. Furthermore,
the necessary condition holds if and only if the bracketed terms are zero, so for the linearizion about
the nonstochastic steady state we can focus on the bracketed terms.
Denote nonstochastic steady state variable with a ∗ subscript, e.g. pj,∗ is the steady state price
relative to the price level of firm j. Rewrite the inner terms:
Ej,t
{[
(1− v) + vmcj,t
p∗j,t
]
+
∞∑
s=1
(βθ)s
[
(1− v)pis∗ + v
mcj,t+s
p∗j,t
Πsτ=1pit+τ
]}
= 0 (2.17)
Since we are taking a first order approximation in logs, write:
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Ej,t
{[
(1− v) + vmcj,∗
p∗j,∗
(1 + m̂cj,t − p̂∗j,t)
]
+
∞∑
s=1
(βθ)s
[
(1− v)pis∗ + v
mcj,∗
p∗j,∗
(1 + m̂cj,t+s − p̂∗j,t +
s∑
τ=1
pit+τ )
]}
= 0
In steady state:
1− v + vmc∗
p∗j,∗
+
∑
s
(βθ)s + (1− v)pi∗ + vmc∗
p∗j,∗
= 0
so collecting those terms and eliminating, we focus on the log deviations:
Ej,t
[
m̂cj,t − p̂∗j,t +
∞∑
s=1
(βθ)s
(
m̂cj,t+s − p̂∗j,t +
s∑
τ=1
pit+τ
)]
= 0
Collecting all the p̂∗j,t terms and applying the formula for an infinite geometric sum we write
Ej,t
[
m̂cj,t − 11− βθ p̂
∗
j,t +
∞∑
s=1
(βθ)s
(
m̂cj,t+s +
s∑
τ=1
pit+τ
)]
= 0
We defined p̂∗j,t as lnP ∗j,t − lnPt Note that aggregate prices aren’t in the agent’s information set
so we can’t pull them out of the sum. But own optimal prices are, hence we can substitute in the
identity and rearrange to obtain
lnP ∗j,t = (1− βθ)Ej,t
[
m̂cj,t +
1
1− βθ lnPt +
∞∑
s=1
(βθ)s
(
m̂cj,t+s +
s∑
τ=1
pit+τ
)]
(2.18)
Roll this equation forward one period and apply the law of iterated expectations to obtain
lnP ∗j,t+1 = (1− βθ)Ej,t+1
[
m̂cj,t+1 +
1
1− βθ lnPt+1 +
∞∑
s=1
(βθ)s
(
m̂cj,t+s+1 +
s∑
τ=1
pit+τ+1
)]
Take m̂cj,t+1 inside the sum operator and solve for the sum of marginal costs to obtain:
∞∑
s=1
(βθ)sEj,tm̂cj,t+s =
βθ
1− βθ
[
Ej,t lnP ∗j,t+1 − Ej,t lnPt+1)
]− βθ ∞∑
s=1
(βθ)s
s∑
τ=1
Ej,tpit+τ+1 (2.19)
Substitute (2.19) into (2.18) to obtain
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lnP ∗j,t =(1− βθ)
[
Ej,tm̂cj,t +
1
1− βθEj,t lnPt
]
+ βθ
[
Ej,t lnP ∗j,t+1 − Ej,tPt+1
]− (1− βθ) ∞∑
s=1
(βθ)s
s∑
τ=1
Ej,tpit+τ+1
+
∞∑
s=1
(βθ)s
s∑
τ=1
Ej,t(pit+τ )
(2.20)
Some algebra allows us to write this last term as
(1− βθ)
∞∑
s=1
(βθ)s
s∑
τ=1
Ej,t(pit+τ ) = βθEj,tpit+1 + (1− βθ)
∞∑
s=1
(βθ)s+1
s∑
τ=1
Ej,tpit+τ+1
substituting this into (2.20) and simplifying yields
lnP ∗j,t = (1− βθ)Ej,tm̂cj,t + Ej,t lnPt + βθ [Ej,t lnPj,t+1 + Ej,tpit+1 − Ej,t lnPt+1]
By definition, pit+1 = lnPt+1 − lnPt − ln pi∗. Substitute this in:
lnP ∗j,t = (1− βθ)Ej,tm̂cj,t + (1− βθ)Ej,t lnPt + βθEj,t lnP ∗j,t+1 − βθ ln pi∗ (2.21)
Denote the average reset price as lnP ∗t =
∫
lnP ∗j,tdj. The evolution of the price level can be
written
lnPt = θ(lnPt−1 + ln pi∗) + (1− θ) lnP ∗t (2.22)
Integrate (2.21) across firms and solve for the average reset price
lnP ∗t = (1− βθ)m̂c(1)t|t + (1− βθ) lnP (1)t|t + βθ lnP ∗t+1|t(1)− βθ ln pi∗ (2.23)
Plug (2.23) into (2.22) to show
lnPt = θ lnPt−1 + (θ − (1− θ)βθ) ln pi∗ + (1− θ)
[
(1− βθ)m̂c(1)t|t + (1− βθ) lnP (1)t|t + βθ lnP ∗t+1|t(1)
]
(2.24)
Given the price index (2.22) and the definition of pit, we can show two facts:
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lnP ∗t+1 =
pit+1
1− θ + lnPt + ln pi∗
lnPt+1 = pit+1 + lnPt + ln pi∗
We can plug these into (2.24) in order to obtain
pit + lnPt−1 + ln pi∗ =θ lnPt−1 + (θ − (1− θ)βθ) ln pi∗
+ (1− θ)
[
(1− βθ)m̂c(1)t|t + (1− βθ) lnP (1)t|t
+ βθ
pi(1)t+1|t
1− θ + lnP
(1)
t|t + ln pi∗
]
Collecting terms:
pit =(θ − 1) lnPt−1 + (θ − (1− θ)βθ − 1) ln pi∗
+ (1− θ)
[
(1− βθ)m̂c(1)t|t + (1− βθ) lnP (1)t|t
]
+ βθpi(1)t+1|t + (1− θ)βθ lnP (1)t|t + (1− θ)βθ ln pi∗
Simplifying this expression:15
pit =(θ − 1) lnPt−1 + (θ − 1)pi∗ + (1− θ) lnP (1)t|t
(1− θ)(1− βθ)m̂c(1)t|t + βθpi(1)t+1|t
Rewriting this yields the expression in the paper (using the fact that m̂c(1)t =
∫
j
Ejt (yt − ajt )dj) =
y
(1)
t − at
pit = (1− θ)E¯tpit + (1− θ)(1− βθ)E¯tyt − (1− θ)(1− β)at + βE¯tpit+1
15Like Melosi (2017), I assume that past inflation is revealed but not used in expectations formation.
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2.B Details of the inference problem
2.B.1 Preliminaries
As Kohlhas (2014) notes, the orders of expectation in (2.12) increase in a predictable way, according
to Binet’s formula
k¯∑
k=0
(
zk+21 − zk+22
z1 − z2
)
where z1 = (1 +
√
5)/2 and z2 = (1−
√
5)/2.
At a given order k > 0 there will be z
k+2
1 −zk+22
z1−z2 orders of expectation, of which
zk+11 −zk+12
z1−z2 are
average expectations of the firms and z
k
1−zk2
z1−z2 are central bank expectations.
We can also define appropriate sub-matrices H¯ and HCB to grab only the higher-order expecta-
tions of firms or households. Figure 2.4 shows the basic idea for k¯ = 5, where H is 159× 159; there
are three “fundamental” states, 96 states which correspond with higher order firm expectations, and
60 which correspond with higher order central bank expectations.
Figure 2.4: Example of H when k¯ = 5. Black squares indicate positions where there is an element
equal to 1, white squares indicate elements equal to 0.
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Figure 2.5: Example of R, the reordering matrix that adds in redundant so that ECBt X0:k¯t =
RECBt AnX
0:k¯
t . Black boxes denote 1 entries, while white boxes are 0 entries.
R is a matrix that “adds back in” redundant orders of expectation. For example, when k¯ = 5, R
is 96× 60. The grid for nonzero values appears in figure 2.5.
2.B.2 The inference problem
Given Gaussian signals with i.i.d. measurement error, and given our assumption that agents have an
infinite history of signals, it is optimal for them to use the steady-state Kalman filter for inference.
I first characterize the inference problem for firms (assuming a solution exists) before characterizing
the inference problem for the central bank. Using the results, I verify that the law of motion for
the state takes the proposed form (2.11) in appendix 2.B.3. For ease of exposition, I deal with the
truncated vector of higher order expectations, rather than the infinite order one. The derivation is
exactly the same, replacing X(0:k¯)t with X
(0:∞)
t throughout.
It will be useful to define a particular re-ordering matrix H˜ implicitly:
X1:k¯+1t = H˜
[
E¯tX
0:k¯
t
ECBt AnX
0:k¯
t
]
(2.25)
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And a matrix R that “adds back in” the redundant orders of expectation.
The firm inference problem
Recall the idiosyncratic firm j’s information set is
Ωjt =
{
ajτ , g
j
τ , Rτ ; τ ≤ t
}
(2.26)
The signals observed by the jth firm has the truncated representation:
zjt =
e1T
e3

︸ ︷︷ ︸
D¯
X
(0:k¯)
t +
σ˜a 0;0 0
0 σ˜g

︸ ︷︷ ︸
Q¯
[
ea,jt
eg,jt
]
(2.27)
where ej is a selection vector with a one in the jth entry and zeros elsewhere. (2.27), in combination
with (2.11) forms a state-space representation which enables use of the Kalman filter.
The standard Kalman filter derivation (see, for example Hamilton (1994b)) yields the following set
of recursive expressions for The firm’s current-period state estimate error covariance matrix (P jt|t),
its one-step ahead state forecasting error covariance matrix P jt+1|t and its one step ahead forecasting
error matrix for the signals Ωjt|t−1:
Ωjt|t−1 = D¯Pt|t−1D¯
′ + Q¯Q¯′ (2.28)
P jt|t−1 = MPt−1|t−1M
′ +NN ′ (2.29)
P jt|t = Pt|t−1 − Pt|t−1D¯′[Ωjt|t−1]−1DP jt|t−1 (2.30)
Iterating on this system until it converges yields the steady state Kalman gain K¯ = which is the
same across firms
K¯ = PD′Ω−1 (2.31)
The Kalman filter implies that firm j’s expectation of the state is
EjtX
(0:k¯)
t = (M − K¯D¯M)Ejt−1X(0:k¯)t−1 + K¯D¯MX(0:k¯)t−1 + K¯D¯(Nεt + Q¯ejt ) (2.32)
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Integrating over firms to find the average expectation yields
E¯tX
0:k¯
t ≡
∫ 1
0
EjtX
(0:k¯)
t dj = (M − K¯D¯M)E¯jX(0:k¯)t−1 + K¯D¯MX(0:k¯)t−1 + K¯D¯Nεt (2.33)
since the idiosyncratic shocks are mean zero.
Note our definition of H˜ implies that
H˜−1X1:k¯+1t =
[
E¯tX
0:k¯
t
ECBt AnX
0:k¯
t
]
(2.34)
Then define a matrix S¯ that selects only the firm expectations from the right hand side of the
previous expression, so we have
[
I 0
]
H˜−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
S¯
X1:k¯+1t = E¯tX0:k¯t (2.35)
and we can substitute this into (2.33) to obtain
E¯tX
0:k¯
t = (M − K¯D¯M)S¯X0:k¯t−1 + K¯D¯MX0:k¯t + K¯D¯Nεt (2.36)
Inference problem for the central bank
Recall the central bank’s information set is assumed to be
Ωjt =
{
aCBτ , η
CB
τ , g
CB
τ ; τ ≤ t
}
(2.37)
The central bank’s signals are
zCBt =
e′1e′2
e′3

︸ ︷︷ ︸
DCB
X0:k¯t +
σ˜CBa 0;0 0
0 σ˜CBg

︸ ︷︷ ︸
QCB
[
ea,CBt
eg,CBt
]
(2.38)
Note that the noisy part of the central bank’s signals will not average out, which differentiates
their error from firms’.
As before (with some obvious changes in notation), the Kalman recursion will yield the following
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expression for the central bank’s beliefs about the state:
ECBt X
0:k¯
t = (M −KCBDCBM)ECBt−1X0:k¯t−1 +KCBDCBMX0:k¯t−1 +KCB(DCBN +QCB)εt (2.39)
Then recalling
H˜−1X1:k¯+1t =
[
E¯tX
0:k¯
t
ECBt AnX
0:k¯
t
]
(2.40)
we can write
R
[
0 I
]
H˜−1X1:k¯+1t = RECBt AnX0:k¯t
⇒ SCBX1:k¯+1t = RECBt AnXt
(2.41)
Substituting this expression into (2.39) yields the following expression:
ECBt X
0:k¯
t = (M −KCBDCBM)SCBX1:k¯+1t +KCBDCBMX0:k¯t−1 +KCB(DCBN +QCB)εt (2.42)
However, our law of motion is written in terms of EtAnX(0:k¯)t , whereas the above expression
contains redundant central bank expectations about its own expectations. To get this in the form
of ECBt AnX0:k¯t take the left inverse of R (note that R is not square but the left inverse generally
exists)
ECBt AnX
0:k¯
t =R−1left(M −KCBDCBM)SCBX1:k¯+1t
+R−1leftK
CBDCBMX0:k¯t−1 +R−1leftK
CB(DCBN +QCB)εt
(2.43)
The law of motion for the state
We had proposed that the vector of higher-order expectations X0:k¯t followed a VAR(1) in (2.11). We
can combine the results from the previous section to show that
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X1:k¯+1t+1 =H˜
[
E¯tX
0:k¯
t
ECBt AnX
0:k¯
t
]
+ H˜
[
(M − K¯D¯M)S¯
R−1left(M −KCBDCBM)SCB
]
X1:k¯+1t
+ H˜
[
K¯D¯M
R−1leftK
CBDCBM
]
X0:k¯t−1
H˜
[
K¯D¯N
R−1leftK
CB(DCBN +QCB)
]
εt
(2.44)
and thus (implicitly) derive expressions for M and N :
M =
[
Φ 0
0 0
]
+
 0
0 H˜
(
M¯1
MCB1
) +
 0
H˜
(
M¯2
MCB2
)
0
 (2.45)
N =
 Σ
H˜
(
N¯
NCB
) (2.46)
where M¯1,MCB1 , M¯2,MCB2 , N¯ , NCB are implicitly defined by (2.44).
2.B.3 Showing the proposed law of motion holds
We show that (2.11) holds by combining (2.36) with (2.43) and matching coefficients. Stacking the
the latter two equations yields
X1:k¯+1t+1 =H˜
[
E¯tX
0:k¯
t
ECBt AnX
0:k¯
t
]
+ H˜
[
(M − K¯D¯M)S¯
R−1left(M −KCBDCBM)SCB
]
X1:k¯+1t
+ H˜
[
K¯D¯M
R−1leftK
CBDCBM
]
X0:k¯t−1
H˜
[
K¯D¯N
R−1leftK
CB(DCBN +QCB)
]
εt
(2.47)
Given the assumed structure for exogenous variables and shocks, we can write the law of motion
for xt as:
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xt =
atηt
gt
 =
ρa 0 00 ρr 0
0 0 ρg
xt−1 +
σa 0 0 0 00 σr 0 0 0
0 0 σg 0 0


εat
εrt
εgt
eCB,at
eCB,gt
 (2.48)
xt = Φxt−1 + Σεt (2.49)
X0:k¯+1t =
[
xt
X1:k¯+1t
]
=
[
Φ 0
0 0
] [
xt−1
X1:k¯+1t−1
]
+
 0
0 H˜
(
M¯1
MCB1
)[ xt−1
X1:k¯+1t−1
]
+
 0
H˜
(
M¯2
MCB2
)
0
[ xt−1
X1:k¯+1t−1
]
+
 Σ
H˜
(
N¯
NCB
) εt
Where M¯1, etc are implicitly defined.
We then truncate rows/columns to ensure we respect the highest order of expectation k¯.
We then have the following mapping
M =
[
Φ 0
0 0
]
+
 0
0 H˜
(
M¯1
MCB1
) +
 0
H˜
(
M¯2
MCB2
)
0

N =
 Σ
H˜
(
N¯
NCB
)
where M¯1,MCB1 , M¯2,MCB2 , N¯ , NCB are implicitly defined by (2.44).
2.B.4 H¯ and HCB
To find H¯ and HCB (the submatrices that select only average firm expectations and central bank
expectations, respectively) note that
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X0:k¯t = Htrunc
 xtE¯tX0:k¯t
ECBt AnX
0:k¯
t
 (2.50)
where Htrunc enforces the truncation that orders of expectation greater than k¯ = 0. Then we can
write
pinv(Htrunc)X0:k¯t =
 xtE¯tX0:k¯t
ECBt AnX
0:k¯
t
 (2.51)
and then premultiplying by appropriate selection matrices will give us HCB and H¯.
2.C Details of the structural equations
We begin with:
[
pit
yt
]
= GCE¯t
[
pit
yt
]
+GF E¯t
[
pit+1
yt+1
]
+RXFEt
[
pit+1
yt+1
]
+GRRt +GXX0:k¯t
(2.52)
Rt = FCECBt
[
pit
yt
]
+ FXECBt X0:k¯t + e2X0:k¯t (2.53)
Next we need to substitute out the expectations terms, using our proposed form of the solution.
Particularly, assuming interest rates are observed by everyone:
E¯t
[
pit
yt
]
= E¯t(AX0:k¯t +BRt) = AH¯X0:k¯t +BRt (2.54)
E¯t
[
pit+1
yt+1
]
= E¯t(AX0:k¯t+1 +BRt+1) = AMH¯X0:k¯t +B(TMH¯)X0:k¯t (2.55)
Et
[
pit+1
yt+1
]
= Et(AX0:k¯t+1 +BRt+1) = (A+BT )MX0:k¯t (2.56)
ECBt
[
pit
yt
]
= ECBt (AXt +BRt) = AHCBX0:k¯t +BTX0:k¯t (2.57)
Rewriting the original system by making these substitutions:
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[
pit
yt
]
= GC
(
AH¯X0:k¯t +BRt
)
+GF
(
AMH¯X0:k¯t +B(TMH¯)X0:k¯t
)
+RXF (A+BT )MX0:k¯t +GRRt +GXX0:k¯t
(2.58)
Rt = FC
(
AHCBX0:k¯t +BTX0:k¯t
)
+ FXHCBX0:k¯t + e2X0:k¯t (2.59)
We can solve for B explicitly:
[
B1
B2
]
=
[
(1− θ) (1− θ)(1− βθ)
0 0
] [
B1
B2
]
+
[
0
−1
]
(2.60)
which implies
B =
[− 1θ (1− θ)(1− βθ)−1
]
(2.61)
Second, we can rewrite T solely as a function of A:
T =
[
φpi φy
](
AHCB +
[− 1θ (1− θ)(1− βθ)−1
]
T
)
+ FXHCB + e2 (2.62)
which implies
T =
(
−φpi 1
θ
(1− θ)(1− βθ)− φy
)
T +
(
FCAH
CB + FXHCB + e2
)
(2.63)
T = 1
1− (−φpi 1θ (1− θ)(1− βθ)− φy)
(
FCAH
CB + FXHCB + e2
)
(2.64)
For completeness, the A expression becomes:
A = GCAH¯
+GF
(
A+B
(
1
1− (−φpi 1θ (1− θ)(1− βθ)− φy)
(
FCAH
CB + FXHCB + e2
)))
MH¯
+RXF
(
A+B
(
1
1− (−φpi 1θ (1− θ)(1− βθ)− φy)
(
FCAH
CB + FXHCB + e2
)))
M
+GX
(2.65)
Conditional on A, we can find a new expression for T when computing a fixed point.
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2.D Figures from calibrated model
2.D.1 Calibration 1
Impulse responses
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Figure 2.6: Impulse response to TFP shock, calibration 1.
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Figure 2.7: Impulse response to monetary policy shock, calibration 1.
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Figure 2.8: Impulse response to demand shock, calibration 1.
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Figure 2.9: Correlation of inflation with other observables, calibration 1.
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Figure 2.10: Correlation of output with other observables, calibration 1.
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Figure 2.11: Correlations between interest rate and other variables, calibration 1.
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Figure 2.12: Correlations between TFP and other variables, calibration 1.
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Figure 2.13: Correlations between one-step ahead private inflation expectations and other vari-
ables, calibration 1.
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Figure 2.14: Correlations between two step ahead private inflation expectations and other vari-
ables, calibration 1.
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Figure 2.15: Correlations between three step ahead private inflation expectations and other vari-
ables, calibration 1.
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Figure 2.16: Correlations between four step ahead private inflation expectations and other vari-
ables, calibration 1.
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Figure 2.17: Correlations between one step ahead central bank inflation expectations and other
variables, calibration 1.
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Figure 2.18: Correlations between two step ahead central bank inflation expectations and other
variables, calibration 1.
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Figure 2.19: Correlations between three step ahead central bank inflation expectations and other
variables, calibration 1.
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Figure 2.20: Correlations between four step ahead central bank inflation expectations and other
variables, calibration 1.
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2.D.2 Calibration 2
Impulse responses
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Figure 2.21: Impulse response to TFP shock, calibration 2.
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Figure 2.22: Impulse response to monetary policy shock, calibration 2.
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Figure 2.23: Impulse response to demand shock, calibration 2.
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Figure 2.24: Impulse response to demand shock, calibration 2.
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Figure 2.25: Impulse response to central bank demand measurement error shock shock, calibration
2.
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Figure 2.26: Correlation of inflation with other observables, calibration 2.
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
-1
0
1
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
-1
0
1
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
-1
0
1
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
-1
0
1
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
-1
0
1
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
-1
0
1
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
-1
0
1
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
-1
0
1
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
-1
0
1
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
-1
0
1
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
-1
0
1
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
-1
0
1
Figure 2.27: Correlation of output with other observables, calibration 2.
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Figure 2.28: Correlations between interest rate and other variables, calibration 2.
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Figure 2.29: Correlations between TFP and other variables, calibration 2.
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Figure 2.30: Correlations between one-step ahead private inflation expectations and other vari-
ables, calibration 2.
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Figure 2.31: Correlations between two step ahead private inflation expectations and other vari-
ables, calibration 2.
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Figure 2.32: Correlations between three step ahead private inflation expectations and other vari-
ables, calibration 2.
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Figure 2.33: Correlations between four step ahead private inflation expectations and other vari-
ables, calibration 2.
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Figure 2.34: Correlations between one step ahead central bank inflation expectations and other
variables, calibration 2.
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Figure 2.35: Correlations between two step ahead central bank inflation expectations and other
variables, calibration 2.
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Figure 2.36: Correlations between three step ahead central bank inflation expectations and other
variables, calibration 2.
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Figure 2.37: Correlations between four step ahead central bank inflation expectations and other
variables, calibration 2.
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2.D.3 Calibration 3 and 4
Impulse responses
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Figure 2.38: Impulse response to TFP shock, calibration 3.
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Figure 2.39: Impulse response to monetary policy shock, calibration 3.
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Figure 2.40: Impulse response to demand shock, calibration 3.
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Figure 2.41: Impulse response to demand shock, calibration 3.
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Figure 2.42: Impulse response to central bank demand measurement error shock shock, calibration
3.
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Figure 2.43: Correlation of inflation with other observables, calibration 3.
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Figure 2.44: Correlation of output with other observables, calibration 3.
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Figure 2.45: Correlations between interest rate and other variables, calibration 3.
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Figure 2.46: Correlations between TFP and other variables, calibration 3.
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Figure 2.47: Correlations between one-step ahead private inflation expectations and other vari-
ables, calibration 3.
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Figure 2.48: Correlations between two step ahead private inflation expectations and other vari-
ables, calibration 3.
168
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
-1
0
1
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
-1
0
1
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
-1
0
1
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
-1
0
1
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
-1
0
1
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
-1
0
1
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
-1
0
1
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
-1
0
1
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
-1
0
1
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
-1
0
1
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
-1
0
1
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
-1
0
1
Figure 2.49: Correlations between three step ahead private inflation expectations and other vari-
ables, calibration 3.
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Figure 2.50: Correlations between four step ahead private inflation expectations and other vari-
ables, calibration 3.
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Figure 2.51: Correlations between one step ahead central bank inflation expectations and other
variables, calibration 3.
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Figure 2.52: Correlations between two step ahead central bank inflation expectations and other
variables, calibration 3.
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Figure 2.53: Correlations between three step ahead central bank inflation expectations and other
variables, calibration 3.
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Figure 2.54: Correlations between four step ahead central bank inflation expectations and other
variables, calibration 3.
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Calibration 4: TFP shock
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Figure 2.55: Impulse response to TFP shock, calibration 4.
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2.D.4 Calibration 5
Impulse responses
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Figure 2.56: Impulse response to TFP shock, calibration 5.
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Figure 2.57: Impulse response to monetary policy shock, calibration 5.
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Figure 2.58: Impulse response to demand shock, calibration 5.
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Figure 2.59: Impulse response to demand shock, calibration 5.
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Figure 2.60: Impulse response to central bank demand measurement error shock shock, calibration
5.
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Correlations
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Figure 2.61: Correlation of inflation with other observables, calibration 5.
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Figure 2.62: Correlation of output with other observables, calibration 5.
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Figure 2.63: Correlations between interest rate and other variables, calibration 5.
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Figure 2.64: Correlations between TFP and other variables, calibration 5.
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Figure 2.65: Correlations between one-step ahead private inflation expectations and other vari-
ables, calibration 5.
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Figure 2.66: Correlations between two step ahead private inflation expectations and other vari-
ables, calibration 5.
179
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
-1
0
1
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
-1
0
1
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
-1
0
1
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
-1
0
1
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
-1
0
1
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
-1
0
1
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
-1
0
1
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
-1
0
1
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
-1
0
1
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
-1
0
1
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
-1
0
1
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
-1
0
1
Figure 2.67: Correlations between three step ahead private inflation expectations and other vari-
ables, calibration 5.
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Figure 2.68: Correlations between four step ahead private inflation expectations and other vari-
ables, calibration 5.
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Figure 2.69: Correlations between one step ahead central bank inflation expectations and other
variables, calibration 5.
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Figure 2.70: Correlations between two step ahead central bank inflation expectations and other
variables, calibration 5.
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Figure 2.71: Correlations between three step ahead central bank inflation expectations and other
variables, calibration 5.
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Figure 2.72: Correlations between four step ahead central bank inflation expectations and other
variables, calibration 5.
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2.E Melosi calibration figures
This appendix contains calibrated results for the model with a calibration similar to the estimated
model in Melosi (2017), with very little noise in the central bank’s observations of technology shocks
(σ˜aCB ≈ 2× 10−16 ) and a small amount of noise in their observations of demand shocks (σ˜gCB =
0.0033 ). Higher levels of noise in technology shocks results in there being no solution to the fixed
point problem. Here I present two sets of results: A baseline, and one where the persistence of
technology shocks is calibrated to the same as the data used in the rest of the paper, and a third
where in addition to the lower persistence of technology shocks the central bank strictly targes
inflation in its policy rule.
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2.E.1 Baseline Melosi calibration
Impulse responses
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Figure 2.73: Impulse response to TFP shock, Melosi calibration.
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Figure 2.74: Impulse response to monetary policy shock, Melosi calibration.
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Figure 2.75: Impulse response to demand shock, Melosi calibration.
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Figure 2.76: Impulse response to demand shock, Melosi calibration.
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Figure 2.77: Impulse response to central bank demand measurement error shock shock, Melosi
calibration.
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Figure 2.78: Correlation of inflation with other observables, Melosi calibration.
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Figure 2.79: Correlation of output with other observables, Melosi calibration.
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Figure 2.80: Correlations between interest rate and other variables, Melosi calibration.
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Figure 2.81: Correlations between TFP and other variables, Melosi calibration.
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Figure 2.82: Correlations between one-step ahead private inflation expectations and other vari-
ables, Melosi calibration.
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
-1
0
1
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
-1
0
1
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
-1
0
1
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
-1
0
1
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
-1
0
1
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
-1
0
1
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
-1
0
1
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
-1
0
1
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
-1
0
1
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
-1
0
1
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
-1
0
1
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
-1
0
1
Figure 2.83: Correlations between two step ahead private inflation expectations and other vari-
ables, Melosi calibration.
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Figure 2.84: Correlations between three step ahead private inflation expectations and other vari-
ables, Melosi calibration.
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Figure 2.85: Correlations between four step ahead private inflation expectations and other vari-
ables, Melosi calibration.
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Figure 2.86: Correlations between one step ahead central bank inflation expectations and other
variables, Melosi calibration.
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Figure 2.87: Correlations between two step ahead central bank inflation expectations and other
variables, Melosi calibration.
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Figure 2.88: Correlations between three step ahead central bank inflation expectations and other
variables, Melosi calibration.
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Figure 2.89: Correlations between four step ahead central bank inflation expectations and other
variables, Melosi calibration.
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2.E.2 Lower persistence of technology
Impulse responses
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Figure 2.90: Impulse response to TFP shock, Melosi calibration with lower technology persistence.
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Figure 2.91: Impulse response to monetary policy shock, Melosi calibration with lower technology
persistence. 195
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Figure 2.92: Impulse response to demand shock, Melosi calibration with lower technology persis-
tence.
196
5 10 15 20
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
5 10 15 20
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
5 10 15 20
-0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
5 10 15 20
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
5 10 15 20
-0.5
-0.4
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
5 10 15 20
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
5 10 15 20
0
1
2
3
4
Figure 2.93: Impulse response to demand shock, Melosi calibration with lower technology persis-
tence.
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Figure 2.94: Impulse response to central bank demand measurement error shock shock, Melosi
calibration with lower technology persistence.
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Figure 2.95: Correlation of inflation with other observables, Melosi calibration with lower technol-
ogy persistence.
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Figure 2.96: Correlation of output with other observables, Melosi calibration with lower technology
persistence.
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Figure 2.97: Correlations between interest rate and other variables, Melosi calibration with lower
technology persistence.
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Figure 2.98: Correlations between TFP and other variables, Melosi calibration with lower technol-
ogy persistence.
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Figure 2.99: Correlations between one-step ahead private inflation expectations and other vari-
ables, Melosi calibration with lower technology persistence.
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Figure 2.100: Correlations between two step ahead private inflation expectations and other vari-
ables, Melosi calibration with lower technology persistence.
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Figure 2.101: Correlations between three step ahead private inflation expectations and other vari-
ables, Melosi calibration with lower technology persistence.
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Figure 2.102: Correlations between four step ahead private inflation expectations and other vari-
ables, Melosi calibration with lower technology persistence.
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Figure 2.103: Correlations between one step ahead central bank inflation expectations and other
variables, Melosi calibration with lower technology persistence.
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Figure 2.104: Correlations between two step ahead central bank inflation expectations and other
variables, Melosi calibration with lower technology persistence.
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Figure 2.105: Correlations between three step ahead central bank inflation expectations and other
variables, Melosi calibration with lower technology persistence.
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Figure 2.106: Correlations between four step ahead central bank inflation expectations and other
variables, Melosi calibration with lower technology persistence.
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Chapter 3
Information Investment in a Coordination
Game
204
Abstract
Economic agents may face a trade off between the ability to accurately forecast a signal and having
beliefs correlated with other agents. I develop a two stage model where prior to choosing actions in a
coordination game, non-atomistic agents decide how to allocate attention across public and private
signals. Sufficient conditions for a unique symmetric switching equilibrium in the coordination game
are insufficient to support the existence of symmetric information equilibria. Numerical analysis
suggests (1) when symmetric equilibria do exist, they are unique (2) Changes to committee size
or information quality have small effects on committee welfare but large effects on the accuracy of
beliefs
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3.1 Introduction
When making binary economic decisions in uncertain environments, agents often have two sets of
incentives. One is the incentive to take the correct action given the underlying state of the world.
A second is a strategic complementarity motive. For example, members of a committee may be
indifferent about a proposition but choose to vote for or against it based on what the majority of the
other members seem to want to do, because they do not want to “stick their necks out” or because
they value consensus. If they have strong views that differ from the other committee members,
however, they may choose to dissent in spite of the coordination motive.
In this environment, the information agents use is important. If agents are relying on the same
signals to inform their beliefs, then they will likely act similarly. If they instead rely on idiosyncratic
information, there may be greater variation in beliefs and (perhaps) of actions. Often, committees
feature information revelation (like debate or expert testimony) before actions are taken. There
may be an incentive to invest in research to help guide the committee’s decision, even setting aside
other strategic motives arising from differences in preferences. On the other hand, understanding
information presented by others is costly in terms of time and effort, and data presented to others
may be interpreted in idiosyncratic ways. Depending on the trade off perceived by agents between
being correct and doing the same thing as others, they may find that paying attention to public
information is less worthwhile than improving ones own forecasts or vice versa.
As a concrete example, members of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) have to decide
whether to maintain the status quo or adjust policy. The Federal Reserve Board staff prepare an
analysis of economic conditions that is circulated prior to the meeting. However, the regional Fed-
eral Reserve banks also prepare separate forecasts and analyses of current conditions. Some of these
are required and circulated widely, like the Beige Book (the summary of Federal Reserve District
conditions). Different Federal Reserve Banks produce statistics about conditions in financial and
commodities markets, manufacturing and commerical activity, and also publish model-based fore-
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casts and research briefs on economic trends. However, the Federal Reserve banks do not generally
release all their information to the public, and FOMC members present summaries of their views at
meetings. These summaries may not reflect all of the information used in forming beliefs. For exam-
ple, Reserve Bank presidents may request briefings on topics not included in projections reported to
the rest of the FOMC. Committee members must decide what indicators to pay attention to when
forming their beliefs. Even given a common set of data, they may reach different conclusions based
on their readings of the available information. Indeed, FOMC dissents often reflect differences in
opinion about what the current stance of monetary policy is and whether it is appropriate given an
agreed-upon set of goals (Thornton and Wheelock (2014)).
FOMC members also appear to care about coordinating their actions. For example, writing in the
Wall Street Journal, former Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia President Charles Plosser noted
that the September 2015 FOMC vote to maintain a policy rate at zero had only one hawkish dissent
despite three voting members indicating they were ready to increase rates. He argued that the vote
might have been lopsided because of
[...] the desire, inside and outside the Fed, for consensus decision-making. Markets don’t
like dissent or indecision, goes the argument. Some say that the presidents of the 12
Reserve Banks should quit talking to reporters and giving speeches, or at least refrain
from questioning actions taken by the FOMC or the Fed chairman. By the same token,
any opposition from the members of the Board of Governors might be seen as signaling
a lack of confidence in the chairman. (Plosser (2015)).
Hence, understanding how policymakers form expectations and their desire is thus important for
understanding how policy is determined.
In this paper, I develop a stylized model that reflects this intuition about the way members of a
committee with dispersed information decide on binary actions. The model consists of a two stage
game. In the first stage, agents (“committee members”) decide how much attention to pay to a set
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of signals which are noisy realizations around the true (univariate) state. One set of signals has noise
which is partially common across agents, while another signal is purely private. Investing attention
is costly, but reduces the idiosyncratic variance in observing that signal. The second stage is a finite
player coordination game similar to the “stag hunt” game of Carlsson and van Damme (1993a) and
similar in many ways to the global games literature reviewed in Morris and Shin (2003).1 Agents
observe signals whose properties are determined by information choices made in the first stage and,
based on those signals, form expectations about the underlying state and others’ beliefs. Payoffs
in the coordination game depend on agents’ own actions, the underlying state, and the actions
of others. The coordination game has a unique symmetric switching equilibrium supported by
symmetric information choice (Proposition 1).
Given the existence and uniqueness of the coordination equilibrium, I then ask whether a unique,
symmetric information choice equilibrium always exists. I find it does not. Investing in better in-
formation increases ones ability to correctly forecast the and thus helps the committee members
avoid costly mistakes. But the need to forecast the future beliefs of others when deciding what
information to observe introduces non-concavity in payoffs; investing in information may have neg-
ative marginal benefit even setting aside the costs of attention (Lemma 3). Whether utility is “well
behaved” depends in a complicated way on all of the model parameters, and I show using numerical
examples how there may not be a benefit to investing in information even when the conditions for
an equilibrium in the coordination game are satisfied.2 This stands in contrast to the beauty contest
setting of Myatt and Wallace (2012) which has convex loss function which, combined with convex
costs, yields a unique (global) solution.
Given the possible pathologies associated with the information choice game, analytic compara-
tive statics are difficult to come by. In section 3.5, I explore a particular numerical example under
quadratic attention costs. In each of the parameterizations I consider, the symmetric equilibrium
1Unlike the global games literature, which typically assumes discontinuity of payoffs, I assume payoffs for actions
are continuous in the state and in the number of players who take an action.
2This is distinct from the non-concavity arising in Radner and Stiglitz (1984) because it is unrelated to the costs of
acquiring information.
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I find appears to be the unique symmetric equilibrium. In that equilibrium, the majority of fore-
cast weight is on private signals, and the best public signals receive the most weight. Lowering
the number of committee members reduces expected payoffs of the members only sightly but has
larger deleterious effects on overall forecast accuracy. A single member of the committee improving
the quality of her publicly-supplied statistic improves welfare slightly but can lead to noticable im-
provements in forecast accuracy. Increasing the cost of attention, surprisingly, increases welfare and
dramatically improves forecast accuracy. Given the results, I conclude by suggesting some tentative
normative lessons of the model and possible positive implications that could be tested using data
on monetary policy committee behavior and suggestions for future work.
The paper contributes to the literature on information choice in coordination games. Much of the
recent work on game theory models of dispersed information (reviewed in Morris and Shin (2003) and
Angeletos and Lian (2016)) takes the information structure as given.3 Exceptions include Hellwig
and Veldkamp (2009), Myatt and Wallace (2008, 2012, 2014) and Chahrour (2014) who all focus
on endogenous information structures in the context of many agent “beauty contest” games. The
latter two papers, in particular, focus on how a (unitary) monetary policymaker should provide
information to a continuum of agents who play a beauty contest game. By contrast, I embed an
information choice problem similar to that of Myatt andWallace (2012) in a finite player coordination
game, which is more amenable to examining information choices within, for example, policymaking
committees.
This paper is closely related to a smaller literature focused on the information choice foundations
of Carlsson and van Damme (1993b)-style global games. Szkup and Trevino (2015) study the
decision to invest in precision of a private signal in regime change game. They show the uniqueness
of symmetric precision choices in their context and show prior information (which they interpret
as a public signal) and private information may be complements. My paper differs from theirs in
3Morris et al. (2016) show in coordination games there is a unique rationalizable action played whenever there
is “approximate common certainty” of the probabilities players assign to their payoffs being higher than their
opponents’ payoffs. However, they do not examine information choice per se.
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examining the endogenous allocation of attention to both public and private signals. Yang (2015)
studies general private information acquisition in a coordination game with an entropy-based cost
of precision and shows how multiple equilibria can arise. Morris and Yang (2016) show how a
more general cost functional can generate uniqueness of equilibria in coordination games if there are
continuous payoffs. Both these papers focus on private signals in a setting with atomistic agents. I
impose a somewhat stronger information structure.
The motivating example in the paper and the discussion in section 3.5 is are related to a large
literature on how monetary policy committees function in practice. Blinder (2009) reviews a num-
ber of features of committee design in central banks around the world. The numerical examples
explore some of the same issues, particularly, the optimal committee size and the desirability of
consensus decision making. There are many features of monetary policy committees that I set aside
to focus on the information choice decision, but which would be interesting to explore as extension
in future work. For example, Sibert (2003) examines the incentives for heterogeneous committee
members to establish reputations for toughness; Faust (1996) analyzes the design of Federal Reserve
as a solution to balance interests for and against opportunistic inflation; Waller (1992) examines
partisan appointments to the committee. All three papers focus on heterogeneity among central
bankers. By contrast, I assume committee members are ex-ante homogeneous and have an exoge-
nous coordination motive. Malmendier et al. (2017) examine empirically how the life experiences of
FOMC members influences their expectations and voting behavior; in the setup here, this could be
thought of as the weight on private signals (although here private signals are centered on the truth
and I consider symmetric equilibria). Finally, the social choice literature has also examined how
committees function as deliberative bodies, emphasizing the effects of voting procedures, and how
debate and persuasion can affect beliefs and preferences (Li and Suen (2009) review this literature).
I abstract from these aspects of committee decisions.
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3.2 General description of the game
Players are members of a committee. There are L members, l = 1, 2, . . . , L. Call θ ∼ N(0, σ2Θ) the
fundamental.
Players form expectations using L+1 signals. The signal structure is similar to Myatt and Wallace
(2012).4 L of those signals are associated with each player of the game, and are “public” in the sense
that it is common knowledge that a portion of the noise in the signal is common across agents. For
example, each signal can be thought of as a forecast circulated before the meeting). One signal is
purely private.
Player l’s public signals xl = {xnl}Ln=1 are
xnl = θ + ηn + εnl
where
ηn ∼ N(0, κ2n)
εnl ∼ N(0, ζ2n/znl)
The private signal is
rl = θ + εrl
where
εrl ∼ N(ζ2rl/zrl)
The noise in signals is somewhat stylized. For public signals, one could imagine ηn being the
underlying noisiness of the signal - for example, sampling error from a statistical release - and εnl
4I do not explicitly refer to a (model consistent) prior. The inclusion of the prior very mildly affects the condition
needed for uniqueness in the coordination game, but complicates the notation in the information choice stage
significantly. Hence, I follow Myatt and Wallace (2012) in setting aside the prior, or assuming that one of the
signals is available without cost and treated as the prior.
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being noise coming from imperfections in communication or less-than-perfect attention devoted to
receiving the information (closely listening to the person presenting it or paying close attention to
the underlying detail of the data release).5 The l-specific noise can be eliminated by investing in
a higher znl, which I sometimes informally refer to as paying closer attention to the signal (i.e.,
spending more time examining the data) but the former cannot. Investment in purely private signal
precision zrl might be though of as investing effort in collecting and analyzing data privately. A
choice of zkl = 0 implies a signal has infinite variance; such a signal will be ignored, so choosing
to invest no attention to a signal is equivalent to ignoring it entirely. Without loss of generality, I
assume the public signals are ordered by “quality” with less noisy signals first, so ζ21 < ζ22 < . . . < ζ2L.
The precision of the public and private signals are the inverse of their variance, defined respectively:
ψnl =
1
κ2n +
ζ2n
znl
ψrl =
zrl
ζ2rl
In the first stage of the game, agents choose a vector zl (the extent to which they want to eliminate
idiosyncratic noise in their future signals). I refer to this choice as agents’ investment in precision.
This investment comes at a cost C(zl).
After the first stage, nature chooses realizations of the fundamental, the common component of
noise in public signals, and the idiosyncratic noise in each players’ signals. l’s posterior beliefs are
formed in a Bayesian manner given her realized signals, so her conditional expectations are
El(θ|xl, rl) =
∑L
n=1 ψnlxnl + ψrlrl∑L
n=1 ψnl + ψrl
(3.1)
Define wk,l = ψnl∑L
n=1
ψnl+ψrl
. By construction,
∑
k wk = 1. Posterior uncertainty is the inverse of
the sum of the precisions, i.e.
5The communication interpretation of noise is similar to Prat et al. (2015).
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Var(θ|xl, rl) =
(
L∑
n=1
ψnl + ψrl
)−1
(3.2)
In the second stage, given her beliefs about the fundamental El(θ|xn, rn), members make a binary
choice to maximize expected payoffs. The action space in the coordination game is
al ∈ {0, 1}
Payoffs are related to the realization of the fundamental, the choice made in the coordination
game, the choices of other agents, and the costs of allocating attention to signals, summarized by
the cost function C(zl).
Call a−l the action profile of players other than l. The payoff of player l is:
ul(al, zl, a−l, θ) =αal(al − a¯) + β(1− al)(al − a¯)
+ γal(a¯− k
L
) + δ(1− al)( k
L
− a¯)
+ λalθ + µ(1− al)θ + νal + τ(1− al)
− C(zl)
(3.3)
where a¯ = (1/L)
∑L
n=1 an.
The payoff function is reduced form but is intended to capture the intuition discussed in the
introduction. The payoffs reflect inherent costs and benefits of taking the action, whether their
action is similar to everyone else’s, and whether the average action is above or below a cutoff value
k/L. It also reflects a linear payoff in the fundamental that varies across which actions agents take.6
In the next section, I describe the solution to the coordination game conditional on information
choice, including restrictions on parameters in the utility function sufficient for a symmetric switching
equilibrium. Given this equilibrium, I analyze information choice in section 3.4.
6A more realistic applied model would likely include some interaction of the state with whether the average action
was above or below the cutoff. This is excluded to simplify the information stage.
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3.3 Coordination game
To solve the model, I adapt the solution method developed in Morris and Shin (2003). In particular,
I establish some properties of the optimal strategy given the payoff structure (equation (3.3)). The
structure of the game, along with some assumptions about the parameters in equation (3.3), gives
rise to a switching strategy, which is unique given symmetric information choice.
3.3.1 Payoff properties
Payoffs can be parameterized by a function:
pil(a−l, θ) = u(1, a−l, θ)− u(0, a−l, θ) =α
(
1− 1
L
)
+ γ
(
1− k
L
)
− δ k
L
+ ν − τ
+ 1
L
(β − α+ γ + δ)
∑
i6=l
ai
(λ− µ) θ
When pi(a−l, θ) > 0 al = 1 is preferable, otherwise l should choose al = 0.
This can be written more compactly as
pil(a−l, θ) = α∗ +
β∗
L
∑
i6=l
ai + λ∗θ (3.4)
I make the following assumptions about these parameters:
Assumption 1 (Action Monotonicity). Payoffs for al = 1 are increasing in the number of others who
take ai = 1, i 6= l. That is, β∗ ≡ β − α+ γ + δ > 0.
Assumption 2 (State monotonicity). al = 1 is more preferable in higher states of the world, all else
equal. That is, λ− µ ≡ λ∗ > 0.
These assumptions immediately imply the following lemma, whose proof follows from direct cal-
culation and is included (along with other proofs and derivations) in the appendix:
Lemma 1 (Limit dominance). There exists θ, θ¯ such that for all θ∼ < θ and for all a−l, pi(a−l, θ∼) < 0
and for all θ˜ > θ¯ and for all a−l, pi(a−l, θ˜) > 0.
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3.3.2 Switching strategy
I look for equilibria in the space of symmetric switching strategies.
Definition 2 (Switching strategy). A switching strategy in the coordination game s : R → {0, 1}
maps observed signals xl, rl onto actions.
In particular, a symmetric switching strategy is a strategy profile such that for all l,
s(xl, rl) =
{
1 if El(θ|xl, rl) > θ∗
0 if El(θ|xl, rl) ≤ θ∗
(3.5)
I make the following assumption about precision choices to facilitate exposition:
Assumption 3 (Common knowledge of signal noise). The precision of each players’ signals is common
knowledge in the coordination stage.
Beliefs about the beliefs of others. With some abuse of notation, denote El(θ) the posterior
belief of l. l knows p’s expectations are the same as her own. Given signal precisions are common
knowledge by assumption 3, her expectation of p’s belief is a function of her belief about p’s signals.
Hence
El(xnp) =El(θ) + El(ηn) + El(εnp)
= El(θ)
(3.6)
The variance of l’s beliefs about p’s signals are
Varl(xnp) =Varl(θ) + Varl(η) + Varl(εnp)
=
(∑
n
ψnl + ψrl
)−1
+ ψ−1np
(3.7)
Symmetric information choice implies that p 6= l, we can write ψnp = ψ′n and ψrp = ψ′r. We now
have all the pieces needed to prove the existence and uniqueness of a symmetric switching strategy
given symmetric information choices.
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Proposition 1 (Symmetric switching equilibrium). Given payoffs described by (3.3) and assump-
tions 1 and 2 and beliefs characterized by (3.1),(3.2), (3.6), and (3.7), there exists a unique symmetric
switching algorithm in the coordination game where the threshold θ∗ is given by
θ∗ = − 1
λ∗
(
α∗ + β
∗
2
(L− 1)
L
)
(3.8)
The proof is in appendix 3.A. Briefly, given that everyone forms expectations optimally and is
playing the symmetric switching strategy, one can directly solve for a θ∗ as the value that would make
l indifferent between playing either action, given her beliefs. The assumption of state monotonicity
is sufficient in this model to show that at θ∗ payoffs are increasing and thus the optimal action does
not switch back to al = 0 for some θ > θ∗, for instance. The coordination game satisfies standard
conditions (Carlsson and van Damme (1993b), Morris and Shin (2003)) which shows that it is the
only switching equilibrium that survives the iterated deletion of dominated strategies. The proof
of the theorem also includes a comment on how it goes through when we explicitly include prior
information.
3.3.3 Two convenient normalizations
Inspection of (3.8) shows for any value of β∗ and λ∗ we can adjust α∗ to generate θ∗ = 0. In
particular, we can adjust the intrinsic payoffs associated with each action (τ, ν) without affecting
the other terms. This normalization does not affect the uniqueness of θ∗ or the proof of Proposition
1. Hence, I normalize θ∗ = 0 for the remainder of the paper. We also can normalize µ = 0 without
loss of generality, since only λ− µ > 0 is necessary for uniqueness.
3.4 Information choice
Other than symmetric information, the assumptions made to supporting a unique symmetric switch-
ing equilibrium in the coordination stage are fairly weak; they amount to Bayesian updating, strategic
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complementarity, and defining the payoffs so the payoff to al = 1 is increasing in the state. Symmet-
ric information choice is widely assumed in the literature on coordination games. In this section, I
describe how the information optimization problem can fail to be well behaved.
3.4.1 Preliminaries
Future conditional expectations. Optimal information choice maximizes ex-ante utility given
the optimal switching strategy in the coordination stage. It amounts to choosing the variance of
the distribution of conditional expectations in the coordination stage to maximize expected payoffs.
Player l’s future conditional expectation can be written in terms of the θ and the sum of the
realizations of noise:
El(θ) =θ +
L∑
n=1
wnl(ηn + εnl) + wrlεrl
=θ +Q(l)
(3.9)
Note Q(l) ∼ N(0, σ2Q(l)) where
σ2Q(l) =
L∑
n=1
(wnl)2
(
κn +
ζ2n
znl
)
+ w2rl
ζ2rl
zrl
(3.10)
Then El(θ) = θ +Q(l) ∼ N(0, σ2Θ + σ2Q(l))
Ex-ante utility. Under the symmetric switching strategy, al = 1 when El(θ) > θ∗ = 0 for all l.
I look for symmetric information choices as well, which imply other players choose σ2Q(p) = σ2Q′ for
all p. Ex-ante expected utility is
E(Ul) = E(Ul|El(θ) > 0)× P (El(θ) > 0) + E(Ul|El(θ) ≤ 0)× P (El(θ) ≤ 0)
= E(Ul|al = 1, θ +Q)P (θ +Q > 0) + E(Ul|al = 0, θ +Q)P (θ +Q ≤ 0)
(3.11)
I show in appendix 3.B the following lemma:
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Lemma 2 (Ex-ante utility). Ex-ante utility, conditional on zl, z′ is
E(Ul) =
1
2
(
α
L− 1
L
+ γ
(
1− k
L
)
+ ν + δk
L
+ τ
)
(3.12a)
+ λ√
2pi
σ2Θ√
σ2Θ + σ2Q
(3.12b)
+ L− 1
L
(β − α+ γ + δ)
∫ ∞
θ=−∞
∫ ∞
q=−θ
Φ
 β(z, z′)(θ + q)√
(σ2θ + σ2Q′)(1− ρ2)
 fQ(q)fΘ(θ)dqdθ
(3.12c)
− C(z) (3.12d)
Where
ρ = Cov(θ +Q, θ +Q
′)√
σ2θ + σ2Q′
√
σ2θ + σ2Q
= σ
2
θ +
∑
n wnw
′
nκ
2
n√
σ2θ + σ2Q′
√
σ2θ + σ2Q
(3.13)
and
β(z, z′) = σ
2
θ +
∑
n wnw
′
nκ
2
n
σ2θ + σ2Q
(3.14)
and fQ(q) and fΘ(θ) are the PDFs of Q and θ.
What’s the intuition for this expression?
• (3.12a) is the constant part of expected payoffs for each action
• (3.12b) is the expected payoff associated with the state. In the absence of noise, the this would
just be the expected value of half-normal distribution, but it is adjusted to account for the
fact that a player might pick al = 1 when they (incorrectly) believe θ > 0 due to noise.
• (3.12c) reflects the expected payoff from others’ actions, given the switching equilibrium in the
second stage.
• Finally, (3.12d) is the cost of attention allocation.
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3.4.2 Marginal benefits
Agents allocate attention by paying a cost to receive more precise signals. These benefits come from
choosing al = 1 only when θ > 0 (the “direct effect”) and from picking the same action as others (the
“coordination effect”). Below, I analyze the direct and coordination benefits of increased attention
to a particular signal, i.e., an increase in zk holding fixed zk′ , k′ 6= k.
The following remark states some results about the effect of paying more attention to a particular
signal on weights, noise, and the correlation of the distribution of beliefs (with derivations in appendix
3.B)
Remark 1 (Effects of a change in attention). Increasing attention to a particular signal k (an increase
in znk):
1. Unambiguously increases precision:
∂ψkl
∂zkl
=
{
ζ2k
(zklκ2k+ζ
2
k
)2 k ∈ 1, 2, . . . . , L
1
ζ2r
k = r
2. Has weakly diminishing returns on precision: ∂
2ψkl
∂z2
kl
≤ 0.
3. Increases the weight on the signal paid attention to and decreases the weight on other signals
that receive positive attention: ∂wkl∂zkl > 0,
∂wk′l
∂zkl
< 0
4. Causes the overall variance of noise to fall: ∂σ
2
Q
∂zkl
< 0
5. Changes the distribution of noise: ∂fQ(q)∂zkl = fQ(q)
(
q2
σ2
Q
− 1
)
∂σ2Q
∂zkl
6. Has ambiguous effect on β(z, z′) and ρ. 
The punchline of the remark is that increased attention to a signal causes noise to fall but has
potentially ambiguous effects on whether posterior beliefs are expected to be more correlated. This
is intuitive: Investing in a more precise signal means that signals will be closer to the realization
of θ. However, investing in a signal that others are not paying attention to lowers the weight of
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shared information in forming posterior beliefs and means that those posterior beliefs may be less
correlated. Counterbalancing this is the fact that having a more accurate forecast of the fundamental
implies a more accurate forecast of the average realization of others’ noisy signals.
With these preliminaries out of the way, we can proceed to examining the benefit to a marginal
increase in precision.
Direct effect. The direct effect of a marginal increase in attention to a particular signal (an
increase in zkl), setting aside the coordination effects:
∂
∂zkl
(
λ
σ2Θ√
2pi
1√
(σ2Θ + σQ)2
)
= −12
λ√
2pi
σ2θ
∂σ2Q
∂zkl
(σ2Θ + σ2Q)3/2
(3.15)
This is unambiguously positive because investing in precision reduces noise (∂σ
2
Q
∂zkl
< 0). Investing
in precision means you are less likely to make a costly mistake in forecasting the state.
Coordination effect. The coordination effect is more intricate than the direct effect. Suppressing
the (positive) coefficient and taking the derivative inside the integral:
∂
∂zkl
∫ ∞
θ=−∞
∫ ∞
q=−θ
Φ
 β(z, z′)(θ + q)√
(σ2θ + σ2Q′)(1− ρ2)
 fQ(q)fΘ(θ)dqdθ
=
∫ ∞
θ=−∞
∫ ∞
q=−θ
{
φ
 β(z, z′)(θ + q)√
(σ2θ + σ2Q′)(1− ρ2)
 (θ + q)√
(σ2Θ + σ2Q′)
[
β′(z, z′)√
(1− ρ2)
+
β(z, z′)ρ ∂ρ
∂znk
(1− ρ2)3/2
]
+ Φ
 β(z, z′)(θ + q)√
(σ2θ + σ2Q′)(1− ρ2)
 ∂σQ
∂zkl
(
q2
σ2Q
− 1
)}
fQ(q)fΘ(θ)dqdθ
The first integral is:
√
(σ2
θ
+σ2
Q
)√
(σ2
θ
+σ2
Q′ )
[
β′(z,z′)√
(1−ρ2) +
β(z,z′)ρ ∂ρ∂znk
(1−ρ2)3/2
]
2pi
(
1 +
(
β(z,z′)√
(σ2
θ
+σ2
Q′ )(1−ρ2)
)2
(σ2θ + σ2Q)
)
The sign of this effect is ambiguous, because increased attention has an ambiguous effect on both
220
ρ and β(z, z′).
The second is:
∂σ2Q
∂zkl
β(z,z′)√
(σ2
θ
+σ2
Q′ )(1−ρ2)
σ2Q
2pi
(
1 +
(
β(z,z′)√
(σ2
θ
+σ2
Q′ )(1−ρ2)
)2
(σ2θ + σ2Q)
)√
σ2Q + σ2Θ
This is strictly negative.
The first term reflects the fact that investing in attention to a particular signal affects the extent
to which posterior beliefs are likely to be correlated. The second reflects the fact that, holding fΘ(θ)
fixed, shrinking noise means the distribution of possible beliefs is shrinking. To summarize:
Remark 2 (Net coordination effects). The net direction of the coordination effect is ambiguous. 
The following follows immediately:
Lemma 3 (Expected losses from investing in information). Increasing signal precision may have
negative marginal effects on expected utility. Direct comparison of the direct and coordination effects
shows that the sign of the benefits side of investing in coordination is
Sign
{
∂σ2Q
∂zkl
β∗(L− 1)ρ√1− ρ2σ2Q
2piL
(
σ2θ + σ2Q
) − λσ2θ
2
√
2pi
(
σ2θ + σ2Q
)3/2

+
β∗(L− 1)
(
ρ2 ∂ρ∂zkl
√
σ2θ + σ2Q′ +
∂β
∂zkl
(
1− ρ2)√σ2θ + σ2Q)
2piL
√
(1− ρ2)
(
σ2θ + σ2Q′
) }
(3.16)

The term in square brackets in (3.16) can be negative when the benefit to coordinating is suffi-
ciently large relative to the direct benefit. Per the last part of remark 1, the second line of (3.16)
has ambiguous sign. Intuitively, large β∗ relative to λ∗ can result in the marginal direct benefit
to investing in more accurate signals being smaller than the losses in expected coordination utility.
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Table 3.1: Baseline calibration
.
Parameter Interpretation Value
L Number of players 12
λ Coefficient on fundamental in utility 1
β∗ Coefficient on sum of others’ actions in utility 0.1
σ2θ Variance of fundamental 2
κ2i , i = 1, . . . , L Common component of noise in public signals 4
ζ21 “Receiver” noise in first public signal 0
ζ2i , i = 2, . . . , L “Receiver” noise in public signals 0.05-0.25
ζ2r Receiver noise in private signal .3
z, z′ Amount of investment in reducing signal noise 0.05/varies
This also depends on the variance of the fundamental and the noise in signals.7
This non-concavity is distinct from the non-concavity noted by Radner and Stiglitz (1984), because
it is unrelated to the marginal cost of acquiring information. Like in their paper, and in Myatt and
Wallace (2012), it may also be that in equilibrium some signals are ignored because they are too
costly to acquire in the first place. But it turns out that we can generate large regions of investment
in signal precision that have negative marginal benefits to investing in attention even setting aside
the cost of investment.
Numerical illustration. To illustrate the properties of increased precision on expected benefits
of investing in more precise signals, I calibrate the model and calculate marginal utilities, letting the
amount of attention paid to one signal vary. Details of the baseline calibration are in table 3.1.8
Figure 3.1 shows the effect of a marginal change in zkl on the non-cost components of utility,
decomposed into the direct effect and coordination effects, varying z2l from 0.001 to 1. The first 12
signals are numbered in order of their quality (i.e., signal 1 has the lowest noise ζ2i has the second
lowest, etc) while signal “13” corresponds to the purely private signal. Under this calibration, the
direct benefit is large, and the net effect from coordination is also generally positive.
7There is some economic intuition behind the result that a small λ leads to negative incentive to invest in information.
In the coordination game, with α∗ selected to ensure θ∗ is zero given β∗, small λ∗ implies that the value above
which one should always choose al = 1 regardless of what others are doing θ¯ is very negative. Depending on the
the variance of the fundamental, it may be that there is essentially no chance of a θ realization that would result
in al = 0 being optimal.
8The parameters chosen are arbitrary in the sense that they are not pegged to a particular real-world variable.
L = 12 corresponds with the number of voting members on the FOMC (although the committee has 19 members
and each report their views.)
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Figure 3.2 illustrates the change in σ2Q, ρ and β(z, z′) as z2l increases. For the baseline calibration,
the correlation of beliefs is quite high, and increasing as investment in the public signal increases.
Figure 3.3 shows the change in precision of signal 2 and the corresponding changes in signal weights.
Finally, figure 3.4 shows how a marginal increase in attention paid to each signal (as z2l changes)
affects the derivatives discussed in remark 1.
By contrast, if σ2Θ = 1, λ = 0.0001, β∗ = 5, marginal utility is negative at low levels of z2l. This is
illustrated in figure 3.5. This is due to the (much smaller) direct effect of investing in signal quality
and larger coordination losses.
Returning to the baseline case with the parameters in table 3.1, I illustrate the effect of increased
investment in purely private information in figure 3.9. As before, increase investment in private
information leads to diminishing (but positive) marginal benefits. However, the marginal returns
to investing in additional private information are constant, so as zrl increases, private signal weight
continues to increase towards 1. Figure 3.10 shows ρ is declining in increased zrl. This illustrates
the ambiguity mentioned at the end of Remark 1.
3.4.3 Cost functions
Even in the case where marginal utilities are well-behaved (in the sense of increasing in z), the
properties of the cost function C(z) will generally affect equilibrium existence and uniqueness. In
the context of a beauty contest game, Myatt and Wallace (2012) shows in the context of a beauty
contest game, nonconvexity of costs (for example, entropy-based costs as in the rational inattention
literature) may yield multiple equilibria, but with convex costs and a convex loss function there
will be a unique equilibrium. Here, the payoff function is not necessarily concave so a convex cost
function is insufficient to guarantee an equilibrium.
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3.4.4 Equilibrium
Now that all of the pieces are in place, I can fully characterize the equilibrium of the two stage game.
Definition 3 (Equilibrium). A pure strategy symmetric Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium is a set
of investment choices zk and a threshold choice θ∗ such that for all players l = 1, 2, . . . , L:
1. For all l ∈ {1, 2, . . . , L}, the choice of element zk of z¯ is zk = max(0, z∗k) where z∗k solves:
− 12
λ√
2pi
σ2θ
∂σ2Q(z¯)
∂z∗
k
(σ2Θ + σ2Q(z¯))3/2
+ β∗
[
β′(z,z′)√
(1−ρ(z¯,z¯)2) +
β(z,z′)ρ(z¯,z¯) ∂ρ(z¯,z¯)∂znk
(1−ρ(z¯,z¯)2)3/2
]
2pi
(
1 +
(
β(z¯,z¯)√
(1−ρ(z¯,z¯)2)
)2)
+β∗
∂σ2Q(z¯)
∂z∗
k
β(z¯,z¯)√
(σ2
θ
+σ2
Q(z¯)′ )(1−ρ(z¯,z¯)2)
σ2Q
2pi
(
1 +
(
β(z¯,z¯)√
(1−ρ(z¯,z¯)2)
)2)√
σ2Q(z¯) + σ2Θ
= C ′k(z¯)
(3.17)
with z∗k > 0 for at least one zk where σ2Q(z¯) is defined as in (3.10), ρ(z¯, z¯) is defined as in (3.13),
β(z¯, z¯) is defined as in (3.14), and C(z¯) is an increasing, continuous differentiable function.
2. Expectations in the coordination game are given by (3.1) with variance (3.2).
3. For all l ∈ {1, 2, . . . , L}, al = 1 when El(θ) > θ∗ and al = 0 when El(θ) ≤ θ∗, where θ∗
satisfies
θ∗ = − 1
λ∗
(
α∗ + β
∗
2
(L− 1)
L
)
(3.18)
The first element of definition 3 says, in the attention allocation stage, signals must satisfy a first-
order condition of a the player’s constrained utility maximization problem, where the constraint
is that at least one cannot have zk = 0. The definition allows for corner solutions, in that some
signals may have zero precision (zk = 0), but does impose the restriction that at least one signal is
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observed so the expectation in the coordination game are well-defined, and I restrict the choices to
be symmetric. Expectations (which are required to follow Bayes’ rule) are the second condition of
the definition. The third element restates the switching equilibrium in symmetric strategies.
In section 3.3, I showed that the coordination game satisfies sufficient conditions for a unique
switching equilibrium, conditional on symmetric solution to the attention allocation game. It is easy
to see how such an equilibrium could fail to arise. For instance, in figure 3.5, marginal utility was
negative over a region of z even gross of the costs of investing in information, despite conditions
for uniqueness in the coordination game being satisfied. Given positive and increasing costs to
investing, an equilibrium may fail to exist because it is too costly to acquire the amount of precision
that generates any investment in information, which leads to a failure of expectations being well-
defined in the coordination stage.
3.5 Numerical analysis
In the previous section, I derived conditions for a symmetric information allocation equilibrium and
shown that there are circumstances where those sufficient conditions can fail to be satisfied. However,
I have not demonstrated whether any symmetric equilibrium exists, and if such equilibria are unique.
In this section, I explore uniqueness and comparative statics in a computational example.
To completely characterize the model, I need to add a cost function. As Myatt and Wallace (2012)
show, in beauty contest games the exact specification of the cost function matters for which signals
receive attention and whether there is a unique equilibrium. Since the calibration is somewhat
arbitrary, I assume costs are quadratic in the total attention allocated. In particular, the baseline
cost function is
C(z) = .375
(∑
zk
)2
(3.19)
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Uniqueness, signal weights and signal weights under the baseline baseline. I solve for
equilibrium by numerically searching for symmetric attention allocations that satisfy the first order
condition in definition (3). I verify uniqueness using a numerical global search method. I find no
other solutions which satisfy the first order condition and satisfy the constraints on z¯.9
The equilibrium precisions for this calibration are shown in the first column of table 3.2. Recall the
first signal has zero idiosyncratic noise, and the other signals are ordered by quality; private signals
have κ2n = 0 but ζ2r > ζ2k for k = 2, . . . , L. Unsurprisingly, more attention is paid to signals have are
“higher quality” and the worst signal receives nearly no weight. The private signal receives the most
weight, although about 70% of committee members’ beliefs are driven by the public signals. This is
despite the fact that the private signal does not have diminishing returns to accuracy. Committee
members endogenously choose to allocate costly attention to strictly worse (public) information
because it helps them coordinate with others. Within the set of public signals, they allocate more
attention to the signals that are more accurate, although all signals receive at least a little attention.
With these baseline results, I conduct some simple comparative static exercises. Weights under
the different scenarios are shown in the remaining columns of table 3.2. Ex-ante welfare, overall
signal accurate, and costs (both in “raw” terms and relative to the baseline) are shown in table 3.3.
A smaller committee. One feature of committee decisions is the number of members. Blinder
(2009) documents that the number of members involved in setting monetary policy varies across
countries. One trade off when picking committee size might be that when there are many members,
many different views are represented, but there may be limits to the extent committee members can
absorb information provided by others. In the context of the current example, I set the number of
committee members L = 3. I choose the “best” three members (those with the lowest idiosyncratic
signal variance). As the second column of table 3.2 shows, there is some small re-allocation of
9In general, whether the algorithm succeeds or fails to find a symmetric attention allocation is sensitive to the starting
value. However, whenever it succeeds, it converges to the same value. While I have found uniqueness in all of the
example calibrations considered, it is possible there are regions of the parameter space where multiple equilibria
can exist. As the discussion in the previous section suggests, it is straightforward to find parameterizations where
no symmetric equilibrium appears to exist.
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Baseline Smaller L Higher costs Smaller κ2 Smaller σ2θ
1 0.147 0.176 0.097 0.138 0.172
2 0.093 0.108 0.064 0.177 0.107
3 0.082 0.095 0.057 0.078 0.095
4 0.073 - 0.051 0.070 0.084
5 0.064 - 0.045 0.061 0.074
6 0.056 - 0.040 0.054 0.064
7 0.048 - 0.035 0.046 0.056
8 0.041 - 0.030 0.040 0.047
9 0.034 - 0.025 0.033 0.039
10 0.028 - 0.020 0.027 0.032
11 0.021 - 0.015 0.020 0.024
12 0.015 - 0.011 0.014 0.017
Private 0.297 0.622 0.510 0.241 0.190
Table 3.2: Weights in numerical examples
attention to the remaining public signals (weights are increased by about 1-3 %).
However, in equilibrium it appears much of the attention previously allocated to the lower-quality
public signals is reallocated to the private signal. Moreover, committee members find it less worth-
while to invest in attention generally; the total spent on investment drops by nearly 18% relative to
the baseline. Forecast quality suffers; overall noise in beliefs is about 20% higher. Welfare losses are
not large, however; welfare only falls by about 3% and when we adjust for the fact that coordination
payoffs are affected by the number of agents ((L− 1)/L shows up in the ex-ante welfare expression),
losses are about 1% relative to the baseline. In short, with fewer committee members it is less
optimal to invest in information for coordination reasons, and the committee members’ forecasts
are worse on average. If social welfare is related to the accuracy of forecasts, then a smaller com-
mittee may be deleterious to the public interest. This rationalizes, to an extent, the oft-mentioned
justification for having a diversity of views represented on monetary policy committees.
Ex-ante welfare Relative Welfare σ2Q Relative σ2Q C(Z) Relative C(z)
Baseline 0.493 1.000 0.589 1.000 0.042 1.000
Smaller L 0.478 0.970 0.704 1.194 0.035 0.826
(Adj. for size) 0.489 0.991 - - - -
Higher costs 0.508 1.031 0.389 0.661 0.048 1.138
Smaller κ2 0.495 1.004 0.553 0.938 0.044 1.052
Smaller σ2θ 0.317 0.642 0.687 1.166 0.026 0.613
Table 3.3: Welfare, accuracy, and total attention expenditure in numeric examples.
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Higher cost schedule. The “cost” of attention is stylized; one could imagine different reasons
why it might be more or less difficult to increase the precision with which committee members
observe a particular signal. To gain some intuition about how the cost function affects attention
allocation, I adjust equation (3.19) by increasing the cost schedule:
C(z) = .5
(∑
zk
)2
+ 0.1
(∑
zk
)
(3.19′)
Under this adjusted cost function, total costs increase at a faster rate, and a marginal increase in
attention now has a constant component. Hence, once the marginal benefit from an increase in
precision drops below 0.1, it will no longer be worth it to invest in that signal. Column 3 of table 3.2
shows the weights in this scenario. Less weight is placed on private signals - whose marginal gains
in precision are diminishing - and the majority of the weight falls on private information. Perhaps
surprisingly, however, welfare is only mildly worse with the higher cost schedule and accuracy is
much improved. The latter comes from much higher investment in z (which is about 80% higher,
not shown) while total costs are less than 14% higher). This counterintuitive result likely comes
from the nonconcavities of the utility function and perhaps reflects partially the Radner and Stiglitz
(1984) logic that the net benefit of investing in information is likely negative at low levels of precision;
if optimizing committee members equal benefits with costs, they may have to invest more when costs
increase.
An increase in the accuracy of a public signal. Although treated as a primitive of the
environment, one could imagine the common component of noise in public signals κ2n is a choice
variable. For example, prior to the information allocation stage of the game, a committee member
could have improved data collection or exerted more effort in producing a forecast. Although the
costs of this effort are abstracted from here, we can ask what effect an improvement in the signal has
on attention allocation and welfare. Accordingly, column 4 of table 3.2 reflects the weights on signals
when κ2 is reduced from 4 to 2. ζ2i is unchanged. In this scenario, more weight is allocated towards
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the second signal, mostly at the expense of private information and the first signal. This result
is intuitive; agents who care both about accuracy and coordinating with others should put more
weight on the best public signals. There are still diminishing returns to investing in the precision
of the public signals, however, so it still does not make sense for committee members to allocate
all of their attention to the public signal. As the sixth line of table 3.3 shows, the improvement in
the fundamental precision of signal 2 does improve the overall accuracy of forecasts, but the overall
improvement in welfare is quite small. This suggests, in a richer model where the costs of providing
signals is explicitly taken into account and where improving signal quality is costly, equilibrium
public signals may be lower quality than would be socially optimal.
Smaller fundamental variance. Finally, I modify the baseline calibration by reducing σ2Θ from
2 to 1. This would reduce welfare in the full-information case because payoffs directly related to θ are
truncated below by zero and the mass of the distribution is also close to zero. Here, a similar logic
applies; inspection of (3.15) reveals the direct benefit of greater attention is increasing in the variance
of θ. Although coordination benefits also depend indirectly on σ2Θ, the weights reported in the final
column of table 3.2 show a re-allocation of signal weights away the private signal towards public
signals is optimal when fundamental variance falls. Given that state-related payoffs are smaller
(since the realizations of θ are smaller), committee members invest much less in information overall,
and σ2Q is larger. In signal-to-noise-ratio terms, it is much worse since the variance of θ has dropped
by half; under the baseline, the signal-to-noise ratio is about 3.4, while in this case it is about 1.5.
Positive implications of the numerical analysis. Although the model is quite stylized, it gen-
erates predictions that could be tested against data on how committees with collective information
behave in practice. In the model, signals are indexed by committee member. The most accurate
signals receive the most attention, and to the extent those signals are associated with particular
members, it suggests that members of the committee who produce the most accurate signals should
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be the most influential (monetary policy should reflect their assessments more often and those mem-
bers should dissent less.) In the context of the monetary policy example, these predictions could be
verified using the individual FOMC projections introduced in Romer (2010) and the FOMC dissent
time series data compiled by Thornton and Wheelock (2014).
A second positive prediction is that when the volatility of the fundamental is lower, coordination
concerns become more salient and committee members tend to focus more on common public indi-
cators as a result. This rationalizes the observation in Thornton and Wheelock (2014) that dissents
were more common in the pre-Great Moderation period when inflation and unemployment volatility
were higher: the decline in economic volatility made the unanimity motive more salient for FOMC
members. Following the Great Recession, dissents became more common as FOMC members per-
ceived greater uncertainty about the fundamental and relied more on their idiosyncratic signals.
This proposition could be more formally tested using US macroeconomic data or macroeconomic
data from other countries (and unlike the previous set of predictions about signal quality, does not
rely on observing the projections of individual committee members).
Normative implications of the numerical analysis. The model ignores many salient features
of the operating environment of monetary policy committees. Nevertheless, the computational
experiments suggest two tentative normative lessons. First, reducing committee size may not impact
the welfare of committee members, but reduces the accuracy of their projections. To the extent social
welfare is more driven by whether the FOMC sets appropriate policy, the smaller committee could
make policy worse. This could be taken to justify the role of regional Federal Reserve Banks in
forming separate assessments of the economy, as well as institutional arrangements that ensure
those views are available to the committee when making decisions. To the extent unanimity or
collegiality concerns lead to less investment in accurate economic projections, mechanisms that more
closely align committee member payoffs with forecast accuracy. For instance, individual projections
of FOMC members are only released in an individually identifiable form ten years after they are
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made. There may be merit in releasing them sooner to induce reputation incentives to elicit high-
quality projections. One might worry about strategic substitutability motives if forecasts were
publicly identifiable. However, this risk already exists to the extent that regional Federal Reserve
presidents are free to voluntarily disclose their forecasts, excepting media blackout periods near
FOMC meetings. And, as Plosser (2015) argues, FOMC members could try to shift their own norms
away from unanimity as its own reward.
3.6 Conclusion
In this paper, I have examined whether a stylized finite player coordination game with a unique equi-
librium and symmetric information is necessary supported by the information choice of committee
members. The answer is no. Conflicting direct and coordination effects in information investment
mean that trying to have more precise forecasts may reduce the payoffs of committee members even
without taking the costs of information investment into account. The nonconcavity of payoffs is rem-
iniscent of, but distinct, from the results of Radner and Stiglitz (1984). However, I show in numerical
examples how unique information equilibria do appear to exist under certain parameterizations, and
in computational exercises explore the implications of changes in the economic environment for fore-
cast accuracy and welfare. Crucially for the applied problem of monetary policy committee design,
changes that have little impact on welfare of committee members may have larger impacts on the
accuracy of the committee’s beliefs.
There are a number of directions for future work. Much stronger assumptions (or different dis-
tributional assumptions) may make it somewhat easier to generate analytic results for the existence
and uniqueness of equilibria (symmetric or otherwise) in the information coordination game. Once
the theoretical conditions for uniqueness are more clearly established, it will be easier to modify
the model to examine applied questions like optimal monetary policy committee design, or other
coordination games that feature finite “informationally large” agents.
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An important extension will also to be to understand the motives behind information production
in this setting. Research in a committee setting is a public good and thus might be subject to
inefficient underinvestment. In this paper, the quality of research associated with each committee
member was exogenous. But the amount of resources devoted by committee members to producing
research (either public or private) is also a choice. Once conditions for equilibrium in the attention
game are understood, it would be interesting to understand how agents decide what information to
bring to the meeting, and what the normative implications of those decisions are.
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3.A Derivations for coordination game
Proof of lemma 1. Given action and state monotonicity, we can characterize θ, θ¯ directly. In par-
ticular, the payoff from others’ actions is maximized when
∑
i6=l ai = L − 1 and minimized when∑
i6=l ai = 0. Hence:
θ = sup θ < −
(
α∗ + β∗ L−1L
λ∗
)
and
θ¯ = inf θ >
(−α∗
λ∗
)
Proof of proposition 1. First, we use the assumptions about how others form expectations to char-
acterize l’s belief about p’s beliefs. Plugging the signal expectations into (3.1) for p implies:
El[Ep(θ)] =
∑L
n=1 ψnp + ψrp∑L
n=1 ψnp + ψrp
El(θ) = El(θ)
and
Varl[Ep(θ)] = (L+ 1)
(∑
n
ψnl + ψrl
)−1
+
L∑
n=1
[ψnp]−1 + [ψrp]−1
Under the proposed threshold rule, l believes p will take the action if her expectation of p’s
expectation exceeds the threshold.10
El[Ep(θ)] > θ∗
This happens when:
0 > θ
∗ − El(θ)√
(L+ 1) (
∑
n ψnl + ψrl)
−1 +
∑L
n=1[ψnp]−1 + [ψrp]−1
10To generalize this to a case where agents potentially have different precisions, this threshold will be specific to p.
See Szkup and Trevino (2015).
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The probability this occurs is
P (ap = 1|xl, rl) = 1− Φ
 θ∗ − El(θ)√
(L+ 1) (
∑
n ψnl + ψrl)
−1 +
∑L
n=1[ψnp]−1 + [ψrp]−1

where Φ is the CDF of the standard normal.
If we restrict ourselves to symmetric equilibria, then we can write the expected actions of other
players as:
P
(∑
n
an = `
)
=
(
L− 1
`
)Φ
 θ∗ − El(θ)√
(L+ 1) (
∑
n ψn + ψr)
−1 +
∑L
n=1[ψ′n]−1 + [ψ′r]−1
L−1−`
1− Φ
 θ∗ − El(θ)√
(L+ 1) (
∑
n ψn + ψr)
−1 +
∑L
n=1[ψ′n]−1 + [ψ′r]−1
`
The threshold θ∗ is such that
α∗ + β
∗
L
L−1∑
`=0
P
(∑
n
an = `
)
`+ λ∗θ∗ = 0
We would like to show that θ∗ is unique. Note that when El(θ) = θ∗
P
(∑
n
an = `
)
=
(
L− 1
`
)Φ
 θ∗ − θ∗√
(L+ 1) (
∑
n ψn + ψr)
−1 +
∑L
n=1[ψ′n]−1 + [ψ′r]−1
L−1−`
1− Φ
 θ∗ − θ∗√
(L+ 1) (
∑
n ψn + ψr)
−1 +
∑L
n=1[ψ′n]−1 + [ψ′r]−1
`
We can simplify the binomial term:
El(pi(·, ·)) = α∗ + β
∗
L
(L− 1)12 + λ
∗θ∗ = 0
Hence, the threshold is
θ∗ = − 1
λ∗
(
α∗ + β
∗
2
(L− 1)
L
)
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To prove uniqueness of the threshold, we need only show the slope of the utility parameterization
is greater than zero at θ∗ (otherwise, there are at least three equilibria). This always holds given
our assumption that λ∗ > 0.11
We have shown that θ∗ is the cutoff signal for l given her beliefs about the state and about others’
beliefs. We can also show that θ∗ is the only one that survives the iterated deletion of dominated
strategies. Note that the expected payoff for al = 1 when El(θ) = θ∗ conditional on all others using
a switching strategy at some θ̂ is
α∗ + β
∗
L
(L− 1)
(
1− Φ
(
θ̂ − θ∗
Varl(Ep(θ))
))
+ λ∗θ∗
This is strictly increasing in θ∗, strictly decreasing in θ̂, continuous, and by Lemma 1 satisfies
a “limit dominance” property. Hence, from the exact argument in Appendix A of Morris and
Shin (2004), the switching strategy around θ∗ is the only one that survives the iterated deletion of
dominated strategies.
3.B Derivations for the information choice game
To simplify the expression for ex-ante utility, it is helpful to use the following result, which (trivially)
extends Ellison (1964):
11In the case with a model-consistent prior, the above changes somewhat. The probability of another player’s signal
exceeding the threshold is
1− Φ

θ∗ −
∑
n
ψ′n+ψ
′
r
1
σ2
θ
+
∑
n
ψ′n+ψ′r
θ∗
Varl(Ep(θ))

θ∗ implicitly solved an appropriately modified version of (3.A). Uniqueness requires
λ∗L
β∗(L− 1)

1−
∑
n
ψ′n+ψ
′
r
1
σ2
θ
+
∑
n
ψ′n+ψ′r
Varl(Ep(θ))

−1
>
1√
2pi
.
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Lemma 4 (extension of Ellison (1964), Theorem 2, corollary 1).
∫ ∞
−∞
Φ(aθ − b
c
)fΘ(θ)dθ = Φ
 −b
a
√
c2
a2 + σ2Θ

Proof. ∫ ∞
−∞
Φ
(
aθ − b
c
)
fΘ(θ)dθ =Eθ
[
Φ
(
aθ − b
c
)]
= Eθ
[
Φ
(
θ − b/a
c/a
)]
Say X ∼ N(b/a, (c/a)2) with PDF fX(x). With some abuse of notation,
Eθ
[
Φ
(
θ − b/a
c/a
)]
=
∫ ∞
−∞
[∫ θ−b/a
c/a
−∞
fX(x)dx
]
fΘ(θ)dθ
=Eθ
[
PX
(
X − b/a
c/a
≤ θ − b/a
c/a
∣∣∣∣θ)]
=PX,Θ
(
X − b/a
c/a
≤ Θ− b/a
c/a
)
= P (X −Θ ≤ 0).
Note that X −Θ ∼ N(b/a, (c/a)2 + σ2θ) and the conclusion follows.
Proof of lemma 2. Recall the expression for ex-ante utility
E(Ul) = E(Ul|El(θ) > 0)× P (El(θ) > 0) + E(Ul|El(θ) ≤ 0)× P (El(θ) ≤ 0)
= E(Ul|al = 1, θ +Q)P (θ +Q > 0) + E(Ul|al = 0, θ +Q)P (θ +Q ≤ 0)
Breaking up the first term:
E(U |El(θ) > 0)
=αL− 1
L
+ γ
(
1− k
L
)
+ λE(θ|El(θ) > 0) + ν
+ (γ − α)
L
E
∑
`6=l
a`|El(θ) > 0

Given the symmetric distribution conjecture,
∑
`6=l
a` = (L− 1)P (a` = 1)
The conditional distribution of p’s beliefs based on l’s beliefs will be:
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θ +Q′|θ +Q ∼ N
ρ
√
σ2θ + σ2Q′√
σ2θ + σ2Q
(θ +Q), (σ2θ + σ2Q′)(1− ρ2)

where
ρ = Cov(θ +Q, θ +Q
′)√
σ2θ + σ2Q′
√
σ2θ + σ2Q
= σ
2
θ +
∑
n wnw
′
nκ
2
n√
σ2θ + σ2Q′
√
σ2θ + σ2Q
Call
β(z, z′) = σ
2
θ +
∑
n wnw
′
nκ
2
n
σ2θ + σ2Q
Then rewriting the conditional distribution:
θ +Q′|θ +Q ∼ N (β(z, z′)(θ +Q), (σ2θ + σ2Q′)(1− ρ2))
Hence, the probability that another players’ beliefs exceed the threshold conditional on any par-
ticular realization of l’s posterior beliefs is
1− Φ
 0− β(z, z′)(θ +Q)√
(σ2θ + σ2Q′)(1− ρ2)
 = Φ
 β(z, z′)(θ +Q)√
(σ2θ + σ2Q′)(1− ρ2)

Call the PDF of θ fΘ(θ) and the PDF of Q fQ(q). Then we can write expected utility conditional
on l receiving a positive signal as:
∫
{θ,q:θ+q>0}
(
α
L− 1
L
+ γ
(
1− k
L
)
+ ν + λ(θ + q)
+ (γ − α)(L− 1)
L
Φ
 β(z, z′)(θ + q)√
(σ2θ + σ2Q′)(1− ρ2)
)fQ(q)fΘ(θ)dqdθ
This can be re-written
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∫ ∞
θ=−∞
∫ ∞
q=−θ
(
α
L− 1
L
+ γ
(
1− k
L
)
+ ν
)
fQ(q)fΘ(θ)dqdθ (3.20a)
+
∫ ∞
θ=−∞
∫ ∞
q=−θ
λθfQ(q)fΘ(θ)dqdθ (3.20b)
+(γ − α)(L− 1)
L
∫ ∞
θ=−∞
∫ ∞
q=−θ
Φ
 β(z, z′)(θ + q)√
(σ2θ + σ2Q′)(1− ρ2)
 fQ(q)fΘ(θ)dqdθ (3.20c)
Simplifying (3.20) line by line:
(3.20a) is
∫ ∞
θ=−∞
∫ ∞
q=−θ
(
α
L− 1
L
+ γ
(
1− k
L
)
+ ν
)
fQ(q)fΘ(θ)dqdθ
=
∫ ∞
θ=−∞
(
α
L− 1
L
+ γ
(
1− k
L
)
+ ν
)(
1− Φ
(
θ
σQ
))
fθ(θ)dθ
=
(
α
L− 1
L
+ γ
(
1− k
L
)
+ ν
)(
1−
∫ ∞
θ=−∞
Φ
(
θ
σQ
)
fΘ(θ)dθ
)
=12
(
α
L− 1
L
+ γ
(
1− k
L
)
+ ν
)
where we’ve used lemma 4 at the last line.
For (3.20b):
∫ ∞
θ=−∞
∫ ∞
q=−θ
λθfQ(q)fΘ(θ)dqdθ
=λ
∫ ∞
θ=−∞
θΦ
(
θ
σQ
)
fΘ(θ)dθ
=λ σ
2
Θ√
2pi
1√
(σ2Θ + σQ)2
Unfortunately, there’s not a convenient closed form solution for (3.20c).12.
Expected utility conditional on El(θ) ≤ 0 is somewhat simpler given the normalizations µ = 0,
and can be written:
12Conditional on a value for θ, the CDF is the right half of the standard normal CDF multiplied by fQ(q). Hence, it’s
bounded somewhere on the interval (1/2, 1), but essentially there’s not a nice analytic version of this. See Owen
(1980)
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1
2
(
δk
L
+ τ
)
−
(
β + δ
L
(L− 1)
)∫ ∞
θ=−∞
∫ −θ
q=−∞
Φ
 β(z, z′)(θ + q)√
(σ2θ + σ2Q′)(1− ρ2)
 fQ(q)fΘ(θ)dqdθ
Combining all of these we arrive at an expression for expected utility in the text
E(Ul) =
1
2
(
α
L− 1
L
+ γ
(
1− k
L
)
+ ν + δk
L
+ τ
)
(3.21)
+ λ√
2pi
σ2Θ√
σ2Θ + σ2Q
(3.22)
+ L− 1
L
(β − α+ γ + δ)
∫ ∞
θ=−∞
∫ ∞
q=−θ
Φ
 β(z, z′)(θ + q)√
(σ2θ + σ2Q′)(1− ρ2)
 fQ(q)fΘ(θ)dqdθ
(3.23)
− C(z) (3.24)
Derivation of expressions in remark 1. Increasing attention to a particular signal k (an increase in
znk):
1. Unambiguously increases precision:
0 < ∂ψkl
∂zkl
=
{
ζ2k
(zklκ2k+ζ
2
k
)2 k ∈ 1, 2, . . . . , L
1
ζ2r
k = r
Note that we can rewrite this as:
∂ψkl
∂zkl
= ζ
2
k
z2kl
ψ2kl > 0
2. Has weakly diminishing returns on precision:
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∂2ψkl
∂z2kl
=
{
− ζ2kκ2k(zklκ2k+ζ2k)3 k ∈ 1, 2, . . . . , L
0 k = r
3. Increases the weight on the signal paid attention to and decreases the weight on other signals
that receive positive attention:
∂wkl
∂zkl
=
∂ψkl
∂zkl
(
∑L
n=1 ψnl + ψrl − ψkl)
(
∑L
n=1 ψnl + ψrl)2
=
∂ψkl
∂zkl∑L
n=1 ψnl + ψrl
(1− wkl) = (1− wk) ζ
2
k
z2kl
ψklwk 5
∂wk′l
∂zkl
=− wk′l
∂ψkl
∂zkl∑L
n=1 ψnl + ψrl
4. Causes the overall variance of noise to fall:
Proof. For zkl > 0:
∂σ2Q
∂zkl
=
L∑
n6=k
(−2)
∂ψkl
∂zkl∑
n ψnl + ψrl
(
κ2n +
ζ2n
znl
)
− 2w2rl
(
ζ2rl
zrl
)
+ 2wkl(1− wkl)
∂ψkl
∂zkl∑
n ψnl + ψrl
(
κ2k +
ζ2k
znl
)
− w2kl
ζ2kl
z2kl
= −2∑L
n=1 ψnl + ψrl
∂ψkl
∂zkl
σ2Q +
2wk∑L
n=1 ψnl + ψrl
∂ψkl
∂zkl
ψ−1k − w2kl
ζ2kl
z2kl
=
−2σ2Q∑L
n=1 ψnl + ψrl
∂ψkl
∂zkl
+ 2w2k
ζ2kl
z2kl
− w2kl
ζ2kl
z2kl
=
−2σ2Q∑L
n=1 ψnl + ψrl
∂ψkl
∂zkl
+ w2k
ζ2kl
z2kl
< 0
The inequality follows from substituting for ∂ψkl∂zkl and using the fact that the weights all sum
to 1.
5. For a particular q, ∂fQ(q)∂zkl = fQ(q)
(
q2
σ2
Q
− 1
)
∂σ2Q
∂zkl
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6. Has ambiguous effect on β(z, z′)
Proof. Note that β(z, z′) is bounded between 0 and 1.
∂β(z, z′)
∂zkl
=
∑
n
∂wnl
∂zkl
w′kκ
2
k(σ2θ + σ2Q)− (σ2θ + (
∑L
n=1 wnw
′
nκ
2
n))
∂σ2Q
∂zkl
(σ2θ + σ2Q)2
=
∂ψkl
∂zkl∑
n ψnl + ψrl
[
−∑n wnw′nκ2n + w′kκ2k
σ2θ + σ2Q
]
− ∂σ
2
Q
∂zkl
β(z, z′)
σ2θ + σ2Q
=
∂ψkl
∂zkl∑
n ψnl + ψrl
[
σ2Θ
σ2θ + σ2Q
− β(z, z′)
]
+
∂ψkl
∂zkl∑
n ψnl + ψrl
w′kκ
2
k
σ2θ + σ2Q
+ 2β(z, z
′)σ2
σ2θ + σ2Q
∂ψkl
∂zkl∑
n ψnl + ψrl
− w2k
ζ2kl
z2kl
1
σ2θ + σ2Q
=
∂ψkl
∂zkl∑
n ψnl + ψrl
[
σ2θ(1− β(z, z′)) + βσ2Q)
σ2θ + σ2Q
]
+ ζ
2
kl
z2kl
wkw
′
kκ
2
k
σ2Q + σ2θ
− ζ
2
kl
z2kl
w2k
σ2Q + σ2θ
= ζ
2
kl
z2kl
ψklwk
σ2Q + σ2θ
{
σ2θ(1− β(z, z′)) + σ2Q(β(z, z′)) + (w′k − wk)κ2k − wk
ζ2k
zkl
}
Clearly this can be zero if wk = 0. The terms involving β(·) are positive, the second falls in
the interval from ranges from [−κ2k, κk] and the third is unambiguously negative if wk > 0.
The sign depends on magnitudes of the variance of the noise in signal k, its relative precision,
and β, and the variance of the fundamental.
The intuition is that paying to recieve a more accurate signal means their beliefs will be more
like yours to the extent that you have a more precise idea what their beliefs are centered
around (i.e., the forecast of θ becomes more precise). (In other words, the denominator of
β(z, z′) unambiguously decreases). But it may cause you to pay closer attention to (and thus
be exposed to idiosyncratic noise from) signals that others are not paying attention to. Hence
the net effect is ambiguous.
7. Has an ambiguous effect on ρ:
Proof. Note ρ can be written as β
√
σ2
θ
+σ2
Q√
σ2
θ
+σ2
Q′
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∂ρ
∂zkl
= 1√
σ2θ + σ2Q′
∂β(z, z′)
∂zkl
√
σ2θ + σ2Q +
1
2β(z, z′)
∂σ2Q
∂zkl√
σ2Q + σ2Θ

The first term in square brackets has an ambiguous sign, while the second is unambiguously
non-positive.
3.C Figures
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Figure 3.1: Effect of increasing z2l on marginal utilities associated with increases in zkl, decom-
posed.
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Figure 3.2: Effect of increasing z2l on noise variance, ρ and β(z, z′).
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Figure 3.3: Effect of increasing z2l on precisions and signal weights.
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Figure 3.4: Marginal effects of changes in zl for different values of z2l.
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Figure 3.5: Effect of increasing z2l on marginal utilities associated with increases in zkl with σ2Θ = 1
λ = 0.0001, β∗ = 5.
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Figure 3.6: Effect of increasing z2l on noise variance, ρ and β(z, z′), with σ2Θ = 1 λ = 0.0001,
β∗ = 5.
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Figure 3.7: Effect of increasing z2l on precisions and signal weights, with σ2Θ = 1 λ = 0.0001,
β∗ = 5.
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Figure 3.8: Marginal effects of changes in zl for different values of z2l, with σ2Θ = 1 λ = 0.0001,
β∗ = 5.
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Figure 3.9: Effect of increasing zr on marginal utilities associated with increases in zkl, decomposed.
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Figure 3.10: Effect of increasing zr on noise variance, ρ and β(z, z′).
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Figure 3.11: Effect of increasing zr on precisions and signal weights.
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Figure 3.12: Marginal effects of changes in z for different values of zrl.
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